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Abstract 
 
 
 
We are living increasingly longer in a society that is struggling to define how to treat 
the very old, particularly those in care homes. The concept of dignity can guide how 
an older individual in care ought to be treated. In this dissertation I argue for an 
understanding of dignity that is built around the views of the persons cared for, and 
for the introduction of laws and policies aimed at creating conditions amenable to its 
realisation. Dignity must be viewed as rooted in our concrete autonomy, one that sees 
us embodied and embedded in the connections we make with others throughout our 
lives. Dignity, understood according to the views of the individual cared for, is 
aligned with this relational view of autonomy, one that prompts us to understand the 
individual through dialogical engagement. In order to realise the kind of dignity that 
matters to elderly individuals in care, it is essential to address a number of negative 
factors, including through law and policies. Addressing these factors means taking 
concrete steps towards converting potential dignity into actual dignity. One of these 
‘conversion factors’ of dignity is vulnerability. In order for this personal conversion 
factor to be conducive to dignity, vulnerability ought to be conceptualised as inherent, 
universal and relational. Another conversion factor, this time environmental, is the 
regulatory system that controls care homes: for dignity to flourish, those affected by 
this system must be involved in its elaboration and monitoring. On a social level 
exists the conversion factor of ageism. Generational rapprochement is one way in 
which to help reduce it. This dissertation examines whether and how legal means 
responsive to these conversion factors help or hinder the creation of conditions 
amenable to dignity in long term aged care. 
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Introduction 
 
       
The appeal to dignity, more strongly, the insistent claim to dignity, points to 
something in us which is genuinely transcendent, something which reflects our 
freedom to call into question all social roles, to say out loud that I am something 
more than my frailty or my performances or my buying power. At that moment 
the passive victim rises up to say “You can’t treat me this way”. The moment we 
speak these words, dialogue becomes possible and advocacy becomes 
inevitable.1 
 
When it comes to growing old, we are relatively lucky. We live in a part of the world 
where our life expectancy is higher than ever before. According to the Office for 
National Statistics the life expectancy at birth in the UK was calculated to be 83 based 
on data for 2014.2 Unimaginably even a few years ago, female life expectancy in 
England has been projected to be 100 by 2064.3 We are lucky because we live in a 
country that makes welfare provisions for when we stop working and our bodies get 
old. When we retire we can expect a state pension,4 free healthcare delivered by the 
National Health Service,5 and social care organised by local authorities to help us 
through old age when we can no longer look after ourselves.6  
 
Legislation governing the provision of social care for older adults has recently been 
overhauled with the enactment of the Care Act 2014. This statute is the result of a 
comprehensive review of the law concerning adult social care by the Law 
Commission, a first of its kind since the days of the National Assistance Act 1948.7 
The Law Commission’s report was motivated by a need to streamline the ‘disparate 
                                                
1 Moody H.R., ‘Why Dignity in Old Age Matters’ (1998) 29 Issue 2-3 Journal of Gerontology 13, 37 
2 Office for National Statistics, ‘Past and projected data from the period and cohort life tables: 2014-
based, UK, 1981 to 2064’ (11th December 2015) 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/lifeexpectancies/b
ulletins/pastandprojecteddatafromtheperiodandcohortlifetables/2014baseduk1981to2064> Accessed 
25th August 2017 
3 Ibid 
4 Old-Age Pensions Act 1908 
5 National Health Service Act 1946 
6 National Assistance Act 1948 
7 Law Commission, ‘Adult Social Care’ Law Com 326 (The Stationary Office, 2011) 
< https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-
11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2015/03/lc326_adult_social_care.pdf> Accessed 14th January 2018 
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range of legislative provisions’ adult social care law consisted of, held ‘piecemeal and 
tortuous’ by the courts, and which still included provisions that were ‘outdated and 
difficult to justify in modern times’.8 Still rooted in part in the old Poor Law, section 
47 of the 1948 Act allowed the removal of people who lived in ‘insanitary conditions’ 
to ‘suitable premises of persons in need of care and attention’, whilst defining under 
section 29 the aim of the Act as ‘the welfare arrangements for blind, deaf, dumb and 
crippled persons’. 9  The report noted that these legislative provisions were 
incompatible with the Human Rights Act 1998 and ought to be changed.10 
 
Following a period of consultation, the Law Commission recommended, inter alia, 
the setting of statutory principles, ‘to give legislative expression to the underlying 
purpose of the statute’.11 Dignity in care was one of the general concepts put forward 
by the Law Commission in its consultation paper as a potential basis for such 
statutory principles.12 The response on this topic divided the opinions: 
[a] large majority of consultees who expressed a view argued there should be a 
principle in the statute based on dignity in care. Some consultees went further and 
argued this should be the primary principle of the statute. However, others were 
concerned by the imprecise nature of dignity and argued there might be 
unnecessary overlap with the choice and control principle.13  
The Law Commission concluded that a concept such as dignity was ‘too imprecise to 
be expressed as statutory principles’, and that whereas the courts were well versed in 
constructing a legal structure ‘conducive to dignity’, it was ‘difficult to build a legal 
structure on the imprecise notion of dignity’. 14  Instead, the Law Commission 
recommended the setting out of ‘a single overarching principle that adult social care 
must promote or contribute to the well-being of the individual’.15  
 
                                                
8 Ibid [1.2] 
9 Ibid [1.1] 
10 Ibid [1.2] 
11 Ibid [4.1] 
12 Ibid [4.3] 
13 Ibid [4.11] 
14 Ibid [4.35] 
15 Ibid [4.37] 
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The promotion of personal dignity is therefore found under the Care Act 2014 as part 
of a wider public duty by local authorities to promote individuals’ wellbeing in the 
delivery of care services.16 Personal dignity is listed in the Act as one of the 
definitional elements of wellbeing, a definition that also includes physical and mental 
health, the protection from abuse or social and economic wellbeing.17 The promotion 
of wellbeing hinges on the presumption that ‘the individual is best placed to judge’ 
his or her own wellbeing, and therefore services ought to be led by the wishes and 
preferences of the person cared for.18 It could be argued that if the definition of 
wellbeing ought to be understood from the perspective of the adult who receives care, 
then that of dignity could be understood under the same premise. 
 
Without deploying a meaning of dignity within those legislative provisions on adult 
social care, how can elderly individuals’ dignity in care be effectively protected? How 
should it be defined and by whom? From these basic questions came my conviction 
that in order to protect dignity, it was essential to understand it from the perspective 
of those whose care was in the hands of others. The two main aims of this dissertation 
are therefore to establish the meaning of dignity as an experienced concept, and then 
to set out whether and how it can be upheld in care homes, through laws or other 
means. Before I do so, I believe it is useful to delve into the origins of the meaning of 
dignity. 
 
 
1) Dignity: origins and evolution 
 
The meaning of dignity has evolved over time and has been used in a variety of 
contexts. During Roman times dignity appears to have had two meanings.19 One was 
that of ‘dignitas hominis’ or ‘status’, accompanied by the ‘honour and respect’ one 
would inspire from holding a particular position in society.20 The other meaning of 
dignity can be found in the writings of Cicero, and where this time ‘dignitas’ was 
                                                
16 Care Act 2014 s.1(a) 
17 Care Act 2014 s.1(2) 
18 Care Act 2014 s.3 
19  McCrudden C., ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19(4) 
European Journal of International Law 655 
20 Ibid 656-657 
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meant as the dignity of all humans, irrelevant of their status.21 In the period of the 
Middle Ages a link was made between God, humankind and dignity. Only humans 
had dignity, as only they were made in the image of God, endowing them of a special 
divine gift no other sentient beings possessed.22 It was not long before the humanists 
of the Renaissance period, amongst whom Pico della Mirandolla was a figurehead,23 
identified this gift as that of reason, the ability to decide one’s path.24 Kant then 
famously dissected the concept of dignity during the Enlightenment period.25 Far 
from the theological interpretation of dignity that valued humankind for being the 
image of God on earth, and bucking the utilitarian ideals that negate the intrinsic 
value of the individual, Kant remains associated with the idea that humans should be 
treated as ends in themselves and not means.26 
 
Besides philosophy, the concept of dignity has also been used in the context of law. 
The French Revolution led to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 
where under Article 6, ‘dignities’, as understood as those positions so far reserved for 
the aristocracy, were now declared to belong to all.27 As Dupré notes, ‘while the 
Declaration did not refer to dignity in the modern sense of this term, the spirit of 
dignity as equality arguably underpins the whole text’.28 Dignity is also central to the 
constitution of Germany under the first Article of the Basic Law for the Federal 
Republic of Germany, stating that ‘human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and 
protect it shall be the duty of the state authority’.29 It is also prominent in the 
constitutional text of South Africa where the Bill of Rights ‘enshrines the rights of all 
people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality 
and freedom’.30 The legal codification of dignity understood as the ‘dignity of man’ 
can be traced back to 1948, where it took centre stage in the Universal Declaration of 
                                                
21 Ibid 657 
22 Ibid 658 
23 Pico della Mirandolla, On the Dignity of Man (Trans. C. Glenn Wallis, Hackett Publishing Company, 
1965) 
24 Ibid 259 
25 Ibid  
26 Kant I., Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (trans. Mary J. Gregor) Practical Philosophy 
(Cambridge University Press, 1996) 429 
27 Dupré C., The Age of Dignity: Human Rights and Constitutionalism in Europe (Hart Publishing, 
2015), 39-40 
28 Ibid 40 
29 < https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/> Accessed 22nd August 2017 
30 <http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/constitution/english-web/ch2.html> Accessed 22nd 
August 2017 
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Human Rights (UDHR), following on from the atrocities committed against mankind 
in the Second World War. The recognition of the ‘inherent dignity … of all members 
of the human family’ was held in the Preamble as the ‘foundation of freedom justice 
and peace in the world’.31  
 
The UDHR recognises ‘the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family’, declaring that ‘the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter 
reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to 
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom’. 32  The 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) specifically declares 
that rights ‘derive from the inherent dignity of the human person’.33 Human rights 
embrace the idea that certain duties are owed to human beings in order for their 
dignity to flourish. They suggest that ‘all people have some core entitlements just by 
virtue of their humanity, and that it is a basic duty of society to respect and support 
these entitlements’.34  
 
The meaning of dignity could therefore be garnered from human right texts. By 
understanding what dignity requires, one could extrapolate as to the meaning of 
conditions necessary for dignity. For instance, the European Convention on Human 
Rights depicts dignity as requiring life (Article 2, Right to life), respect for body and 
mental integrity (Article 3, Prohibition of torture), freedom (Article 4, Prohibition of 
slavery and forced labour; Article 5, Right to liberty and security), justice (Article 6, 
Right to a fair trial; Article 7, No punishment without law). Moody may call this a 
‘minimalist approach to dignity’, a conceptualization of dignity seen as an appeal to 
an ‘ethical floor’.35 But is such an understanding of dignity really enough for those 
who depend on the care of others for their wellbeing?  
 
The multiplication of international human rights instruments for the disabled (the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability), children (Convention for the 
                                                
31 Universal Declaration of human Rights, Preamble 
32 Ibid 
33 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Preamble 
34 Nussbaum M. C., Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Harvard University 
Press, 2013) 62 
35 Moody (n1) 15 
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Rights of the Child) and women (Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women) may be taken to suggest that basic human rights as 
enshrined in the ICCPR or the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), are 
insufficient for individuals who are considered to be in an inferior position to the 
‘norm’. This evolution can also be interpreted as a reflection of our increasingly 
sophisticated understanding of the human condition. Dupré sees dignity as a 
‘heuristic’ concept,36 one ‘whose meaning-content can be increasingly grasped with 
successive acts of knowing, but where further significant discovery always remains 
possible.’37 This substantive ‘malleability’ does not mean that human dignity is an 
empty shell.38 On the contrary, it is its ability to be fashioned by current human 
concerns that makes it a relevant and indispensable value that can inform law 
responsible to uphold it. This is due to the fact that dignity is primarily a moral 
concept. Moral concepts, as Waltzer suggests, ’have minimal and maximum 
meanings’, or may be given ‘thick and thin accounts’.39 The thick meaning of dignity 
has been described as a ‘whole moral view’.40 Spiegerlberg implies that, unless they 
are thick, conceptions of dignity may not be very helpful: ‘the search for grounds of 
human dignity presupposes a full pledged philosophical anthropology, showing man’s 
essential nature, its ingredients, its structure and its place in the cosmos, but also his 
values, rights and responsibilities’.41  It stands to reason that the search for an 
understanding of dignity that can recommend normative implications for the elderly 
requires us to commit to a thicker, rather than thinner, conception of dignity. But 
proceeding along the lines suggested by Spiegerlberg is only one way of thickening 
the concept of dignity. An alternative route, which I favour in this dissertation, and 
which I will defend at greater length later, proceeds from the perspective of the 
dignity-bearing individual. 
 
 
 
                                                
36 Dupré (n27)16 
37 Hughes G, ‘The Concept of Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (2011) 29 
Journal of Religious Ethics 1, 8 
38 Dupré (n27) 17 
39 Waltzer M., Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame Press, 1994), 2 
40 Schultziner D., ‘Human Dignity: Functions and Meanings’ (2003) 3(3) Global Jurist Topic 1, 4 
41 Spiegelberg H., Human Dignity: A Challenge to Contemporary Philosophy’ in R. Gotesky and E. 
Laszlo (Eds) Human Dignity: This Century and the Next (Gordon and Breach, 1970), 61 
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2) Dignity: a disputed concept 
 
Dignity is also a concept whose value has long been disputed.42 A review of the 
literature on the subject highlights the many reasons why dignity has been rejected as 
a worthwhile idea. Rosen brings six main charges against dignity.43 The first one is 
that ‘dignity is a humbug’, meaning that although dignity attracts ideas of ‘grandeur 
and elevated status’, it is in fact only ‘an empty space’.44 Humbug is defined in the 
Oxford dictionary as ‘deceptive or false talk or behaviour’.45 Claims to dignity can 
hide the harsh reality of poor human treatment, making dignity similar to ‘a deceptive 
façade’.46 His second claim against dignity is that conferring dignity to all human 
beings is only a social convention, and that its universality weakens its value.47 
Thirdly, Rosen argues that even if we conceded that dignity was this ‘inner 
transcendental kernel’ that Kant refers to as humanity’s capacity for morality, it fails 
to give any indication as to how one ought to be treated.48 Indeed, if this kernel is a 
given that cannot be taken away, then its immutable presence does not depend on any 
particular conduct from others; it exists regardless. To all these three criticisms I 
would reply that although we may indeed all possess this kernel, it lays dormant 
unless conditions for its flourishing exist. As Nussbaum writes, dignity remains but a 
‘promissory note’.49 
 
His fourth charge against dignity is that under its religious understanding, similar to 
that of Kant’s intrinsic value, dignity can undermine equality.50 The ‘eternal truths of 
natural law’ that inform the religious conception of dignity, demand the ‘need for a 
properly ordered and respectful hierarchy in society’, therefore going against the idea 
of equality of rights to all.51 Fifthly, Rosen objects to claims to dignity on the ground 
                                                
42 McCrudden C. (Ed.) Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford University Press, 2013) 
43 Rosen M., ‘Dignity: The Case Against’ in C. McCrudden, Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 143-153 
44 Ibid 143 
45 < https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/humbug> Accessed 2nd January 2018 
46 Rosen (n43) 
47 Ibid 145 
48 Ibid 146 
49 Nussbaum (n34) 30 
50 Rosen (n43) 148 
51 Ibid 
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that although it has been held by the court to ground respect for autonomy,52 it has 
also been used to attack autonomy.53 A value that can mean something and its 
contrary can be argued to be nonsensical indeed. Lastly, Rosen argues that courts use 
dignity to undermine legitimate and democratically made laws.54 According to him, 
calls to respect for dignity have not only allowed the courts to override the will of the 
legislature, but have also been ignored in cases where dignity had been plainly 
abused.55 Dignity, by remaining unclear, can be the vessel of many a meaning, and be 
used to impose the will of those in power. 
 
The common thread to this latter set of objections in Rosen’s argument against dignity 
is that dignity is devoid of substantial meaning and so can be manipulated to serve the 
ends of those who refer to it. Dignity used to impose the will of the powerful over that 
of the individual through its application as an objective but opaque idea is indeed a 
dangerous prospect. Only a ‘well defined core meaning’ of dignity would help guide 
ethical behaviour and decision making, averting the risk of dignity being filled with 
whatever meaning suits the priorities of those using it to justify their actions.56  
 
Gearty also argues ‘against justiciable dignity’.57 Indeed, he is of the opinion that ‘the 
relatively subsidiary role played by dignity even in cases in which the dignity of each 
of the claimants is so obviously engaged, is the right approach for the judges to have 
taken’.58 His point of view is sustained by two arguments. Firstly, he believes that, 
unlike human rights, ‘dignity cannot afford to be qualified’, explaining why ‘judges 
steer clear of the term’.59 He gives the example of a case in Germany where the 
constitutional court had to rule over the compatibility of abortion with the 
                                                
52 Planned Parenthood v Casey 505 US 833 (1992) at [851], ‘These matters, involving the most 
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’ 
53 Manuel Wackenheim v France, Communication No 854/1999, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/854/1999 
(2002). Although Manuel Wackenheim wished to challenge the ban on ‘dwarf tossing’ events in 
France, claiming that it was ‘an affront to his dignity’, the Council of State sustained the ban arguing 
that these events were ‘an affront to dignity’, illustrating the dual interpretation of dignity of 
empowerment and protection. 
54 Rosen (n43) 152 
55 Ibid153 
56 Ibid 
57 Gearty C., ‘Socio-Economic Rights, Basic Needs and Human Dignity: A Perspective from Law’s 
front line’ in C. McCrudden (Ed.), Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford University Press, 2013) 
58 Ibid 154 
59 Ibid 163 
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constitutional requirement to respect dignity.60 Here, the court decided that it could 
not balance the protection of the life of the foetus with that of the woman’s right to 
self-determination in such cases and so used the protection of human dignity as a lens 
through which to consider both interests; this unavoidably led them to conclude that 
the right to life of the foetus overrode that of the woman’s right to decide for herself.61  
 
The second reason Geary argues against the justiciability of dignity is that its multiple 
meanings cannot be reconciled.62 Gearty also objects to dignity as a justifiable legal 
category. His concerns are primarily with dignity turning into a counter-majoritarian 
tool in the hands of judges, who may use it to unsettle the will of the people and 
Parliament. He believes it is primarily the job of lawmakers to attend to dignity-
related concerns and that they should do so through specific, targeted legislative 
provisions that do not hand over to judges the task of filling dignity with meaning. It 
is not my intention to enter into a debate about whether judges or legislators are better 
at understanding the requirements of dignity. I agree that ‘what dignity is thought to 
require’ necessitates, as Gearty points out, political debate. 63  But the logic of this 
argument also calls for giving, in those debates, a central place to the views of 
dignity-bearing individuals whose dignity is at stake in such debates. Thus, if the 
debate is about dignity in elderly care, we have a special responsibility to attend to the 
views of elderly individuals cared for.       
 
Möllers also argues against the use of dignity in ‘a legal order that respects 
individuals rights’.64 His argument is similar to those expounded above that the 
meaning of dignity is too controversial. He suggests that part of the root of the 
problem can be situated in the fact that different conceptions of the self underpin 
different and potentially incompatible conceptions of differences. In answer to these 
conflicting views of the human being, Möllers replies by asserting that ‘lawyers 
should ignore the underlying fundamental issue in favour of the concrete problem’.65  
 
                                                
60 Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, Article 1 
61 BVerfGE 39, 1 at 43 
62 Gearty (n57) 163 
63 Ibid 171 
64 Möllers C. ‘The Triple Dilemma of Human Dignity: A Case Study’ in C. McCrudden (Ed.), 
Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford University Press, 2013), 173 
65 Ibid 
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This seems to assume that attending to the concrete problem while bracketing one’s 
underlying view of dignity and the self will generate some sort of consensus on how 
to resolve it. It remains to be seen, however, if this is indeed so: it seems just as likely 
that it is impossible to tackle concrete problems without at least implicit or 
unconscious appeal to intuitions about broader moral principles such as dignity and 
broader questions such as the nature of the self.  This is why I believe it is imperative 
to interrogate human dignity and to address heads-on the underlying issue of the 
conception of human being that underpins it; without doing so, we will always 
generate various and possibly conflicting resolutions to concrete problems, resulting 
from various and conflicting views of dignity and personhood. In this dissertation I 
will discuss the question of the conceptualisation of the self, as it is of great 
significance for working out the meaning of dignity. 
 
Macklin rejects the usefulness of dignity on the ground that it adds nothing to how 
individuals are treated.66 Unlike Rosen she does not reject its failure to guide conduct 
on the ground that it is inviolable and inherent and so impervious to the treatment of 
others. Her argument is that other terms can replace it without any problem. In the 
domain of medical ethics, she argues that dignity has no meaning beyond that of ‘the 
need to obtain voluntary, informed consent; the requirement to protect vulnerability; 
and the need to avoid discrimination and abusive practice’.67 It may indeed be the 
case that in medical ethics this is the way that dignity may be translated. The 
important point that Macklin seems to allude to but dismisses, is that it is because of 
calls to human dignity that these forms of treatment have been devised. Dignity is a 
cry that demands attention and the setting out of conditions that can give rise to it. 
Dignity is a useful discourse in medical treatment to focus the mind about the nature 
of human beings and the type of care they require to flourish in specific environments, 
especially those where they are vulnerable. Indeed, in such circumstances, dignity 
may be translated into the need for voluntary consent, the protection of vulnerability 
through non-discriminatory practice and the prohibition of abuse. 
 
Bagaric and Allan’s critique of dignity is grounded in their assertion that ‘as a legal or 
philosophical concept it is without bounds and ultimately is one incapable of 
                                                
66 Macklin R., ‘Dignity is a useless concept’ (20th December 2003) 327 British Medical Journal 1419 
67 Ibid 1419 
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explaining or justifying any narrower interests’.68 Their argument against dignity 
springs from their belief that it is an ill-founded justification for rights. According to 
them, dignity cannot fulfil this role as it is itself a vacuous concept, one that ‘is used 
by academics, judges and legislators when rational justifications have been 
exhausted’.69 Despite the widespread use of the concept of dignity in legal and 
philosophical texts, they argue that the ‘lack of convergence regarding the meaning 
of, and foundations for, a normative concept’ shows that ‘something is amiss’, putting 
in doubt the very existence of the concept of dignity.70 Similarly to those criticisms 
cited above, they put in doubt usefulness of the concept of dignity further by the fact 
that it can be used as an argument for and against the same issue.71 This can be 
illustrated by the debate around euthanasia, where dignity can be advanced as an 
argument for as well as against its practice. Once again, dignity is shown as 
problematic because it is ‘an empowering notion’ as well as ‘a sort of constraint on 
action’.72 This is a recurring contention raised against dignity.73  
 
As Grover writes in response, ‘the essential point is that whether pro or anti-assisted 
suicide, both sides claim to achieve human dignity for the afflicted and both 
acknowledge the centrality of dignity in the human psyche. In this regard, the concept 
of ‘human dignity’ can be analogised to the notion of ‘justice’.74 Few people would 
claim appeals to justice are empty simply because the concept lends itself to different 
interpretations. Furthermore, the very reason that Bagaric and Allan use to defend the 
usefulness of rights can be applied to dignity. They contend that ‘rights claims can be 
politically effective’ and are ‘to many people intuitively appealing’, because ‘the 
generally absolutist and forceful manner in which they are expressed (…) carry more 
emotive punch than related claims grounded in the languages of duties’.75 I would 
endow dignity with the same capacity to raise attention and command action, to ask 
for justice. Its meaning may be contended and unclear, to the point of attaching itself 
                                                
68 Bagaric M. and Allan J., ‘The Vacuous Concept of Dignity’ (2006) 5 Journal of Human Rights 257, 
260 
69 Ibid 
70 Ibid 265 
71 Ibid 266 
72 Ibid 267 
73 Beyleveld B. and Brownsword R., Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford University Press, 
2001) 
74 Grover S., ‘A Response to Bagaric and Allan’s ‘The Vacuous Concept of Dignity’’ (September 
2009) 13(4) The International Journal of Human Rights 615, 619 
75 Ibid 260 
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to oxymoronic values, but dignity has the merit of stirring debates and questioning the 
very notion of being in the world and the type of conditions it necessitates to thrive.  
 
Pinker also criticises the indeterminate meaning of dignity and writes that ‘the 
problem is that “dignity” is a squishy, subjective notion, hardly up to the heavyweight 
moral demands assigned to it’.76 He argues that dignity has three features that prevent 
it from being defined clearly. Firstly, he argues that it is ‘relative’; ‘ascription of 
dignity vary radically with the time, place, and beholder’.77 It is certainly true that 
certain conduct that in the past attracted indignity would not nowadays raise a single 
eyebrow (Pinker gives the example of showing the glimpse of a stocking). Certain 
persons will consider certain actions below their dignity, whereas others will see no 
harm in them at all. Subjectivity does prevail when it comes to dignity, and it is 
context specific. A one-fit-all definition is bound to compromise someone’s dignity. 
The fact that it is so ought not make of the concept a defunct one. One the contrary, it 
has the quality of specificity and adaptability; it manages to represent the custom and 
tradition of individuals at a certain time in history. Its definition ought to be 
contextualised. 
 
Secondly, Pinker qualifies dignity as being ‘fungible’, that is to say a value we 
compromise for the sake of others; Pinker notes that we would rather relinquish our 
dignity than our ‘life, health and safety’.78  He illustrates this by giving many 
examples of situations where we would rather behave in an undignified way (‘getting 
out of a small car… having sex… doffing your belt and spread-eagling to allow a 
security guard to slide a wand up your crotch…. undergoing a pelvic or rectal 
examination’) than jeopardize other values we hold dear. It could be argued that the 
ability to choose which value to prioritise is itself an intrinsic element of dignity. 
Indeed, as we will see, conditions fruitful to dignity imply the idea of autonomy. In 
any case, trade-offs between important values or interests are the rule, not the 
exception, in human lives. Just because one value or interest is given up at any one 
time – and generally for a limited period of time – does not mean it ceases to have 
significance.  
                                                
76 Pinker S., ‘The Stupidity of Dignity’ (28th May 2008) The New Republic  
< https://newrepublic.com/article/64674/the-stupidity-dignity> Accessed 10th January 2018 
77 Ibid 
78 Ibid 
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Similarly to Rosen above, Pinker also believes that ‘dignity can be harmful’.79 
Dignity can indeed lose its positive appeal if it is imposed on by a third party as a 
justification to poor treatment; but that is not dignity, that is the hijacking of a concept 
for personal gain or the infliction of harm, and so must be rejected off hand. Other 
sentiments such as love or welfare can also be invoked to justify actions or behaviours 
that ultimately harm or manipulate others under cover of good intentions. It does not 
mean that these words mean nothing and ought to be rejected. Dignity ought not be 
defined by some to be imposed on others, but be understood through the experienced 
lives of individuals. As Kass writes, ‘what we need is a defence of the dignity of what 
Tolstoy called ‘real life’, like as ordinarily lived, everyday life in its concreteness’.80 
 
 
3) Methodology 
 
The methodology that I have chosen to fulfil my aims in this dissertation is socio-
legal, underpinned by feminist legal theory. The British Library defines socio-legal 
studies as ‘an interdisciplinary approach to analysing law, legal phenomena, and 
relationship between these and wider society. Both theoretical and empirical work is 
included, and perspectives and methodologies are drawn from the humanities as well 
as the social sciences’.81 The part of my dissertation that has drawn from the social 
sciences is found in my definition of dignity. I formulated this definition on the basis 
of an extant of qualitative social science studies conducted specifically to gather and 
understand older people’s views about dignity in order to form a definition of it. My 
approach has been to use empirical findings to understand dignity from the point of 
view of those who live and are cared for in elderly care institutions. In the dissertation 
I use this definition of dignity to inform the duty of local authorities to take dignity 
into account under the Care Act.  I have then used this definition of dignity to 
establish whether and how the laws that shape the lives of individuals who live in 
long-term aged care are creating conditions responsive to its flourishing.  
                                                
79 Ibid 
80 Kass L. ‘Defending Human Dignity’ in E. Pellegrino, A. Schulman and T. Merrill (Eds), Human 
Dignity and Bioethics (University of Notre Dame Press), 313-314 
81 British Library, ‘Help for Researchers’ 
<http://www.bl.uk/reshelp/findhelpsubject/busmanlaw/legalstudies/soclegal/sociolegal.html> Accessed 
14th August 2017 
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My criterion in selecting the particular sample of studies I used to establish a 
definition of dignity was relevance to my topic of research. My aim was never to 
compile a comprehensive study of them all. Nor was it to find the most detailed 
definition of dignity – rather a workable definition. My aim was to illustrate the point 
that when you ask individuals for their participation in the definition of a particular 
value, main themes emerge that can form the basis of a framework to work from. The 
interesting thing about this exercise was that studies revealed that although different 
things mattered to different people (privacy; being talked to like an adult, not a child; 
being well-dressed), all converged to the same kind of discourse. No one answer stuck 
wildly out of the others to give an unusual or alternative meaning to dignity. The 
point is that while each individual experienced dignity differently because everyone is 
unique, there were sufficient similarities and points of convergence to construct a 
general understanding of dignity in elderly care. This sensitivity to particulars, 
coupled with an aptitude for yielding synthetic generalisations, is at the very essence 
of dignity. It is a universal value that speaks of the uniqueness of each human being, 
and in order to enable it, knowing what it means for the individual is essential.  
 
The feminist legal theory aspect of the methodology I used in this dissertation justifies 
theoretically my social approach to dignity. Feminist legal theory espouses an idea of 
autonomy rooted in the concrete nature of the human being that explains the need to 
approach dignity in a social, dialogical and empirical way. Feminists scholars that I 
refer to throughout this paper have all in their own way and within their own theories 
about vulnerability, capabilities, the self and relational autonomy, set out the fact that 
we are all concrete, feeling, biological, interconnected and interdependent finite 
beings who need particular conditions to thrive. I refer to some of their texts in this 
introduction. Taking responsibility for the care of a person, requires dialogical 
exchanges and communication in order to understand, rather than assume, what truly 
matters to that person. 
 
Kant asserts that ‘autonomy is (…) the ground of the dignity of human nature’,82 and 
that autonomy is ‘the capacity to adopt principles that can be universally adopted, 
                                                
82 Kant (n26) 84-85, AK 4:436   
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because they are law-like, and more significantly the rejection of principles that 
cannot be universally adopted’. 83   Autonomy here is attached to an idea of 
personhood that is extracted from all human traits. If, on the contrary, we assume that 
a person only becomes autonomous via the process of relating to others, then dignity 
can only be apprehended through knowing the concrete other. Feminist legal scholars’ 
perception of what it means to be a human being has helped me understand why I 
thought dignity could only ever be understood through a relational ethic, one that 
demands that we ask to know the person in front of us.  
 
 
4) Dissertation Structure 
 
This dissertation is split into six main chapters. The first one will set out the 
theoretical underpinnings of a definition of dignity obtained through dialogue. Here, I 
will delve into the Kantian realm of dignity and expose why this particular 
understanding of it, although absolutely relevant, cannot guide ethical conduct in the 
context of people in need of care because of the kind of being it is attached to. 
Turning my attention to the communitarian view of human autonomy, I will end up 
aligning my thoughts to that of feminists. Autonomy is not here understood as ‘the 
property the will has of being a law unto itself (independently of every property 
belonging to the objects of volition’, 84  but rather as the result of our 
interconnectedness. The notion of the stand-alone man that underpins a Kantian view 
of autonomy is rejected by the feminist reconceptualization of autonomy, to be 
replaced by a view of the human being that is more fragile, that does not live in a 
vacuum and is embedded in human relationships.85 This particular view of autonomy 
is relational, rooted in our interconnectedness.86  From this starting point, I will 
establish the kind of ethical model that I believe is needed to understand dignity, a 
model rooted in the relational autonomy of human beings. I suggest that the meaning 
of dignity needs to be found in communication and dialogue, without which it would 
                                                
83 O’Neill O., Bounds of Justice (Cambridge University Press, 1996) 43 
84 Kant (n26) 47, AK 4:441 
85 Mackenzie C. and Stoljar N., Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, 
and the Social Self (Oxford University Press, 2000) 
86 Nedelsky J., Law’s relations: a relational theory of self, autonomy, and law (Oxford University 
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be impossible to know the ‘concrete other’, a paradigm devised by Benhabib.87 My 
approach to dignity is phenomenological, that is, grounded in individuals’ subjective 
experiences. 
 
In the second chapter, I have used a sample of qualitative social sciences studies 
realised in the context of healthcare that have questioned older people about their 
perception of dignity. I have teased out from them the main areas of dignity for those 
individuals who need to be cared for because of their advanced chronological age. It 
transpires that identity formation, self-determination and respect for the individual’s 
humanity are essential for the possibility of dignity. I do not claim that the definition 
of dignity these studies generate is definite and immutable. It is only there to suggest 
that for the creation of care environments amenable to dignity, our understanding of 
dignity must be done in partnership with the individuals concerned, through a 
dialogical exchange.  
 
Dignity understood under this ethical framework resonates with Nussbaum’s work on 
human capabilities, where she believes that certain human capabilities are essential 
for human dignity, a promissory note that requires certain conditions to actually 
flourish. 88  I suggest that for dignity in institutional care to be realised (identity, self-
determination and respect for humanity), certain conditions are necessary. These 
conditions rest on certain factors to be addressed that regard the person cared for, the 
environment they live in, and the wider social environment. Following the capability 
theory, I call these factors ‘conversion factors’, where conversion points to the ways 
in which these factors mediate between potential and actual dignity, converting the 
former into the latter.89 The next few chapters are devoted to examining these factors. 
 
The third and fourth chapters examine the vulnerability of the older person in care. 
Vulnerability is identified here as a personal conversion factor to dignity. The first of 
these chapters discusses the meaning of vulnerability and how to understand it so that 
it can be amenable to the flourishing of dignity. I argue in this chapter that in order to 
                                                
87 Benhabib S., Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics 
(Polity Press, 1992) 
88 Nussbaum (n34) 
89 Robeyns I., ‘The Capability Approach: a theoretical survey’ (March 2005) 6(1) Journal of Human 
Development 93 
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achieve this aim, vulnerability has to be conceptualised in a way that will trigger 
protection from the state but prevent over paternalistic interventions that could 
undermine a person’s dignity. The second half of this chapter examines criminal and 
human rights laws currently in place to protect individuals from the effects of 
vulnerability. I will examine here how the Crown Prosecution Services approach 
crimes against older individuals and the reach of criminal laws into vulnerability 
protection. I will then review the role of human rights law on the protection of 
vulnerability in care. In the last part of this chapter I will focus my attention on the 
important case of McDonald, which not only discusses the role of Article 8 in the 
protection of dignity in the context of care, but also reveals the impact courts can 
have, in their judicial review capacity, on the conceptualisation of dignity.90 
 
The fourth chapter examines the more interventionist laws aimed at protecting 
individuals from the consequences of vulnerability, namely laws relating to 
safeguarding, capacity and deprivation of liberty. In this chapter I will examine 
whether these rules, aimed at protecting the individual’s vulnerability, are compatible 
with the aim of dignity realisation. I will review the problem posed by the tension 
between capacity and autonomy, wondering how best to protect the most vulnerable 
in a way that can be amenable to dignity. 
 
In the fifth chapter I broaden my field of enquiry to examine the living environment 
of the care home. Nursing homes, as Agich remarks, are institutions that can ‘isolate, 
control and reconstitute the daily lives of their residents’.91  Here, I consider the 
regulatory framework care homes are under as an environmental conversion factor to 
dignity. Starting with the wider aims of regulations, I will then examine in details 
those in place for care homes and assess whether they can create conditions amenable 
to dignity as defined in this dissertation. Aided by Braithwaite’s practical expertise in 
the regulatory system of care institutions across continents, I will discuss the possibly 
to create a regulatory model that goes beyond safety concerns and embraces the 
                                                
90 R (On the Application of Elaine McDonald) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea [2011] 
UKSC 33, 6 July 2011 and McDonald v The United Kingdom, Application 4231/12, [2014] ECHR 492, 
20th May 2014 
91 Agich. G. J., Dependence and Autonomy in Old Age: An ethical framework for long-term care 
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possibility of dignity.92 My argument will be that regulations need to include the 
participation of those they regulate. Imposing rules on individuals for the sake of their 
best interest and protection may not necessarily allow the dignity of the individual to 
flourish. I will argue that individuals in care must have a say in the regulatory 
framework that controls the environment they live in, and be part of its monitoring 
process. 
 
The final chapter widens the net of inquiry to look at an important societal conversion 
factor, that of ageism. In this part of my paper I discuss the various theories that have 
tried to explain our complicated relationship with old age. Whether because older 
individuals remind us of our own mortality, because through our evolution we prefer 
to keep the weakest in society at arms’ length, or because we have over the years 
severed the ties that used to bind us to our elders, the reasons why we treat older 
people less well than others are complex and multi-faceted. I will discuss here the 
detrimental effects of ageism on dignity. Finally, I will mention the current anti-
discrimination laws that exist to mitigate its negative effects and the kind of initiatives 
that may help bolster their aim. 
 
I believe it is also important to mention here the impact of the economic system a 
country adopts on its welfare policies, and as such on the potential creation of 
conditions for dignity in care. Although for the purpose of this thesis I will not be able 
to delve into this topic, it is worth mentioning here that it is axiomatic that the 
realisation of dignity is shaped by the commitments states make to their public 
resources redistribution policies. It can be argued that neoliberalism, the economic 
system currently adopted by the UK, influences the possibility of dignity in long-term 
aged care by suppressing the flow of public resources to the sector, but most 
importantly by redefining the value and meaning of public services.93 According to 
Harvey, the brand neoliberalism we live under is  
 
                                                
92 Braithwaite J., Makkai T. and Braithwaite V., Regulating Aged Care: Ritualism and the New 
Pyramid (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007) 
93 For an in depth analysis of the relationship between economics, welfare and rights, see amongst 
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[a] theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being 
can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and 
skills, within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property 
rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the State is to create and preserve 
an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. … State interventions 
in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum.94  
 
Commodification is key to promote these aims, transforming an ever-increasing array 
of goods, activities, and relationships as market commodities.95 Even ‘sexuality, 
culture, history, heritage and nature’ are now being traded for a price, although they 
were never originally ‘produced as commodities’.96 Polanyi, commenting on the 
commodification of labour, has written that ‘in disposing of a man’s labour power the 
system would, incidentally, dispose of the physical, psychological and moral entity 
‘man’ attached to that tag.’97 The commodification of care could have similar 
consequences to that of labour, and so have some important bearing on the 
conceptualisation of dignity in care settings. Although Britain still has not ventured 
fully down the path of complete welfare marketization, it is slowly opening the doors 
to private markets for the provision of care. Estes and Philippson point to the fact that 
‘elder care has already been identified by the Coalition of Service Industries as a 
service area to be included in a comprehensive GATS agreement’.98  
 
Neoliberalism also promotes the idea that welfare can have a de-incentivizing effect 
on people to work, and instead assumes that the solution to social good can be 
reached through the virtues of equal individual responsibility. 99  Pursuing the 
marketization of care is meant to promote empowerment through choice, and a rise of 
high quality low cost care through efficiency brought on by competition.100 Neoliberal 
ideals are therefore defining the way in which vulnerability is perceived and the 
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response it warrants from the state’s redistributive policies. Navarro has written that 
‘deregulation of international capital flows and trade has considerably narrowed the 
scope of governments to pursue expansionist and redistributive policies, forcing all 
governments to cut public social expenditures and deregulate labour markets in order 
to make their countries more competitive’.101 Under neoliberalism the trend has been 
to reduce public welfare programmes, but to facilitate global markets.102  
 
For these reasons and many more that cannot be examined here, the economic context 
of a country should also be considered a conversion factor to dignity in care, one that 
shapes the public services landscape, and so the way in which individuals are treated 
by institutions and public authorities when in receipt of welfare. However dignity in 
care may be conceptualised by social care policies, its realisation cannot but be 
influenced by the economic ideology that governs a state’s redistributive policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
101 Navarro V., Schmitt J. and Astudillo A., ‘Is Globalization Undermining the Welfare State? The 
Evolution of the Welfare State in Developed Capitalist Countries during the 1990s’ in in V. Navarro 
(Ed.) Neoliberalism, Globalization and Inequalities, Consequences for Health and Quality of Life 
(Baywood Publishing Company, 2007), 27 
102 Estes C.L. and Phillipson C., ‘The Globalization of Capital, The Welfare State, And Old Age 
Policy’ (2002) 32(2) International Journal of Health Services 279  
 21 
Chapter I 
 
Theoretical framework 
 
 
1) Introduction         
 
In England and Wales, local authorities are the public bodies responsible for 
organising and sometimes dispensing care in the community. Their duties are defined 
under the Care Act 2014. The Care Act demands the promotion of individual 
wellbeing, and dignity is referred to as a component part of that wellbeing.1 The Act 
then specifies that individual wellbeing is best understood from the perspective of the 
individual concerned.2 As wellbeing is defined as comprising personal dignity, it can 
be assumed that dignity ought to also be understood in a similar way. There is no 
clear indication within the Act as to how local authorities need to proceed in taking 
the person’s dignity into account as part of this wellbeing duty, but I will argue here 
that the best way forward would be to ask the individuals concerned what dignity 
means to them. In this chapter, I will explain the theoretical justification for this 
particular choice. 
 
Leget argues that there are three types of dignity, one subjectively experienced, one 
social or relational and one that is intrinsic.3 I will argue here that in order to give rise 
to dignity in care, it is insufficient to limit our understanding of dignity to the idea of 
intrinsic dignity; rather, the subjective and relational perspectives of dignity are also 
crucial to the context of care. Although intrinsic dignity is the basis upon which the 
claim to a minimum treatment of older individuals in care stems from,4 it fails to give 
any indication as to the nature of that treatment. I believe that a subjectively 
experienced understanding of dignity, justified by our relational and social nature, is 
the key to appreciating how to treat a person dependent on care. As Nussbaum writes, 
‘some living conditions deliver to people a life that is worthy of the human dignity 
                                                
1 Care Act 2014 s.1(a) 
2 Care Act 2014 s.3 
3 Leget C., ‘Analyzing dignity: a perspective from the ethics of care’ (2013) 16 Med Health Care and 
Philos 945 
4 Moody H.R., ‘Why Dignity in Old Age Matters’ (1998) 29 Issue 2-3 Journal of Gerontology 13, 37 
 22 
that they possess, and others do not. In the latter circumstances, they retain dignity, 
but it is like a promissory note whose claims have not been met’.5 Indeed, the way to 
create those conditions is firstly to understand dignity. My claim here is that a more 
concrete view of personhood has considerable potential for informing political theory 
about the conditions necessary for dignity in care institutions for the elderly. I will be 
adopting here an approach to personhood underpinned by the feminist ethics of care.6  
 
In this chapter, I argue that the adoption of a strictly Kantian view of dignity, based 
on the revolutionary idea that all individuals possess inviolable and intrinsic worth, is 
insufficiently concrete to specify the conditions necessary to the realisation of dignity. 
I propose that although Kant brings an essential and ground-breaking understanding 
of dignity as the inherent value of every human being independently of any other, it is 
rooted in an abstract view of autonomous rational agency, and that this abstraction 
hides from view the complex biological, relational and finite nature of individuals’ 
autonomy, concrete characteristics that must be taken into account when setting out 
those conditions for dignity in elderly care. Kant’s understanding of dignity would 
also, interpreted strictly, limit the reach of human rights guarantees in the realisation 
of dignity. 
 
Most specifically, this chapter will proceed along the following lines. Firstly, I will 
briefly expound Kant’s definition of intrinsic human dignity and show how it rests on 
an underlying abstract conception of autonomy. Secondly, I will suggest that such an 
abstract understanding of dignity requires no more than the presence of conditions of 
negative freedom and cannot be used to inform ethical conduct. This in turns implies 
that human rights have a limited role to play and that they are not promising tools to 
promote the dignity of dependent vulnerable people. Thirdly, I will use Grear’s 
account of human rights and the ‘vulnerable embodied’ idea of humanity it embraces, 
to highlight the necessity to engage with the concreteness of our beings and autonomy 
in order to understand and therefore enable dignity for all.7 Fourthly, I will discuss 
                                                
5 Nussbaum M. Creating Capabilities (Harvard University Press, 2011), 30 
6 Gilligan C., Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Harvard University Press, 1982): 
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alternative conceptions of autonomy, and conclude that relational and concrete 
autonomy is a more relevant ground into which to anchor our understanding of 
dignity in care. Concrete autonomy is based on the importance of the individual’s 
environment, history and relationships, and adopts a conceptualisation of the 
individual rooted in care ethics. Finally, I will contend that a concrete and relational 
understanding of autonomy demands a discursive ethical framework to give rise to a 
subjective and experiential understanding of dignity – one which is better suited to 
frame care policies, and more relevant to them. 
 
 
2) Kantian dignity 
 
Although the concept of dignity has only relatively recently entered the legal domain,8 
its legal protection by law is traditionally considered to be the preserve of human 
rights instruments. The legal codification of dignity is most famously found in the 
Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human rights (UDHR). The UDHR 
recognises the ‘inherent dignity’ and ‘the equal and inalienable rights of all members 
of the human family’, declaring that ‘the peoples of the United Nations have in the 
Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth 
of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined 
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”.9 The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights specifically declares that rights 
‘derive from the inherent dignity of the human person’.10 Human rights embrace the 
idea that certain duties are owed to humans in order for their dignity to be respected. 
They suggest that ‘all people have some core entitlements just by virtue of their 
humanity, and that it is a basic duty of society to respect and support these 
entitlements’.11  
 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 8  For a summary of the history of dignity see McCrudden C., ‘Human Dignity and Judicial 
Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19(4) EJIL 655, 656-663 
9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble 
10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Preamble 
11 Nussbaum M.C., Creating Capabilities (Harvard University Press, 2011) 62 
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This statement implies a certain idea of dignity, one that can be attributed to Kant. 
Rosen, who has written extensively on the subject of dignity, refers to Kant as ‘the 
thinker on whose giant shoulders the modern theory of human rights largely rests’.12 
The Kantian understanding of dignity is far removed from the theological 
interpretation of dignity that valued mankind for being the image of God on earth, and 
bucks the utilitarian ideals that negated the intrinsic value of the individual for the 
sake of optimizing the overall happiness of all,13 Kant’s depiction of dignity is as a 
special value (Würde) bestowed upon human beings because of their unique capacity 
for ‘acting morally and feeling the force of morality’s claims’. 14  Kant shows 
individuals as intrinsically valuable, independently of religion and other human 
beings.  
 
On this anti-utilitarian basis Kant defines the inviolability of dignity by declaring that 
a man cannot be used ‘merely as a means’ by any man, but must always be ‘regarded 
… at the same time as an end.’15 Although it may be clear to us how using a man as a 
mere instrument or object for a particular purpose may indeed violate his dignity, it is 
less clear how a man may be treated as an end.16 Kant indicates that ‘morality is the 
condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in itself’,17 but this 
statement only takes us so far. 
 
According to Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kant, the Kantian’s notion of humanity as 
an end in itself refers to human beings’ ‘power of rational choice’, ‘the power to (…) 
make something an end by conferring the status of goodness on it, and pursue it by 
rational means’.18 This, Rosen argues ‘draws the boundaries of personhood quite 
narrowly: it restricts it to those human beings who are actively capable of exercising 
rational agency’. 19  It appears to exclude those whose age has rendered them 
dependent on others for their sheer survival. 
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The concept of personhood under Kant seems restricted even further if we follow his 
proposition that ‘autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human nature and 
of every rational nature’.20 As Rosen points out, this does not mean that dignity and 
autonomy are one of the same things.21 Kantian’s autonomy, as the ground to dignity, 
has been interpreted as ‘the capacity to adopt principles that can be universally 
adopted, because they are law-like, and more significantly the rejection of principles 
that cannot be universally adopted’.22 Kant’s autonomy hereby rests on the idea that 
‘the moral law which we must acknowledge as binding upon us is “self-given”’.23 It is 
‘the dignity of the moral law that makes human beings –its embodiment- worthy of 
respect’.24 That is to say to the extent that they are capable of endorsing the moral 
view. 
 
This particular conception of autonomy has attracted much criticism because of the 
conception of the self that it adopts. Kant’s analysis sees negative freedom as 
meaning to work ‘independently of alien causes determining it’, and positive freedom 
as a rational way of using negative freedom,25 or the capacity for autonomy (namely, 
for identifying and pursuing universally valid values). In this context negative 
freedom is a pre-requisite of positive freedom or autonomy. But negative freedom 
here is not mere absence of material constraints. Rather, it is also a freedom from 
‘preferences, desires, inclinations’,26 or any other human emotion that may interfere 
with our appreciation and pursuit of the moral law. Thus understood, negative 
freedom assumes a ‘noumenal self’, an entity that bears no resemblance to any 
empirically definable agent. 27 It assumes a version of personhood that is able to 
suspend any human trait or emotion in order to assume autonomy, and appears 
therefore even further removed from reality.28 
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Kant’s definition of autonomy has not always been seen as ‘this metaphysically 
ambitious’; elsewhere it has also been interpreted as ‘a capacity to understand moral 
reasons and be motivated by them’.29 Even this ‘toned down’ version of autonomy, 
however, requires rational thought and so also suggests a conception of personhood 
that excludes certain groups, amongst them the cognitively impaired elderly.  
 
A Kantian articulation of dignity marks an important shift away from its Christian 
ethos of ‘sacred worth of the human person in the sight of God’.30 It also underpins a 
conception of morality founded on ‘absolute principles’ such as rights and justice, and 
departs from a consequentialist model that favours utility outcomes, and where 
mankind is but a homogenous grouping whose overall happiness maximisation 
overrides individual dignity.31 Kantian dignity certainly marks a departure from the 
idea that it is acceptable to treat some lives with impunity for the sake of increased 
levels of overall happiness for the greatest number. Nevertheless, it still seems inept at 
including people whose autonomy has been compromised because of age, and whose 
lives are led in institutions. As Nussbaum writes, although ‘dignity is an intuitive 
notion’, it ‘needs to be given content by placing it in a network of related notions’.32 
Kantian dignity espouses a view of personhood that is anchored in the notion of 
abstract autonomy and hence at first sight, appears to generate principles that may not 
consider the dignity of the non-autonomous elderly in care settings. It also fails to 
inform as to the type of conditions necessary to allow dignity to flourish in concrete 
situations. 
 
 
3) Conditions for Kantian dignity 
 
A strict reading of Kantian dignity predicated on the notion of abstract autonomy 
appears to require a strictly liberal arrangement of society. Hill has set out that ‘the 
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dignity principle must be applied not merely to relations between individuals isolated 
from others but, first and crucially to a system of laws that can provide the framework 
for moral relations amongst individuals’. 33  He explains that in setting out the 
‘implication of the dignity principle for laws, one should take the point of view of the 
legislators in the ‘kingdom of ends’, that is, fully rational and autonomous persons, 
each with ‘private ends’ but abstracting from personal differences’ and making only 
universal laws’.34 This point of view, he explains, is embraced by Kant and Rawls 
when they assert that ‘the first principle of justice adopted would be that the system of 
laws should try to ensure to each person viewed in advance of particular 
contingencies an equal and full opportunity to live out his or her life within the 
constraints of those laws’.35 Hill continues by stating that ‘one of the most significant 
consequences of placing a special value on human beings’ capacity to set and 
rationally pursue ends is that there is a strong prima facie case for allowing 
individuals freedom to form and pursue their own life plans subject only to the 
constrains that others be allowed a similar freedom’.36 According to Rawls, under the 
veil of ignorance and in the original position of complete impartial rationality as 
espoused by Kant, individuals would choose the same universal principles of justice 
based on freedom and equal rights.37 Agich has argued that 
 
liberal theory is not in itself the problem, but the extension of what is primarily 
a political and legal theory into ethics levels the complex landscape of moral 
life. We need not reject liberal theory, but can confine it within its proper 
borders and we can supplement its contribution to ethical analysis and practice 
by offering a fuller and more adequate view of what it means to be an 
autonomous agent.38  
 
Applying the notion of abstract liberal autonomy as the foundational value of dignity 
would restrict quite dramatically its ability to help shape the societal conditions 
needed for the realization of dignity in institutions.   
                                                
33 Hill T. E., Dignity and Practical Reason (Cornell University Press, 1992), 208 
34 Ibid 209 
35 Ibid  
36 Ibid 53 
37 Rawls J., A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition, Harvard University Press, 1971), 221-227 
38 Agich. G. J., Dependence and Autonomy in Old Age: An ethical framework for long-term care 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003), 13 
 28 
 
In the context of a strict liberal notion of autonomy, human rights would be used to 
forbid the interference of the state with the individual by for instance, prohibiting the 
use of torture, preventing the state from interfering in a person’s private life, or 
forbidding arbitrary detention, and also preventing individuals from interfering with 
another in unwarranted (e.g. harmful) ways. This particular political conception of 
rights promotes the ‘negative liberty’ of the individual or the ‘freedom to be left 
alone’.39 A system of human rights mostly anchored in negative freedom embraces a 
conception of personhood that is attached to a liberal view of autonomy.40 Autonomy 
understood in this way demands that the state refrains from interfering so that 
individuals may pursue their own version of a good life. In turn, this assumes certain 
individual qualities such as ‘self-assertion, critical reflection, and knowledge of one’s 
interest qualities’.41 This particular conception of personhood, as Agich suggests, is 
political in nature, but translates with difficulty as an adequate ethical model upon 
which to build a framework to protect the dignity of those who become acutely 
dependent due to age.42  
 
Rights intervene paradigmatically when the individual needs to assert a claim against 
authority. Hence rights do have a place in institutions when conflicts arise between 
the individual and the care professionals in charge.43 In fact the Care Act 2014 makes 
explicit that care providers fall under section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998 
as exercising a ‘function of a public nature’ in providing care arranged by local 
authorities, and so are required to abide by human rights laws.44 Rights are a useful 
counterweight to the power of the institution to enforce certain rules imposed on the 
individual that may conflict with her right to a private life, her right to refuse or 
consent to treatment, but say little as to the sustainability of dignity pre-conflict.45  
Agich writes that  
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[A] preoccupation with personal entitlements can divert concern from collective 
responsibilities. Rights rhetoric too often channels individuals ‘aspirations into 
demands for their own share of protected opportunities and fails to address more 
fundamental issues about what ought to be protected. Such an individualistic 
framework ill serves the values of cooperation and empathy that feminists find 
lacking in our current legal culture.46 
 
Whether Kant’s concept of dignity rests on rational agency, or a metaphysical version 
of the self, unperturbed by its connection to the outside world and immune to its 
physicality, it is not easily reconcilable with an idea of dignity that includes all 
people, even those whose autonomy has been compromised by ageing. Dignity in this 
context, as Waldron remarks, may be the ‘legal ground of the rights’ set out in human 
rights instruments, but not the telos or goal of human rights.47 Griffin considers that 
‘the sort of dignity relevant to human rights, is that of a highly prized status: that we 
are normative agents’,48 once more anchoring dignity within an autonomy-based 
discourse. He also concedes that ‘there are several acceptable uses of ‘dignity’ not 
relevant to human rights: for example, the dignity that quite properly should be 
accorded to a person deep in dementia’.49 Dignity based on abstract and Kantian 
ideals of autonomy and rational agency may indeed be the ground of human rights, 
but this would limit the meaning of dignity and certainly evade those who no longer 
possess these characteristics.  
 
Douzinas concurs when he writes, in respect of the universality of rights, that ‘(o)nce 
the slightest empirical or historical material is introduced into abstract human nature, 
once we move from the declarations onto the concrete embodied person, with gender, 
race, class and age, human nature with its equality and dignity retreats rapidly’.50 
Rights have been accused of framing the individual as ‘represented without 
significant reference to their own developmental history, personal values, or 
relationships with others’.51 The ethical debate, if unduly focused on rights thus 
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understood, would be limited to the balancing of rights and omit to consider the 
person as a social and complex evolving and biological entity. Our vulnerability, 
inherent to our physiological selves, 52  would then be addressed by healthcare 
provisions whenever it became an obstacle to our pursuit of a worthwhile life, but 
would not be catered for when it were or became a permanent state. A strict 
interpretation of Kantian dignity entails a strict liberal political ideology, which would 
on the face of it, disregard the dignity of the partially functioning by focusing too 
heavily on the importance of negative liberty. 
 
It is unquestionable that in order for dignity to flourish, certain rights not to be 
interfered with are fundamental, but as I have argued, a strict liberal interpretation of 
autonomy rooted in negative liberty would jeopardize the universality of dignity as a 
human value. Fortunately, the reality of human rights as they are currently interpreted 
and operationalised is far more complex than what is suggested by the Kantian view 
of fully autonomous individuals protected by rights grounding duties which are 
primarily ones of non-interference. The panoply of human rights obligations currently 
adhered to by our government, whether nationally, regionally or internationally, 
manifests a far more concrete view of persons and autonomy, and a far more inclusive 
meaning of dignity. Human rights protect far more than an ideal of dignity borne out 
of abstract autonomy, and are nowadays very much representative of our complex and 
finite human nature. 
 
In the next part of this chapter I will examine the underlying nature of the person that 
is revealed by human rights, and how they reflect a more concrete and flawed human 
nature than that espoused by Kant’s dignity. As I will argue, the development of 
economic, social and cultural rights more particularly reflects the need for certain 
conditions for dignity for all, and the concrete and embodied nature of people. By 
committing to the upholding of these human rights, the state is also under a positive 
obligation to provide certain resources and conditions for dignity to be realized, 
acknowledging that the self is vulnerable and not an autonomous entity in the strict 
liberal sense of the term.  
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4) Human rights and the embodied self 
 
In her work looking at corporate human rights, Grear has argued that the conception 
of the self underpinning legal human rights ought to be understood as one of 
‘embodied vulnerability’, instead of one of ‘quasi-disembodiement’ rooted in male 
autonomous rationality. 53 She presents this ‘quasi-disembodiement’ as borne out of 
Western rationality and entrenched in liberal laws and the legal subject.54 Indeed, she 
traces its Western world origins in Kantian’s morality, rooted in reason and able to 
‘transcend embodied particularities’,55 and ‘premised on the decontextualisation of 
the subject from the world of objects, including the body’.56 As law is ‘a discourse of 
reason’, it ‘functions as both product and producer of this disembodied rationalism’.57  
 
According to Grear, liberal laws, distinguished by rationality and positivity, have 
indeed functioned as a ‘rationalising enterprise’, eclipsing the importance of the 
human biological nature by a system of rational and positive laws. 58 She traces this 
phenomenon back to the emergence of capitalism in the nineteenth century, and the 
important role the state played during this period in facilitating its development 
through legal positivism. 59  According to her account, the ensuing ‘rationalistic 
jurisprudence’ these laws produced was to serve the interests of the property owners, 
but also cut out from its ambit the disorderliness and complexity of the social 
sphere.60 She notes that this created a dichotomy between the ‘thin’ and caricature-
like conception of the legal subject, capable of engaging in rational and consensual 
social relationships, and the actual human being who evolves in a complicated and 
confrontational web of social interactions.61  
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Despite the fact that the origins of the human rights movement are often found in 
times of social crisis and as a response to actual human suffering (the French 
Revolution and the Second World War being prime examples of such phenomena), 
Grear notices that even in international human rights instruments, human beings, who 
are ‘ontologically vulnerable’, are ‘conceptualised as quasi-disembodied legal 
subject’.62 She points out that the UDHR has assimilated the social contractarians’ 
abstract construct of the ‘natural man’ and his ‘natural rights’, as found under the 
French Declaration of the Right of Man and Citizen, into the abstract construct of 
‘human beings’.63 Feminist commentators have echoed this view where they have 
criticized international human rights law as being set out under the male ‘standard’, 
one that dictates how the ‘other’, the female, ought to be protected to reach the same 
equal status.64 According to some, even CEDAW’s portrayal of discrimination is 
based on the flawed idea of discrimination that ‘male and female are the same’.65 This 
particular articulation of international human rights instruments shows it as a paradox 
of exclusions under the guise of universality, because founded on one gendered 
abstract model, a similar construct to that of Kantian dignity. 
 
Grear’s account of disembodiment then focuses on the genealogy of human rights 
law, ‘the paradigmatic jural site for the convergence of humanity, law and the legal 
subject’.66 However, if we track the evolution of human rights, the ever-increasing 
particularization of contemporary rights in recent decades may be interpreted as an 
attempt to rectify the excessive abstraction that characterized the origins of the human 
rights tradition. Thus, the relatively recent recognition of the rights of ‘the girl child, 
migrant labour, indigenous peoples, gay and lesbians (…), prisoners, and those in 
institutional regimes, refugees, and asylum-seekers children’, 67  denotes the 
recognition of the suffering of those bodies that are excluded by the abstract model of 
quasi-disembodiment, and the paramount importance of the recognition of their 
‘embodied difference’.68 This development can be applied to the dependent elderly.  
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Grear hence continues by exposing the ‘centrality of embodiment’ to argue for a shift 
in the focus of human rights. She bases her argument on the writings of Merleau-
Ponty,69 a western philosopher whose work provides ‘a phenomenological account of 
perception as being embodied experience’. The importance of his account resides in 
the importance of the ‘perspectival nature of perception’, which translates more 
simply in saying that our embodiment conditions how we conceive the world around 
us, but how it is also borne out of that very world we inhabit.70 Grear also quotes the 
work of Johnson and Lakoff,71 whose cognitive scientific work has concentrated on 
showing that ‘the mind is inherently embodied. Thought is mostly unconscious. 
Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical’.72 This perspective is in contrast with 
Kant’s ‘noumenal self’, free of all human biological and neurological realities. Grear 
therefore concludes that ‘it cannot be stressed enough that the centrality of human 
embodied vulnerability is a crucial insight for the theory of human rights’,73 and that 
the impossibility of legal disembodiment results in a gap between legal subjectivity 
and human beings’.74  
 
This gap Grear mentions between abstract legal subjectivity and concrete situated 
human beings is similar to the one I referred to above between different 
understandings of dignity. Autonomy needs not be rejected as the normative basis of 
dignity. What ought to change is how autonomy is defined so as to better reflect the 
embodied and finite nature of individuals. This shift in the understanding of autonomy 
and dignity helps us move towards a more concrete and phenomenological approach 
to human rights, closing the gap between abstraction and reality, and better able to 
provide the conditions necessary for dignity to thrive. In the next part of this chapter I 
will therefore examine the nature of concrete autonomy. I will begin by reviewing the 
communitarian critique against the Kantian ideal of autonomy. Inspired by their belief 
in the inextricable link between the person and her environment, I will then explore 
more concrete accounts of autonomy founded on a version of the self that is social 
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and biological in nature. These concrete views of autonomy will provide a framework 
within which to understand and reformulate not only dignity, but the kind of human 
rights needed to promote its possibility. 
 
 
5) Concrete Autonomy 
 
a) Communitarian critique of liberal autonomy 
 
Communitarians, the main critics of liberal autonomy and the individualistic view of 
the person it presupposes, have stressed the fundamental importance of the world 
individuals inhabit as part of the conceptualization of the self. 75  Their ethical 
standpoint privileges ‘the formation of character rather than the possession of rights 
and obligations’. 76  They understand autonomy as bounded by and relative to 
particular traditions. They also consequently challenge the primacy of individual 
rights and the place of liberal autonomy.  
 
In contrast to the high levels of abstraction and universalism used by liberal theories 
such as Rawls, communitarians believe that individuals cannot be disconnected from 
the tradition they belong to; not only do individuals see the world through this 
tradition, but their tradition is constitutive of their very subjectivity. 77  Indeed, 
communitarians reject Rawls’ justification of the original position that ‘the self is 
prior to the ends which are affirmed by it’.78 In other words, there is no self that 
logically precedes the ends chosen by it; the self and the ends available to it are 
constituted within the same tradition. 
 
Taylor adopts an Aristotelian conception of the person where ‘[m]an is a social 
animal, indeed a political animal, because he is not self-sufficient alone, and in a 
important sense is not self-sufficient outside the polis’. 79  Taylor suggests that 
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liberalism portrays an atomistic view of the self that somehow manages to exist 
independently of any social context, whilst at the same time resting on the 
paradoxically non-liberal premise that those individuals belong to a society founded 
on freedom and self-fulfillment.80 Taylor therefore proposes a ‘politics of difference’, 
one that recognizes the specific identity of groups and individuals, rather than one 
based on universalism, where all individuals are presumed to possess the same rights 
and the same worth.81 It goes against the discriminatory and detrimental effect of the 
homogenizing model of liberal identity, and instead argues for the consideration of 
the specificities and characteristics of those groups, particularly those vulnerable 
groups, that do not fit its profile.  
 
This conceptualization of the self as embedded in its tradition and community shifts 
the ethical focus off individual rights. MacIntyre for instance returns to the 
Aristotelian vision of virtues,82 where ‘virtues are human qualities, the possession of 
which enables it to achieve the goods, which are intrinsic to social practices’.83 This 
entails the adoption of ‘an enacted narrative’ in order to ‘avoid conflicts between 
different virtues’, so as to ‘have an account of the good for the whole of human life 
conceived as a unity’.84 Waltzer also rejects the universality of rights and claims that 
‘actual men and women (…) claim justice, and resist tyranny, by insisting on the 
meaning of social goods amongst themselves. Justice is rooted in the distinct 
understanding of places, honors, jobs, things of all sorts that constitute a shared way 
of life. To override those understanding is to act unjustly’.85 
 
Many commentators have argued against the communitarian critique of liberalism and 
its individualistic atomized vision of agents. Some have insisted that liberalism could 
include a vision for common good within the bounds of autonomy. 86 Feinberg for 
instance has argued that ‘”common good” is hardly alien to the pluralistic liberal 
tradition. One of its great enemies is the intolerant predominant sub-community that 
                                                
80 Ibid 200 
81 Taylor C., ‘The Politics of Recognition’ in Gutmann A. (Ed) Multiculturalism (Princeton University 
Press, 1994)  
82 MacIntyre A., After Virtues: A Study in Moral Theory (University of Notre Dame Press, 1981)  
83 Nino C., The Ethics of Human Rights (Clarendon Press, 1993), 88-89 
84 Ibid 
85 Waltzer M., Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (Basic Books, 1983), 314 
86 See Raz, J., The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon Press, 1986) and Kymlicka W., Liberalism, 
Community and Culture (Clarendon Press, 1989)  
 36 
chokes off or absorbs weaker sub-communities and soon identifies its own parochial 
values and traditions with those of the comprehensive national community’87. Indeed, 
Agich has written that the communitarians’ appeal to tradition may be their 
downfall.88 He, as Feinberg, sees tradition in the concrete world as something people 
disagree about, and so necessitate a certain overarching authority ‘to impose 
orthodoxy’ and ‘foreclose further discussion and debates’.89 Ultimately, this appeal to 
higher authorities could result in ‘tyranny, not community’.90 In fact, Scanlon remarks 
that ‘victims (of human rights violations) would rarely concede that, because such 
behavior is common in their country, their tormentors are acting quite properly’.91 
From this point of view, human rights may be seen as one of the essential elements to 
provide the conditions necessary for an autonomy-based dignity, even as we 
recognize that autonomy cannot and should not be conceived entirely separately from 
the value and specificities of cultural and historical traditions. Mindful of this, 
rejecting liberalism completely on the count of its abstract view of the autonomous 
self, extricated from its community and tradition, is to my mind unnecessary. Some 
liberals embrace a conception of personhood anchored in communities and tradition, 
whilst still acknowledging the central place of autonomy. In a liberal landscape, the 
‘social nature of man’ can be accommodated by ‘recognising the bedrock importance 
of community to human nature and well-being’.92  
 
In any case, the basic point remains that communitarians arguments expose the 
concrete, socially embedded nature of autonomy; as such, these arguments are a 
useful starting point in the quest for a fuller conception of autonomy, one that fleshes 
out the bare abstract bones of the liberal ideal of autonomy. In order to include the 
dependent elderly in a conceptualization of dignity sensitive to the conditions that 
enable the realization of dignity, it is necessary to ground it precisely in such a 
concrete view of autonomy and personhood. In this next section, I will explore how 
more concrete and embodied conceptions of autonomy may lead to a different 
approach to dignity. I will shift my attention from considering conception of 
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autonomy as self-ruling rationality, to that adopted by feminist writers as entrenched 
in the relational self, and our ‘embodied vulnerability’.93 I will conclude that a 
concrete view of autonomy can give rise to a subject-specific understanding of 
dignity, giving rise to a more phenomenological approach to rights as defended by 
Grear above.  
 
 
b) Evolutional Autonomy  
 
For Haworth, whose work on autonomy cuts across the social sciences, autonomy is 
evolutional.94 According to his account of autonomy, the individual can only become 
autonomous through a process of ‘internalization’ of her community’s values and 
habits that will enable her to ‘acquire a certain amount of competence in the world, to 
achieve the results she wants, so that she can interpose herself between domination by 
others and domination by say, those of her physically based desires with which she 
does not identify’.95 This view of autonomy insists on the embodiment of individuals, 
and on the idea that we do not possess the same capacity for autonomy throughout the 
course of our lives. Autonomy is learnt, and presumes a fluctuating level of 
dependency on others.  
 
Without wishing to assimilate the issues faced by elderly people in care to those of 
children, parallels can nonetheless be drawn up with the theoretical ideas that have 
underpinned the debates regarding children’s rights. The particularization of rights for 
children reveals the need to respect their autonomy in face of parental authority, but 
also to limit that autonomy for their own protection. Indeed, Eekelaar reminds us that 
‘children often lack the information or ability to appreciate what will serve them 
best’.96 Some writers have defined children’s ‘autonomy interest’ as their claim to 
lead a life of their choosing, free from adult authority.97 Freeman has explained that 
uncritically giving heed to such interest could prevent children from reaching ‘a 
rationally autonomous adulthood’ where they would be ‘capable of deciding on (their) 
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own system of ends as free and rational beings’.98 Eekelaar therefore advances the 
view that a child’s ‘autonomy interest’ could not only conflict with ‘his 
developmental interest’, but also his ‘basic interest’, that of ‘general physical, 
emotional and intellectual care within the social capabilities of his or her immediate 
caregivers’.99 
 
It could be argued here that although the ‘developmental interest’ of children no 
longer applies to the dependent elderly, their ‘basic interest’ may sometimes need to 
take priority over their ‘autonomy interest’. It is unavoidable therefore to raise the 
problematic notion of paternalism, the ‘bête noire’ of liberal autonomy, especially for 
those whose ‘developmental interest’ cannot be invoked as a reason to compromise 
their autonomy. Agich writes that there is a tendency to see a necessary conflict 
between autonomy and ‘acting in the best interests of another’ under the premise of 
beneficence. 100  O’Neill does point out that in the case of medical treatment, 
beneficence should not be the only concern of medical practice, as it would involve 
treating ‘patients as persons only if beneficence so required’, regardless of their level 
of autonomy.101 This dichotomy is only problematic under the guise of liberal 
autonomy and the negative concept of paternalism as something that imposes a 
particular idea of wellbeing onto the individual. In fact, autonomy is not necessarily 
relinquished when someone acts in the best interest of another if that best interest 
includes safeguarding their ‘personal independence and judgment’.102 VanDeVeer 
refers to this kind of beneficence as ‘autonomy-respecting paternalism’,103 whilst 
Agich refers to it as ‘parentalism’, or ‘the term used for a wide range of relationships 
that foster human development’.104 
 
In fact, O’Neill remarks that it is false to assume that only people dependent on the 
care of others, such as children or the very elderly for instance, suffer from constraints 
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on their autonomy: rather, ‘all human capacities for autonomous action are limited’.105 
This can be explained if we adopt a conception of the individual that is inherently 
vulnerable. In this context, she resorts to an ethical theory that does not rely on 
‘idealised autonomy’, but on that of ‘actual human autonomy’.106 O’Neill does not 
recommend giving up on Kantian action-oriented ethics, (based on the primacy of 
agency and hence autonomy), for result-oriented ethics, which is based on wellbeing 
outcomes only, as a basis for an ethical framework in the domain of medical 
treatment.107 She does, however, recommend adapting or modifying Kantian action-
oriented ethics. O’Neill insists that in order for action-oriented ethics to work in the 
context of diminished autonomy, it is essential not to ‘rely on an abstract, ‘idealising’ 
account of autonomy’ that would ‘rule out all paternalism’, but to ‘take account of the 
partial character of human autonomy’, so as to ‘sketch patterns of reasoning which 
draw boundaries in given contexts between permissible and impermissible forms of 
paternalism’.108 
 
An action-oriented ethical framework where autonomy remains intrinsically valuable 
must be based on actual autonomy rather than idealised autonomy, so as to define the 
correct level of paternalism necessary for a life worth living, a life worthy of dignity. 
This ethical framework, as O’Neill concludes, complicates medical (or care) 
treatment, by forcing ‘patterns of reasoning’ that deliver individual outcomes for 
those cared for, rather than a simpler ‘boundary-line’ approach to paternalism.109 In 
practice this means having a personal knowledge of the patient’s circumstances to be 
able to define at which point and for what purpose their autonomy ought to be 
curtailed by paternalistic interventions. An evolutional account of autonomy 
highlights its temporal and individual character. Human beings’ capacity for 
autonomy fluctuates throughout their lives, and for that reason requires the 
intervention of others. In the case of the elderly in long-term care, reduced autonomy 
should not mean that beneficence alone should become the ethical guidance de 
rigueur.  
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In order for the evolutional characteristic of autonomy to be respected, care is 
necessary. It needs not replace autonomy but must facilitate it within an 
individualized approach. A formulation of dignity based on concrete autonomy must 
encompass this element of care or paternalism as argued by O’Neill, in order to give 
rise to the conditions necessary to its flourishing. I will delve into the notion of 
vulnerability and the state response it should trigger to enable dignity in Chapters III 
and IV. The communitarian critique of liberal autonomy and evolutional definitions 
of autonomy all presuppose that individuals, whatever their age or actual capacity for 
autonomy, are relational creatures, and that autonomy must also be defined as such. 
 
 
c) Relational Autonomy 
 
As I have explained above, an abstract notion of autonomy as the source of dignity 
assumes a strict liberal system where legal rights promote negative liberty. I have also 
engaged with the communitarian critique of the autonomous liberal self to reveal the 
importance of communities and tradition in the construction of the self. Dworkin 
concurs that ‘all individuals have a history’, that ‘they develop socially and 
psychologically in a given environment with a set of biological endowments’, and that 
‘they mature slowly and are, therefore, heavily influenced by parents, peers, and 
culture’.110 He therefore defines autonomy as a  
 
second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-order 
preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to accept or attempt 
to change these in light of higher-order preferences and values. By exercising 
such a capacity, persons define their nature, give meaning and coherence to 
their lives, and take responsibility for the kind of person they are.111  
 
This definition supposes a person very much more concrete than the ‘noumenal’ self 
of Kantian autonomy, free from all human impulses and sentiments. It sets out a 
vision of autonomy that is enmeshed with the individuals’ environment and history. 
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Nonetheless, historical accounts of autonomy such as that espoused by Dworkin 
above, but also by Christman, are not without their problems.112 Christman insists on 
the necessity of the person to possess ‘processes of critical reflection’ which 
themselves must be ‘procedurally independent’.113 This means that the person is only 
truly autonomous when she is able to reflect on the influences of the world she 
inhabits, and then analyze and reject if necessary, those that prevent her from critical 
self-reflection. True autonomy, under this particular conception, appears utopian. 
Nobody is fully able to identify and segregate those social influences in order to 
become ‘self-transparent’.114  
 
Some feminist writers have challenged Kantian autonomy because of its repressive 
effect on women. Cole has argued for instance that it represents a masculine 
obsession with self-sufficiency and self-realization to the detriment of human inter 
connectedness and dependency.115 Feminists have argued that social embeddedness is 
not necessarily an obstacle to autonomy, but a factor that may diminish it without 
necessarily negating it.116 Meyers argues that autonomy is a competency that can only 
be realized ‘in the context of social relationships, practices, and institutions’.117 She 
takes the example of women to argue that the skills required for autonomy 
competency can be fostered or stunted depending on the social context the individual 
lives in. According to this account, autonomy is similar to ‘self-realisation’ and so 
implies that  
 
since individuals differ so significantly in their talents, capacities, character 
traits, values, desires, beliefs and emotional attitudes (…), there can be no 
blueprint for what constitutes an autonomous life. Rather autonomy can be 
secured only through the exercise of autonomy competency, or a coordinated 
repertoire of skills and capacities that enable each individual to fully realize 
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himself or herself, whatever self-realization amounts to for each particular 
individual.118 
 
Meyers’ view of autonomy is linked to the individuals’ identity within their social 
context, and confirms the fluctuating character of autonomy. In her account, 
autonomy is a dynamic norm that allows for self-realization, shaped positively or 
negatively by social context.119 She mentions the case of women, and how ‘traditional 
gender socialization’ may compromise their competence to reach full autonomy; on 
one side it facilitates skills useful for ‘self-discovery’ such as ‘emotional receptivity 
and receptiveness’, whilst it also hinders their ability to develop skills for ‘self-
definition’, skills that men will more easily develop in this context.120 Autonomy as 
competence hence reveals the effect of the wider social context in the ability of 
persons to reach higher level of autonomy. It is arguably similar for elderly people, 
whose skills for autonomy competence will be greatly influenced by the social 
meaning of age. The social context the very elderly inhabit will have an impact on 
their ability to be autonomous. 
 
Meyers’ exposition of autonomy sits within a relational account of autonomy because 
it situates it within the definitional bounds of society, but also the very personal 
perception of self-realization it results in. In the same relational perspective, Nedelsky 
argues that autonomy is made possible by ‘constructive relationships - including 
intimate, cultural, institutional, national, global, and ecological forms of relationships, 
all of which interact’.121 She states that ‘a relational conception of autonomy turns our 
attention to the kinds of relations that undermine or enhance autonomy, and the forces 
that structure those relations - from institutional design to gendered division of labor 
to beliefs about entitlement. Examining institutional practices, and the law that shapes 
them, can, in turn, shed lights on what fosters autonomy’.122 The concept of relational 
autonomy reflects and pulls together the characteristics of autonomy highlighted in 
other conceptions of autonomy examined above: autonomy is an individual 
competence, shaped and informed by the individual’s community and tradition, the 
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care of others, societal norms and the institutional framework. The network of all 
these relationships, whether public or intimate, develops within individuals the 
capacity for autonomy. Rooting dignity in concrete autonomy, instead of that 
underscored by Kant, results in a better understanding of the conditions necessary to 
its flourishing in care.  
 
 
6) Dignity rooted in relational autonomy 
 
a) Care ethics 
 
Adopting a relational view of autonomy grounds dignity in an ‘embodied’ view of the 
person, evolving through the lifecourse.123 Relational autonomy underscores the 
paramount importance of care and care ethics. The origins of the ethic of care school 
of thought are generally attributed to Gilligan who developed it in the context of 
feminist critical theories.124 Her path to the formulation of an ethic of care started as a 
critique to the conclusion of Kohlberg’s stages of moral development that women 
were less morally developed than men.125 According to him, moral maturity was 
reached at the post-conventional morality stage, where individuals’ judgments were 
no longer based on the rules adopted by the group they belonged to (the conventional 
morality stage), but fashioned on universal principles such as justice and human 
rights. Kohlberg noted that women tended to make decisions predominantly in 
accordance with the people they were responsible for, and therefore did not attain this 
last stage of moral development associated with moral maturity.126  
 
Gilligan questioned this association of moral maturity and use of universal principles 
and held that women approached moral reasoning differently, with a greater emphasis 
on the relationships and emotional connections they formed, and the context they 
were in. It was not the case that their moral reasoning was weaker, but it was the case 
that it was rooted in a different value system. The place of care, this link that binds 
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people together at some point in their lives, becomes paramount in moral reasoning. 
As Sevenhuijsen summarises, the ethic of care means that ‘individuals can exist only 
because they are members of various networks of care and responsibility (and that) 
the self can exist only through and with others and vice versa’.127 Elderly individuals 
who can no longer live independently must still be considered as intrinsic parts of a 
web of relationships, and not as burdens on society that need to be removed from it.  
 
Caring is the stuff of life, and feminist views on the topic have influenced welfare.128 
As well as being essential to our survival, it can be the source of much ill if absent or 
badly performed. Care within an ethic of care is defined as fundamentally human, and 
whether being cared for, caring for others or both, we are always part of a caring 
dynamics.129 Derived directly from caring, the idea of dependency is also pivotal to an 
ethic of care. Herring has written that ‘a relational life is inevitable’.130 Instead of 
conceiving individuals as separate entities, the ‘relational self’ reflects the fact that 
‘our identities and values are found not in ourselves but in our relationships’.131 
People considered under an ethic of care are not looked at individually, but as part of 
a web of relations.132 As they place value in their relations with others, they seek to 
improve these in order to improve their own selves.133  Put differently, the self is not 
ever autonomous and free from ties, but the result of connections with others. This 
vision of the self means that we are all dependent on each other for our sense of self. 
The idea that people are stand-alone individuals perfectly content without the 
interference of others is actually a fallacy that Held sees as ‘modelled on the 
experience of men in public life and in the market place’.134  
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At most stages of our lives, our relational self forms part of interdependent relations, 
but at others, only dependence remains. As Kittay writes, perfect autonomy is 
fictitious, especially in old age; 
 
The frail elderly person … may herself have been involved in a series of 
interdependent relations. But at some point there is a dependency that is not 
yet, nor longer an interdependency. By excluding this dependency from social 
and political concerns, we have been able to fashion the pretence that we are 
independent, that the cooperation between persons that some insist is 
interdependence is simply the mutual cooperation between essentially 
independent persons’.135   
 
The last pillar of an ethic of care is the notion of responsibility. Care and dependency 
demand and create relations of responsibility. The default position of an ethic of care 
is the effective fulfilment of the responsibility we have towards those we care for.136 
Sevenhuijsen suggests that ‘because the ethic of care starts from a relational ontology, 
it focuses primarily on the question of what politics could mean for the safeguarding 
of responsibility and relationship in human practice and interaction.137  
 
Applying an ethic of care to social care policies, so that our responsibilities to the 
dependent elderly can be fulfilled, demands that we inquire into the meaning of 
dignity for those who are dependent on the care of others. It is only through this 
willingness to discover what the other person needs (or does not want) in order to 
experience dignity that we can begin to create those conditions amenable to it. As 
Sevenhuijsen remarks, ‘the ability and willingness to place oneself in the perceptions 
and viewpoints of others is indispensable in practicing care and responsibility’.138 It is 
important to be aware of the ‘asymmetrical reciprocity’ that caring relationships can 
create.139 Indeed, assuming to know the other and taking responsibility for them can 
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lead to oppression and paternalism. It is, as Sevenhuijsen reminds us, quite impossible 
to see ‘through someone else’s eyes’, as it is to ‘stand in someone else’s shoes’.140 It 
is therefore essential to have ‘the willingness to be open to everyone’s unique, 
embodied subjectivity: the idea that everyone is positioned differently and leads an 
existence that cannot be reduced to that of others’.141 In order to find out about this 
other, communication is key, and so it is in finding out about the other’s dignity. 
 
b) Dignity as subjectively experienced 
 
Benhabib’s feminist critique of the nature of the self under the Rawlsian veil of 
ignorance also leads her to adopt a relational view of the self.142 Benhabib writes that 
‘according to Kholberg and Rawls, moral reciprocity involves the capacity to take the 
standpoint of the other, to put oneself imaginatively in the place of the other, but 
under conditions of the ‘veil of ignorance’, the other as different from the self 
disappears’.143 Rawlsian subjects under the veil of ignorance are rational but ‘do not 
know their conception of the good’.144 Similarly to the beholder of Kantian autonomy, 
this being is dis-embodied, fictitious and un-human like. In her account of ‘the other’ 
Benhabib criticises the moral perspective view of the ‘generalised other’, a standpoint 
epitomised by Rawl’s theory of justice that ‘requires us to view each and every 
individual as a rational being entitled to the same rights and duties we would want to 
ascribe to ourselves.145 She posits this version of the ‘self-other’ relationship model to 
that of the ‘concrete other’, a standpoint that ‘requires us to view each and every 
rational being as an individual with a concrete history, identity and affective-
emotional constitution’.146  
 
Benhabib concludes that ‘from a meta-ethical and normative standpoint, I would 
argue for the validity of a moral theory that allows us to recognize the dignity of the 
generalised other through an acknowledgement of the moral identity of the concrete 
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other’.147 In order to put this moral order in practice, and combine both ethics of 
justice and ethics of care, she suggests ‘a model of communicative need 
interpretations’, 148  based on the idea that in order to create acceptable living 
conditions, it is not sufficient to assume the wishes and wants of this generalized 
other, but rather do so by trying to ‘learn, discursively or ‘dialogically’ what the 
‘otherness’ of other people consists in’.149 She explains that 
 
[N]either can the concreteness nor the otherness of the ‘concrete other’ can 
be known in the absence of the voice of the other. The viewpoint of the 
concrete emerges as a distinct one only as a result of self-definition. It is 
the other who makes us aware both of her concreteness and her otherness. 
Without engagement, confrontation, dialogue and even a “struggle for 
recognition” in the Hegelian sense, we tend to constitute the otherness of 
the other by projection and fantasy or ignore it in indifference.150 
 
Autonomy under the ‘generalized other’ Kantian sense, as the root to human beings’ 
dignity, can be read as excluding a large number of individuals at the periphery of its 
normative framework. Just as the ‘sphere of justice’ once eclipsed women and 
relegated them to the ‘realm of nature’ and the domestic activities of ‘nurture, 
reproduction, love and care’, so it can be argued that abstract autonomy has pushed to 
the shadows those who no longer fit the Kantian autonomous mold. Their dignity is 
not necessarily realized, because the conditions needed for its realisation do not 
appear to correspond to the strict model of justice rooted in Kantian autonomy.151  
 
I agree with Behabib that this does not mean that both ethical concerns of justice and 
care cannot be accommodated within our social order. There already exists, as I 
discussed above, a recognition of the embodiment of the self within the discourse of 
rights. A discursive approach to dignity reflects the intensely personal and relational 
character of autonomy and the concrete other, and offers a far more promising ground 
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upon which to create those conditions necessary to its realization. This is what has led 
me to examining qualitative studies about the meaning of dignity for elderly people in 
institutional care. The role law may play to foster dignity-enabling conditions depends 
on the adoption of a correct ethical framework. The kind of ‘communicative needs 
interpretation’ suggested by Benhabib offers such a framework. I will refer to this 
ethical model as discursive. Because our autonomy is relational and we are the 
product of caring relationships, we have a responsibility to understand dignity from 
the standpoint of the concrete other through dialogue. 
 
In adopting such an ethical model for dignity, particularly in institutional settings 
where people’s concrete autonomy has been deteriorated by age, the person’s own 
idea of dignity becomes the foundational value. This ethical framework makes dignity 
the heuristic concept I referred to in my introduction, one that can mean something 
quite specific to each and every human being, hence embracing individual 
particularism, whilst at the same time remaining universal in the sense that everyone 
has dignity. The meaning of dignity hinges on the person it refers to, and must be 
arrived at through the means of discourse. It should then be the role of the policy 
makers to create laws that enable the conditions fertile for dignity to flourish. It is 
evident that this model raises many problems. One of them would be the practical 
aspect of gathering the information needed from the people concerned. If the person is 
not able to communicate, other means would have to be deployed, and family 
members or close relatives may need to step in and reveal what they believe to be the 
meaning of dignity for that person. One of the main problems is that if dignity has as 
many meanings as there are people, it is going to be impossible to create the 
conditions necessary for its realization. But this needs not be the case. As I will show 
in the next chapter, although the meaning of dignity may be different from person to 
person, it will also be formed of many common elements. The extraction of common 
features to the meaning of dignity as produced through a model of discursive ethics 
can be used as a guiding frame onto which to hook the more detailed dialogical 
exchange that ought to take place with each individual in care.  
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7) Conclusion 
 
This chapter has set out the theoretical framework that supports the rest of this 
dissertation’s idea, which is that the understanding and enabling of dignity in care 
ought to be informed by the subjective views of individuals in care. I started by 
exploring the classic concept of Kantian dignity. Kantian dignity is ground breaking 
in its approach because it defines the intrinsic value of individuals independently of 
religion and a God-like conception of the human. It also sets out the importance and 
value of each and every individual, to be treated as ends and not means, in contrast to 
the utilitarian idea that endless sacrifices may be imposed on individuals so long as 
they promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number. The basis of dignity as 
defined by Kant is upheld by an abstract view of autonomy and rational agency that 
may be interpreted as excluding individuals whose autonomy has been compromised 
because of age. A strict interpretation of this particular conception of the self would 
lead to a system of rights intent on the protection of negative freedom as a prevalent 
political goal, leaving unfulfilled the creation of conditions necessary for the dignity 
of those who are considered dependent. Evidently, this is not the case in reality, as 
many human rights, especially those that are cultural, social and economic in nature, 
recognize our embodied and finite nature, and the fact that we need a certain 
environment for dignity to flourish. 
 
The second part of this chapter has therefore focused on exploring a more concrete 
concept of autonomy, in order to come up with a definition of dignity that could guide 
public bodies to fulfil their duty to take it into account in the delivery of their social 
care services. I first looked at the communitarian critique of theories of justice 
incorporating a Kantian view of mankind, and concluded that, although tradition and 
history do play a part in creating who we are, a communitarian political theory did not 
warrant the dismissal of liberalism. Instead, communitarian critique opened the debate 
on the nature of autonomy, one that is shaped by its history, surroundings and culture. 
This account of autonomy then led me to explore other concrete accounts of 
autonomy, for the most part developed by feminist writers. In conclusion, it appears 
that autonomy is not only anchored in our history and tradition, but it is also 
evolutional, and ultimately relational. Our autonomy is an individual value that is 
transient, and based paradoxically on interdependence and interconnectivity.  
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I have argued that embracing the notion of relational autonomy provides a far more 
inclusive basis for dignity for all. It fits within an ethical framework of care that 
recognises the relational embeddedness of individuals. Understanding dignity 
grounded in relational autonomy suggests that the state has a responsibility to 
safeguard those relationships people depend on.  A discursive approach demands to 
take into account people’s concrete autonomy, and therefore offers a practical mean to 
apprehend experienced and subjective dignity. This in turn would facilitate setting out 
the conditions necessary for dignity to flourish. The next step of my enquiry is 
therefore the application of the theory described here and the search of a definition of 
dignity based on qualitative and empirical studies that have asked the older 
individuals what dignity means to them. 
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Chapter II 
 
Meaning of Dignity        
 
 
1) Introduction 
 
I suggested in the last chapter that dignity ‘à la Kant’ was rooted in a kind of 
autonomy that was not relatable to all human beings, especially those whose rational 
agency had been eroded by age. Instead, I introduced and endorsed a feminist view of 
autonomy, one entrenched in the concrete self. I have linked relational autonomy to 
its source, namely the ethics of care, an approach to morality centred round our need 
to care and be cared for. Sevenhuijsen, quoted in the last chapter, reminds us that this 
is an ethics that is relational by definition, because it ‘focuses primarily on the 
question of what politics could mean for the safeguarding of responsibility and 
relationships in human practice and interaction’.1 This question relies on knowing ‘the 
concrete other’, a process that cannot derive from pretending to be the other, but 
rather only happens when we engage in dialogue.2 
 
I believe that in order to refine the meaning of dignity in the context of elderly care, 
asking the people concerned is essential. A number of academics working in social 
sciences disciplines have conducted such empirical studies through the methodology 
of qualitative research, based on a mix of in-depth or semi-structured interviews and 
focus groups. Most of these studies have been run in the context of social and 
healthcare research, in response to a large body of policies focused on promoting 
dignity as a new paradigm for care.3 These policies in turn are a political reaction to 
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some of the Care Quality Commission reports on inadequate care practices, and on 
the need for reform in the care industry.4 Although many of these documents hail 
dignity as the value to be promoted, few explore directly the meaning of dignity from 
the perspective of the people receiving care.5 For the reasons already stated, however, 
it is of crucial importance to gather the views of those whose lives are affected by 
these policies about the meaning of dignity and its importance in their daily lives. 
Studies that engage with the views of these constituencies are an invaluable source of 
information for the purpose of my argument, as they offer the possibility to critically 
assess whether dignity as understood by those concerned is a concept currently legally 
protected, or capable of legal protection.  
 
In this chapter, I will review studies conducted to this effect and published in nursing, 
healthcare and ageing study journals. In order to locate them, I performed a 
systematic search of the words ‘dignity’, ‘elderly’ and ‘care’ on the social sciences 
databases Assia (Applied Social Sciences index and Abstracts), BHI (British 
Humanities Index), and Web of Science. I limited this search to material from the last 
ten years to keep the results as relevant and up to date as possible. I chose those 
studies that were the most closely matched to my inquiry’s objective, the discovery of 
the meaning of dignity for elderly people in care homes.  
 
Two studies came back as a direct match to my area of inquiry. They could have been 
the sole basis of my inquiry, but I preferred to expand my data pool and put some 
extra flesh on the bare bones of the definition of dignity that was emerging, without, 
however, including findings that were too far removed from the topic at hand. I 
selected an additional 10 studies through this process. As Mason explains, the 
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quantity of data analysed in qualitative studies does not equate to quality of outcome.6 
Indeed data saturation means that eventually, extra data will not add any information 
of value to the original dataset used. In this instance, I felt that adding any more 
qualitative studies to the 12 already analysed in this review would not improve the 
quality of the emerging definition of dignity: the focus of this enquiry must remain on 
the meaning of dignity for a particular segment of the population in particular 
circumstances. 
 
The findings of these studies are presented in this chapter in a thematic form 
following the coding of the material collected, which enabled me to get a clearer 
understanding of dignity and gauge the recurrent motifs and disparities in results. I 
have organised all findings under themes and sub-themes I believe best capture the 
meaning of all the data examined. My goal in this particular chapter has been to 
remain as descriptive as possible, following the themes already identified by those 
undertaking the studies I discuss, in order to let the voices of the research participants 
speak as much as possible. 
 
The studies I have focused upon are as follows; I have used the findings of the 
Dignity and the Older European Project, a long term study spanning the years 
between 2001 and 2004, aimed at forming a better understanding of dignity as a basis 
for ‘better quality of life and healthcare’ through ‘policy development and service 
provision for older people throughout Europe’.7 I have chosen to relate the results 
found for the United Kingdom,8 but also the overall summarised findings for the six 
participating European countries (France, Ireland, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom).9 I have also chosen to use another paper grounded on this original 
                                                
6 Mason M., ‘Sample Size and Saturation in PhD Studies Using Qualitative interviews’ (2010) 11(3) 
Forum Qualitative Social Research Art.8 
7 Tadd W., ‘Editorial: Dignity and Older Europeans’ (2005) Vol. 6(1), Quality in Ageing 2, 3 
8 Woolhead G., Calnan M., Dieppe P.,Tadd W. ‘Dignity in older age: what do older people in the 
United Kingdom think?’ (2004) 33(2) Age and Ageing 165  
The qualitative research conducted here was based on fifteen focus groups and two individual 
interviews and was set in South West England and South Wales between April and October 2002. The 
72 participants came from 12 different settings, were all aged over 65 years old and purposely selected 
in order to represent a cross section of socio-economic backgrounds, ethnicity, gender and level of 
physical fitness. Six of the individuals chosen for the study were nursing home residents. 
9 Bayer T., Tadd W. and Krajcik S., ‘Dignity: The voice of older people’ (2005) Vol 6(1), Quality in 
Ageing 22 
‘This paper reports on the findings of 89 focus groups and 18 individual interviews (involving 391 
older people in 6 European countries between April and October 2002). The participants were 
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research but used as the basis for an enquiry into the similarities between findings 
extracted from interviews and theories written about dignity.10 When possible, I have 
only taken into account the responses offered by those interviewees who lived in care 
homes, although some of the findings related are also mixed with perceptions of 
dignity of older people who are not in residential care.  
 
Another study held in North Wales asked the question ‘What one change today could 
make a difference to you tomorrow?’ and was aimed at older people who used care 
services.11 This study does not specifically target people in nursing homes, but it 
referred to the perception of dignity for people in the context of the provision of care 
services, where vulnerability and dependency occur. It is also the only study 
conducted in the form of a survey where people’s answers were more succinct, more 
numerous and anonymous. 
 
Other studies I have taken into account explore exclusively the meaning of dignity for 
elderly people in situation of care dependency, but do so with an end of life focus. 
One such paper aims at comparing the meaning of dignity for care home residents 
with that of cancer patients in the latter stages of the disease,12 whereas another 
explores dignity in care homes as an extension to the application of palliative care 
practices, 13 or a basis upon which to ameliorate end of life care.14  
                                                                                                                                      
purposely selected to represent a cross section of ‘educational, social and economic backgrounds’, 23. 
25% of the people interviewed were 80 years old and over and 17% were care and nursing home 
residents. 
10  Calnan M., Badcott D. and Woolhead G., ‘Dignity Under Threat? A study of the Experience of 
Older People in the United Kingdom’ (2006) 36(2) International Journal of Health Services 355 
11 Morgan G., ‘Dignity in Care Survey in North Wales’ (2012) 16(4) Working with Older People 175 
The survey was organized by the North Wales Dignity in Care Forum and involved the National Health 
Service and local authorities organisations. 499 responses were received, but there is no data recording 
the demographic statistics of the people who answered.  
12 Hall S., Longhurst S. and Higginson I., ‘Living and dying with dignity: a qualitative study of the 
view of people in nursing homes’ (2009) 38 Age and Ageing 411 
This study is based on the interviews of 18 selected nursing home residents aged 75 and over in one of 
two care homes in London. 
13 Franklin L-L., Ternestedt B-M. and Nordenfelt L., ‘Views on Dignity of Elderly Nursing Home 
Residents’ (2006) 13 Nursing Ethics 130 
This study is based on the multiple interviews (39 in total) of 12 selected residents (10 women and 2 
men) aged 85 and over in two nursing homes in Sweden. It was compiled following a hermeneutic 
approach over a period of 18 months during 2002 and 2003. 
14 Pleschberger S., ‘Dignity and the challenge of dying in nursing homes: the residents’ view’ (2007) 
36 Age and Ageing, 197  
The work conducted here was conducted between November 2001 and February 2003 and is based on 
interviews with 20 residents aged between 63 and 93 years old, 15 women and 5 men in six different 
nursing homes. Participants were selected to represent a range of age, gender, care needs and nursing 
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One study held in Holland has addressed the issue of dignity in care homes in the 
context of illness and its impact on dignity.15 In that country, elderly people with 
disabilities and on-going medical conditions are placed specifically in nursing homes 
rather than residential homes. This particular study was conducted in such nursing 
homes and therefore gave the specific viewpoints of the most frail and vulnerable 
elderly individuals in care, and the impact poor health had on their dignity. Following 
on from this study, the same researchers went on to conduct a longitudinal analysis of 
the changes in the personal dignity of the same residents, giving a particular insight 
into whether the notion of dignity evolved as time went on.16  
 
Another research paper published their findings on the meaning of dignity in care 
homes in the UK following the interviews of all those involved in the care of elderly 
people, including home managers, care assistants, care home nurses, community 
nurses, care home residents and some of their family members.17 Once again, in this 
chapter I only report the responses obtained from the nursing home residents.  
 
I have also included in the research material a study focused on the meaning of 
dignity for residents with dementia.18 A large majority of people in care homes suffer 
                                                                                                                                      
homes were chosen for their varied organizational characteristics. Three further focus group 
discussions involving 30 participants were used to validate the original findings. 
15 Oosterveld M.G, Vlug, H., Roeline, W. Pasman, van Gennip I.E., Muller M., Dick L. Onwuteaka-
Philipsen W. and B.D. ‘Dignity and the factors that influence it according to nursing home residents: a 
qualitative interview study’ (2013) 70(1) Journal of Advance Nursing 97 
This study relied on in-depth interviews conducted between May 2010 and June 2011 with 30 recently 
admitted residents recruited from four nursing homes in Holland. They were aged between 49 and 102 
with a majority suffering from diminished bodily functions due to old age. 
16 Oosterveld M.G., Vlug, H., Roeline, W. Pasman, van Gennip I.E., Muller M., Dick L. Onwuteaka-
Philipsen W. and B.D.  ‘Changes in the Personal Dignity of Nursing Home Residents: A Longitudinal 
Qualitative Interview Study’ (2013) 8(9) Plos ONE  
Twenty-two participants from the study described under n10 were interviewed multiple times over a 
period ranging from May 2010 to December 2012 to find out how their perception of dignity changed 
over time post admission to a nursing home.  
17 Hall S., Dodd R.H., Higginson I.J, ‘Maintaining dignity for residents of care homes: A qualitative 
study of the views of care home staff, community nurses, residents and their families’ (2014) 35(1) 
Geriatric Nursing 55 
16 residents, 11 women and 5 men whose median age was 80.5 years old and living in one of 8 care 
homes in two areas of London were interviewed as part of this particular study.  
18 Goodman C, Amador S., Elmore N., Machena I. and Mathie E., ‘Preferences and priorities for 
ongoing and end of life care: A qualitative study of older people with dementia resident in care homes’ 
(2013) 50 International Journal of Nursing Studies 1639 
The findings used here are part of a larger ‘four year longitudinal mixed method study entitled 
“Evidence Based Intervention s for Dementia End-of-Life”’(at 1640). The data collected in this 
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from some form of the disease.19 Although the particular paper used here does not 
make a direct reference to dignity in its title, it explores the meaning of a worthwhile 
life for the residents with dementia, and so offers some information akin to that found 
in dignity-led discussions.  
 
Finally, I have chosen to take into account a study exploring the opinions on dignity 
of older people from different ethnic backgrounds.20 This particular study focused on 
the opinion of women, but as for most of the research work carried out in this field, 
women tend to be overrepresented because of their naturally longer lifespan.21  
 
The questions ‘what does dignity means to you personally?’, ‘what would treating 
you with dignity involve?’, ‘can you describe an example of how you or anyone you 
know has been treated in a (un)dignified way?’, or ‘what do you think supports a 
resident’s sense of dignity?’,22 were the kind of questions most people were asked to 
answer as a starting point of the interviews conducted. Generally the people 
interviewed found it easier to give examples of threats to dignity than give a positive 
description of dignity. Despite this, it is also true that some were able to highlight 
those good practices in health and care practice that fostered their sense of dignity. 
However the answers were formulated, they were all interpreted and coded to fit a 
dignity-defining framework.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
instance are based on the semi-structured interviews of 18 participants across 6 care homes (13 female 
and 5 male). Their median age was 84.7 years, ranging from 68.7 to 93 years old.  
19 According to the Alzheimer’s Society website,  ‘80 per cent of people living in care homes have a 
form of dementia or severs memory problems’ < http://www.alzheimers.org.uk/statistics> Accessed 
17th December 2014 
20 Saltus R. and Pithara C., ‘A sense of dignity in later life: a qualitative study on the views of older 
women migrants from minoritised backgrounds’ (2014) 15(1) Quality in Ageing 22 
For this research, 32 older women from Caribbean, Chinese, Bangladeshi and Indian origins living in 
Wales took part in semi-structured interviews in their mother tongue. This study asks about the 
interviewees’ perception of dignity in later life, care, and the meaning of dignity in care. 
21 Office for National Statistics, ‘Life Expectancy at Birth and at age 65 by Local Areas in England and 
Wales: 2011 to 13’ <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/subnational-health4/life-expectancy-at-birth-and-
at-age-65-by-local-areas-in-england-and-wales/2011-13/stb-life-expectancy-at-birth-2011-13.html#tab-
National-life-expectancy> Accessed 26th December 2014n‘Life expectancy at birth in England and 
Wales (combined) increased between the periods 2007–09 and 2011–13, from 78.1 to 79.3 years for 
males and 82.2 to 83.0 years for females. Life expectancy increased at a faster pace for males than 
females, causing the gap between the sexes to narrow from 4.1 years in 2007–09 to 3.7 years in 2011–
13’.  
22 Woolhead et al (n8), Bayer et al (n9) and Oosterveld-Vlug  (n15) 
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The limitations of these studies must be acknowledged and some methodological 
clarifications made. Firstly, although some of the research used here was conducted in 
the United Kingdom, some relate findings submitted in other countries such as 
Germany, Holland, Sweden and others mentioned above. Following the pan-European 
work undertaken by the Dignity and Older European Consortium, I treat the findings 
of these different studies as commensurable, because of the similar socio-economic, 
religious and cultural backgrounds these countries broadly share, as well as their 
comparable attitudes and policies concerning ageing populations.23 
 
Secondly, all research except the one surveying older people in Wales,24 purposely 
sampled their participants so as to give a more rounded answer to the questions asked. 
Some tried to select people with a variety of educational, social, and religious 
backgrounds as well as different level of fitness and age. In most cases researchers 
recognized that there was an inevitable female gender bias to their sample groups. It 
must also be appreciated that most participants were selected by the care home 
professionals in charge of their care because they were able to give informed consent 
and were judged by them to be mentally and physically able to contribute to the study 
at hand.  
 
Thirdly, only one study used here purposely reported on the views of people with 
dementia and only one focused on the impact of the ethnicity of the participants on 
the notion of dignity. As the Social Care Institute for Excellence remarks, gaps in 
research still exist about the views of people suffering from dementia or other 
impairment limiting their ability to communicate; studies tend to underrepresent the 
viewpoint of men; and there is limited research on the opinions of some marginalised 
groups such as gay and lesbian older people.25 
 
The themes identified by Woolhead et al to classify their findings were chosen as my 
initial framework upon which to organise the data from all other research papers.26 
Woolhead’s study is closely related to my area of enquiry and the themes she chose 
                                                
23 Tadd (n7), Woolhead et al (n8) and Bayer et al (n9) 
24 Morgan (n11) 
25 < http://www.scie.org.uk/publications/guides/guide15/selectedresearch/gapsintheresearch.asp> 
Accessed 23rd December 2014 
26 Woolhead et al (n8) 
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are clear and simple: dignity of identity, human rights and autonomy.27 With slight 
modifications, I found that Woolhead’s themes were able to provide a useful 
analytical framework for discussing the findings of the other studies I discuss. Thus 
‘dignity of identity’ became ‘identity’, and human rights evolved into ‘humanity’. 
Autonomy remained the same as it stood out as an important and recurring theme in 
all studies.  
 
 
2) Identity 
 
a) Introduction 
 
Identity here is understood as a sense of self. It is intimately related to define the 
perception of one’s own emotional and physical being.  It has transpired from reading 
these studies that the emotional fulfilment of a sense of self depended heavily on the 
interactions a person had. These could be those interactions they had with themselves, 
in the form of self-respect, but also those they experienced with others and which 
made up part of who they were. In the specific case of vulnerable elderly people, 
interactions with health and care professionals were regarded as essential to a sense of 
identity, as well as those with other groups in the wider society.28 These particular 
relationships appear to fulfil the emotional self by defining the person’s place in the 
world, giving them a certain weight and sense of worth. The quality of each of these 
relationships was described as having a real impact on a person’s sense of dignity 
overall. An essential hallmark of that quality was found in the type of communication 
people in care had with their carers.  
 
People interviewed also claimed participation was an important mean to sustain their 
identity. Being involved and having a voice were aspects of participation people 
referred to as important to feeling dignified. Some of the people interviewed also 
talked about their physical selves as an important part of their identity. Identity was 
indeed also perceived as intrinsically linked to the functionality of people’s bodies, 
essential to their wellbeing. Coping with a less able ageing body was regarded in 
                                                
27 Ibid  
28 Woolhead et al (n8) 167 
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some studies as a threat to dignity. The loss of privacy, inescapable when the body 
fails to sustain autonomy, was cited time and again as undignified. These multiple 
challenges to identity were made all the more difficult by the emotional aftermath of 
loss many residents had lived through (including, but not limited to, their partner, 
friends, or home). The dimension of identity can be usefully broken down into a 
number of sub-themes.  
 
 
b) Self-respect 
 
Although self-respect was viewed as a quality people possessed within themselves, it 
was reported important to keep up with physical appearances and look after oneself 
well in order to maintain a sense of pride.29 Some people thought that if you could no 
longer look after yourself, it was essential to be kept looking ‘respectable’ and that 
care staff should enable people to do so in order to keep hold of a sense of dignity. 30 
It was considered undignified for people to be left clothed badly or dressed up by staff 
as if they were dolls.31 People who resisted help and stopped looking after themselves 
through either a lack of will or resources were thought to be less likely to be respected 
by others.32 External appearances connoted the status and state of mind of the person 
and for that reason were important to keep up with.33  
 
Mentally, the ability to react pragmatically to ageing and its negative societal image 
was considered by some to be a proof of dignity.34 Being strong-minded was therefore 
one way of coping with the indignity ageing could bring, but how self-respect was 
sustained varied depending on the person asked. Some held that the actions of others 
were interlinked with their own sense of self-respect (i.e. the effect that had on the 
preservation of their privacy), whereas some said that their sense of pride was within 
them, intimate and unchangeable by others and for that reason managed to remain 
strong in the face of ageing and frailty.35 Some took pride in the achievements they 
                                                
29 Hall et al (n17) 59 
30 Ibid  
31 Ibid 
32 Calnan et al (n10) 364 
33 Ibid 
34 Bayer et al (n9) 24 
35 Hall et al (n12) 414 
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had accumulated throughout their lives, 36 some found their self-respect rooted in their 
family,37 whilst others maintained a strong sense of self by standing up for themselves 
and questioning the care practices they did not agree with.38 People who had religious 
beliefs found that their faith enabled them to preserve their dignity.39  
 
Maintaining self-respect in the face of ageing and dependency was not always 
possible or easy.  One resident who was ill felt that her sense of self had been 
completely and irrevocably altered by the physical and personality changes brought 
on by her condition.40 Being unable to recognize oneself because of the changes ill 
health provoked was felt as a threat to identity and dignity. 
 
Participants defined self-respect as an inner quality that made up the immutable chore 
and strength of their being. Physical appearance could reflect it and so dictated that 
looking presentable mattered. It was also bolstered by remaining strong mentally, a 
feat many achieved by believing in themselves, their achievements, or their faith. This 
internal component part of people’s identity was defined in the context of many 
external factors that also played a role in their overall perception of dignity. 
 
 
c) Relationships 
 
Relationships participants had with others around them were mentioned time and 
again in all studies as very much intertwined with how people perceived their own 
sense of identity. Pleschberger related the results of her study by separating dignity 
into an interpersonal and a relational concept.41 For her, ‘dignity (was) socially 
constructed by the act of recognition and therefore require(d) recognition’.42 Whether 
with the people who cared for them, their family members, friends or the wider 
community, relationships had an important bearing on the dignity of people in care 
homes, as they gave them a sense of who they were. 
                                                
36 Oosterveld-Vlug et al (n15) 101 
37 Saltus and Pithara (n20) 28 
38 Ibid  
39 Ibid  
40 Ibid  
41 Pleschberger (n14) 199 
42 Ibid 
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The relationships of dependence people had with health and care workers were 
essential to their sense of dignity because they influenced many aspects of their daily 
lives. Firstly, they had an impact on the privacy of the participants, a component part 
of their dignity.43 One resident explained that being shielded from others when being 
cared for or dressed was essential to her dignity.44 For people who had experienced a 
hospital stay or a time when they needed care, respect for their privacy was vital. 
Mixed sex wards, the exposure of the naked body and the interference of others in the 
conducting of very intimate care were all portrayed as infringements of their privacy 
and sense of identity.45 On the other hand, some people who lived in nursing homes 
seemed to have accepted the daily intrusions of others on their privacy, and only 
wished to be kept clean and presentable.46 It appears that although these participants’ 
sense of identity had been changed beyond recognition through the ageing process, 
remaining dignified was still made possible by their acceptance of that change, the 
acknowledgment that they needed help, and the adaptation of their expectations to 
their new condition.  
 
Secondly, the relationships people had with care staff contributed to giving them a 
sense of worth, another element important to a sense of dignity. Someone related that 
being ignored by staff made them feel as if ‘they were blockheads just because they 
were old’, and that it made them feel like they were seen as a chore rather than an 
individual. 47 Some reported that care professionals who listened, took time to talk and 
fostered relationships based on mutual respect were key to their dignity.48 In one 
survey mutual respect within relationship in general was prized as one of the most 
important element for dignity to flourish. 49 Others felt that staff members were often 
too busy, or not interested to have any meaningful relationships with them.50 Some 
thought that they ought not to upset staff by complaining because they depended on 
them too much and so were vulnerable to possible retributions.51 It was also reported 
                                                
43 Hall et al (n17) 57 
44 Ibid 
45 Woolhead et al (n8) 167, Franklin et al (n13) 138, Oosterveld-Vlug et al (n15) 102 
46 Woolhead et al (n8) 168 
47 Franklin et al (n13) 139 
48 Calnan et al (n10) 368, Oosterveld-Vlug et al (n15) 102 
49 Morgan (n11) 
50 Franklin et al (n13) 139; Pleschberger (n14) 199; Goodman (n15) 1643 
51 Woolhead (n4) 167 
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that the lack of resources meant a high turnover of temporary staff, which did not 
allow for the building of meaningful relationships.52 Time pressures carers were under 
to get the job done as quickly and efficiently as possible were experienced by those 
cared for as an affront to their dignity.53 It was as if they were not individuals 
anymore, but an item on a list of jobs to complete. The more people needed help with 
every day tasks, the more they relied on care staff for their wellbeing and appreciated 
the care they received.54 It can therefore be assumed from these findings that in the 
case of people in nursing homes, where daily life is defined and ruled by care staff, 
the quality of the relationships formed with them is all the more relevant to their sense 
of identity.  
 
Relationships with family members and friends were also cited as essential to a sense 
of worth.55 One participant, whose sense of dignity had worsened because of her loss 
of mobility and poor health since her admission in a nursing home, said that she only 
felt dignified when she received visitors, because ‘they at least knew who she was’.56 
The person interviewed felt that because of her illness and new circumstances, she 
could no longer be truly herself in her new surroundings. The fact that these visitors 
were few and far between because ‘they were not so many left’ meant that her sense 
of dignity was fragile and in jeopardy when the visits stopped.57 Some felt that the 
place of older people within their own family unit was not as important as it should 
be, reflecting the general depreciation of the value older people held in society today, 
even in those ethnic communities where tradition used to dictate respect for the 
elderly.58 Some people noticed that although they had had quite a few visits when 
they had first arrived at the care home, this tended to diminish as time went on.59 One 
person commented that this kind of abandonment made them feel like they were 
‘alive, but not really living anymore’.60 A study remarked on how some residents 
were no longer visited by their family and hence relied on the interactions they had 
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with their carers to fulfil their need of acknowledgement and exchange.61 Some older 
women from ethnic minorities associated dignity in later life with the status conferred 
to them in their family, one of particular importance that reflected their experience 
and ability to advise and counsel family members.62 
 
Relationships with other people from the nursing home were resented by some and 
interpreted as forced upon them, making it difficult to have some time alone.63 Most 
of the people asked in one particular study where people suffered from ill health 
found that the presence of others was on the contrary reassuring, and that they took 
comfort in the knowledge that they could help each other out if needed.64 One person 
interviewed a while after admission to a nursing home remarked that her dignity had 
been enhanced by her getting to know other residents.65 
 
Relationships interviewees had with other groups in society also influenced their 
sense of identity. People felt their dignity threatened when pejorative terms were used 
to describe them as a sub-group. Words such as ‘wrinklies’ or ‘bed blockers’ used to 
describe older people had a damaging effect on their overall sense of dignity. The 
negative feeling brought on by being seen as a group rather than an individual was 
also a threat to dignity found in other studies.66 It exposed the direct impact of ageism 
on the sense of dignity older people had. Ageism is expressed in the grouping of older 
people, a group that is supposed to share the same defining characteristics.67 This idea 
that a person in only seen as a part of a group rather than as an individual has 
insidious consequences. For instance, some older people felt that they should avoid 
complaining because they would be reinforcing the negative image society already 
had of them.68 Some felt a lack of collective respect for older people transpired in 
today’s world.69 Others felt that it was a shame to be viewed as a group with no use 
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66 Mann J., ‘Dignity and Health: the UDHR’s Revolutionary First Article’ (1998) Vol. 3 (2) Fiftieth 
Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 30 
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and that their experience and knowledge were too quickly dismissed by younger 
generations who could benefit from them.70  
 
On the positive side, one study showed that although people could feel the weight of 
negative stigma and stereotype prior to their admission in care, it seemed less relevant 
as time went by.71 In fact, the environment of the care home felt to some like a 
protective barrier between them and the outside world where people were ‘really 
quick to look down on you’.72 Those with disabilities liked the fact that they were 
amongst others similar to themselves and that their common understanding of how 
this was like was far preferable to the disrespectful look society sometimes had on 
them.73 
 
Relationships, whether with carers, friends, family members, care home residents, or 
the wider community were all extremely important in forming a person’s sense of 
identity. These interactions were essential to a sense of self and influenced greatly 
how the transition to life in a care home was experienced. How positively or 
negatively these relationships influenced people’s perception of themselves often was 
linked to the quality of the communication involved.  
 
 
d) Communication 
 
Communication with people around them affected some residents’ sense of identity, 
as it reinforced their sense of self through the possibility of verbal interaction and the 
expression of their personal preferences and desires. Communication was one of the 
main five issues raised as having a bearing on dignity in the survey carried out in 
North Wales.74  One aspect of communication that was cited as undignifying was 
excessive familiarity and the automatic use of a person’s Christian name by health 
and care staff. Most people found that being addressed by patronizing terms such as 
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‘dear’ or ‘love’ was also detrimental to their perception of identity.75 Ten per cent of 
those surveyed in North Wales by the health board expressed a wish to see the casual 
way people were greeted changed to a more formal and respectful one.76 Being 
addressed in the wrong manner was one example where communication had a 
negative bearing on a person’s identity and indicates that respect for people’s 
individuality, their status and background is very much linked to their identity.  
 
The situation of being talked about but not talked to was reported by one interviewee 
as having the same adverse effect on her dignity.77 Some relayed the same concern 
when they said they were ‘seen but not heard’, talked to as if children, or taken out of 
conversations altogether about their own care choices. 78  Being excluded from 
conversation on the assumption that old people are less able to understand what is 
said reinforces the generational divide and the idea that a person’s identity is 
compromised once they reach a certain stage in life.  
 
The quality of the communication people in care homes had with those who cared for 
them was also mentioned as having consequences on their dignity.79 Some people 
revealed that the silence of care staff during the course of their care made them feel 
invisible, which in turn impacted negatively on their sense of dignity.80 In fact, one 
study exposed that the emotional unavailability of care staff was detrimental to the 
quality of every day life of the residents.81 Social exclusion and isolation in old age in 
general is well documented, and people in care homes, even though surrounded by 
other people, are not immune from it.82  People being cared for often avoided 
communicating their complaints against undignified care because they felt in a real 
position of vulnerability in the hands of the staff looking after them.83 In order to 
sustain autonomy even when frailty set in, it was felt by some participants that the 
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79 See also Woolhead G., Tadd W., Boix-Ferrer J. A., Krajcik S., Schmid-Pfahler S., Spjuth B., Stratton 
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ability to ‘negotiate’ with professionals was primordial, so as to obtain the best 
treatment possible.84 Ultimately people who were dependent on care wished they 
were asked what their wishes and preferences were, and valued being listened to by a 
kind ear.85 
 
More positively, some stated that health care staff who asked for permission before 
carrying out an examination demonstrated respect for their dignity.86 On the contrary, 
communicating by adopting a superior tone, giving non-negotiable instructions or 
using disrespectful or hurtful language, was regarded as damaging to dignity.87 Those 
who developed a relationship with their carers over time found that they were listened 
to more willingly, and hence were more able to influence their care.88 The study 
focused on the views of residents with dementia showed that although a person with 
the disease may express herself in a seemingly confused way, her wishes could be 
understood if listened to carefully and patiently, and not dismissed as nonsense and 
symptomatic of the condition.89  
 
Communicating with others formed an important part of how some participants saw 
themselves. People’s sense of identity was affected by how they were spoken to, by 
whether they felt included in conversations generally, and by the opportunity they had 
to have a say in the direction of their own lives. As well as relationships and 
communication, taking part in activities and having a sense of purpose also mattered 
to some participants and had consequences for their sense of dignity. 
 
e) Participation 
 
Participation appeared on multiple occasions as an area essential to the fulfilment of a 
person’s sense of self. It is closely linked to communication and the idea that 
inclusion is intrinsic to a sense of self. Taking part in activities made some people feel 
worthwhile and was regarded as enhancing their dignity by providing them with an 
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opportunity to interact with others and contribute to something.90 After feeling 
isolated and homesick upon admission to a nursing home, one resident claimed that 
taking part in the various organised activities in place there made her life far more 
enjoyable, and allowed her to build a social circle within her new environment.91  A 
sense of purpose was also found through helping others,92 although the lack of 
physical ability to do so was problematic to some.93  
 
Participation could also be defined in a less practical sense, but rather as the feeling of 
being a part of something bigger than oneself. For instance, some people seemed to 
take strength from a ‘sense of coherence’ given to them by the place they still 
occupied within their family unit. 94  Being surrounded by photographs and 
memorabilia consolidated this sense of worth through belonging.95  
 
Some people interviewed felt that they still would have liked to participate in the 
wider society, that their life experience and accumulated skills could be put to good 
use in educating younger generations or serving their community.96 Some felt that 
unfortunately retirement usually meant the beginning of exclusion from participation 
in society.97 Dignity was also promoted when people felt they were being asked their 
opinion about policies and issues that concerned them directly.98 Older women from 
different ethnic origins felt that their participation resided in the transferring of their 
culture through the generations.99 
 
Throughout these studies, participation was linked to a sense of worth and purpose in 
life, on whatever scale, and seemed paramount to a sense of identity and ultimately 
dignity. Permeating all these criteria that fostered dignity, the physical changes people 
were faced with meant new challenges to their identity too. 
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f) Physical Changes 
 
Physical changes resulting from ageing also played a part in the sense of identity 
elderly people interviewed had about themselves. The ‘unrecognisable body’ emerged 
as a theme in the study conducted by Franklin et al and included the feelings of being 
let down by one’s body through the inability to perform basic functions once taken for 
granted.100 Although people did not feel that their dignity was jeopardized directly by 
their failing bodies, a phenomenon they recognised as the natural process of ageing,101 
it was the shift in their identity resulting from their increasing dependence on others 
that was strongly felt as a threat to dignity. Indeed, People resented their bodies for 
not allowing them to fulfil their basic needs.102 Physical deterioration meant the loss 
of privacy because of the need for others to interfere in daily personal care, and this 
forced exposure of the body to the eyes of others was felt as shameful and 
undignified.103Incontinence was mentioned as a real problem, bringing shame and 
embarrassment to many, and so the need to be kept clean was cited as essential for 
dignity.104 A study reported that especially for women, the wish to keep looking ‘well 
groomed’ was important for oneself but also for the image one gave to others.105  
 
The repercussions of an outwardly frail body were extensive. It was mentioned that 
the loss of bodily functions often led to people being ignored in conversations, as if it 
conveyed to others that they were also mentally impaired and could no longer 
understand what was being said to them.106 More generally some felt that the outward 
signs of ageing bred disrespect from younger generations and so threatened dignity by 
once again demarcating older individuals physically as a different group.107  
 
Conversely, an interesting point worth noting is that older people in care homes did 
not view old age as an illness.108 In a study aimed at evaluating whether the dignity 
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model compiled by Chochinov for terminally ill cancer patients could be adapted to 
elderly people in nursing homes, it was found that the latter viewed their decreasing 
abilities and deteriorating health as a natural part of the ageing process.109 It was 
reported that the effective management of health related concerns such as ‘pain, 
breathlessness, loss of appetite, vomiting, digestive problems and sensory losses’ was 
actually a source of hopefulness to the older individuals.110 Contrary to terminally ill 
patients, none of the elderly healthy people interviewed in this particular study ever 
felt that death was the only outcome to their physical suffering.111  
 
On the contrary, another study focused on the opinions of people in nursing homes 
who were ill found that physical suffering made their lives meaningless and that they 
hoped to die soon.112 This is an important point because it shows that although dignity 
is not synonymous to good health, the sense of dignity is strengthened by it. The 
medical control of symptoms helped people aspire to a better every day and improved 
their sense of dignity,113 but it was never considered the only role nursing homes 
should play in a dignity-centred caring ethos. Some have questioned the over 
medicalization of later life. 114 Being kept alive at all cost has been pitted against the 
optimization of quality of life, where effective symptoms and pain management at the 
end of life are favoured to allow the person to continue living life to the fullest of their 
abilities.115 Some residents were indeed of the opinion that quality of life was 
essential and that when it was ‘time to go’ there was no need to sustain life at all 
costs.116 Most people defined a dignified death as one that was pain free, and agreed 
with the possibility of leaving a living will to prevent the unnecessary and artificial 
maintenance of life.117 These discussions are important because the median period 
between admission to the care home and death is only fifteen months,118 a fact some 
have taken into account by recommending that the type of care offered to home 
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residents should be included within the realm of dignity issues encountered in 
palliative care practices.119  
 
The loss of functions an ageing body brought about resulted in a different sense of 
identity, one where others had to be included in everyday tasks. This shift meant a 
compulsory interference by others into the realm of privacy and the difficult 
acceptance of the loss of independence. This failing body often meant the need for 
pain management, an essential aspect to dignity for some people felt was paramount 
especially when close to dying. This loss of physical dexterity and aptitude was part 
of a larger theme of loss.  
 
 
g) Loss 
 
Loss in more general terms was another aspect of people’s lives that affected their 
sense of identity and therefore their sense of dignity. It is a sub-theme more difficult 
to fit in any particular category, but the interviews showed that loss affected a 
person’s perception of who they were and redefined the world they lived in, so I have 
included it here as part of the dimension of ‘Identity’. As well as the experience of 
physical pain experienced because of the natural decline of the body, a study revealed 
that older people in care homes also suffered the emotional pain of loss.120 The fact 
that they had lived through the loss of people they had been close to all their life 
caused them a great deal of distress. The combined losses of familiar surroundings 
and personal belongings were hard to overcome, although some found their sense of 
dignity improve over time once they had familiarised themselves with their new 
environment and way of life.121  
 
The repercussions of loss were therefore a subject to be addressed in a dignity-centred 
model of care.122 The new physical environment of the nursing home was perceived 
as a necessity because the residents were aware that they needed care, but it was 
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rarely described as a new home per se.123 Although some wished they had not had to 
leave their home, others were thankful that care homes existed at all to fulfil their 
needs, and thought that to be left to cope alone at home was undignified.124  
 
The loss of what had been before, the people and the places that once mattered, was 
portrayed by some as traumatic. This sense of loss generally accompanied them into 
their new life chapter, in a different place, surrounded by different people. Loss must 
therefore be acknowledged as one of the significant factors shaping the dignity of 
elderly people in care. 
 
In sum, identity has been defined as those elements that make up a person sense of 
self. The challenges brought on by the increasing reliance on others, the deterioration 
of the ageing body and the loss of a life once familiar, all contribute to a shift in 
identity. Furthermore, a person’s identity must be placed in context. As the next 
theme will expose, it is how people are able to express that identity that matters, the 
choices they make for themselves and their place in the world that also make up their 
dignity. 
 
 
3) Self-determination 
 
a) Introduction 
 
Self-determination, (often also referred to in studies as autonomy) is a strong theme 
emerging from all studies. For most of the participants, autonomy was a significant 
aspect of their dignity and was to be kept for as long as possible. One interviewee 
described a ‘good death’ as one where one could be ‘active to the very last’, 
illustrating the importance attached to autonomy and the ability to carry on without 
the help of others.125 Although most people interviewed were pragmatic about their 
evolving situation, it did not mean that they did not worry about the loss of basic 
functions such as ‘being unable to walk, go out alone, take medication, bath, dress, eat 
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and enjoy hobbies’.126 One interviewee reported that she would rather die than 
becoming more and more dependent now that she had to be helped with washing and 
using a commode.127 One study reported that nine out of fifteen respondents (or 60%) 
viewed independence, autonomy and choice as the most important aspects of 
dignity.128 Interestingly, district nurses explained that they thought that ‘providing 
comfort and care’ were the most relevant elements they could provide for dignity to 
flourish, and that residents’ choices were always vetoed according to what care staff 
thought were the safer choices or those better for their health.129 This discrepancy of 
opinions about the meaning of dignity between cared for and carers suggests a real 
risk that the choices of the people cared for are not always duly considered by those 
who care for them.  
 
 
b) Independence 
 
Independence, the ability to remain ‘free from outside control’,130 was very much 
seen as essential to dignity. Twenty seven per cent of all responses sent back to the 
health board in the ‘Dignity in care survey in North Wales’ were concerned with 
keeping independence.131 People felt that initiatives to promote independent living 
were good (as in day centres and help at home), but they regarded the need for help 
due to ageing as a threat to their independence and hence dignity.132 Some felt that 
family members and healthcare staff often over-protected them and were therefore a 
hindrance to the maintenance of their independence.133  
 
The fear of losing one’s independence was aggravated by the idea that one could 
become a burden to others, physically or financially.134 Some residents from a nursing 
home mentioned that they were reticent to ask for assistance from the nurses because 
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they felt they were a burden to them.135 Many of the people interviewed had once 
been expected to look after their own parents, and they were keen not to be a charge 
to their own children.136  
 
The loss of freedom of movement was a threat to dignity. Some participants whose 
health had deteriorated so much that they were physically bound to their bed or a 
wheelchair expressed that their sense of dignity was much lower than before their 
dependent state, with some even wishing their lives were over.137 The availability of 
care, in those instances of physical disability, was key to the residents’ ability to 
sustain their independence and feel more dignified.138 For example, having to wait for 
staff when called for help was often mentioned as undignified, especially when one 
needed to go to the toilet and risked not making it in time because of the delay.139  
 
The ability to remain physically but also mentally independent was very much 
associated with keeping one’s dignity intact. This was particularly highlighted when 
people interviewed expressed their concern about being affected by dementia. Many 
considered that the illness rendered people so dependent that it stripped them of their 
dignity.140 One person asked whether dignity could still exist despite such a disease 
answered that it was possible if you were kept clean, talked with and not ‘left alone so 
much’.141 It transpires that even when all independence is lost, the contribution of 
carers and human contact is invaluable for dignity to flourish. 
 
Independence appeared to be one characteristic people were very keen to keep for as 
long as possible, physically and mentally. Many regarded their need to rely on others 
or the extinction of their aptitude to think for themselves as a threat to their very 
reason to live, only mitigated by good quality of care. Holding on to independence 
often meant keeping control, helped or hindered by others.  
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c) Control 
 
Control over one’s body and mind was seen as essential to dignity.142 Many compared 
losing control over their body to reverting back to infancy, and found accepting this 
new condition difficult.143 One resident reported feeling embarrassed because of her 
loss of bladder control but described how the reassuring attitude of staff was helpful 
in maintaining her dignity, dealing with the incidents as if they were nothing to be 
worried about.144 In another study the notion of privacy was again linked to that of 
control, in the sense that people were still keen to make their own choices within their 
personal space.145 Although the nursing home did not belong to the residents who 
lived there, it was considered good practice by staff to knock on their bedroom door, a 
sign that they were entering their home, a private space they still had some control 
over.146 Control over one’s movements was also deemed important for a sense of 
dignity to prevail. One resident found that being in a wheelchair made her feel 
‘worthless’ because she had had to relinquish all control over her daily life to 
others.147  
 
Control over one’s treatment or care was also mentioned as consequential to a sense 
of dignity.148 Generally, people interviewed felt that having a set routine imposed on 
oneself in care homes was synonymous with the curtailment of freedom and the loss 
of control.149 Having to go to the toilets at certain times only was an example given of 
such set practice that threatened a person’s dignity.150 In contrast with those who 
anticipated dependency as a degradation of dignity, those who were able to adjust to 
circumstances beyond their control seemed better able to preserve their identity.151  
 
In essence, the restriction of people’s control over their actions, their privacy, their 
movements, or the type of care they preferred was deemed an infringement of their 
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dignity. Many wished they still had control over certain aspects of their lives that 
ageing had deprived them of. The capacity for self-control is intertwined with 
freedom of choice. 
 
 
d) Freedom of choice 
 
Freedom of choice also appeared an important sub-category of autonomy. Some 
people interviewed resented that choice was limited in the daily life of care homes, 
with a regimented routine replacing the freedom once enjoyed at home.152 Even some 
of the participants with dementia desired to express their preferences for future care or 
the kind of activity they would enjoy, despite knowing that their condition meant a 
loss of memory.153 One resident commented that although she understood why limits 
were put on her whereabouts, she still thought it unreasonable to forbid her a walk in 
the grounds.154 One participant saw her dignity bolstered by the freedom of choice an 
electric wheelchair gave her, allowing her independent movement.155 Despite their 
loss of mental capacity and their physical frailty, people still wished they could be the 
ones making some choices in their daily lives.  
 
Others mentioned that freedom of choice about their care was removed from them and 
that professionals imposed their own choice as an alternative.156 This theme was also 
found under the previous findings about identity and the importance older people 
attached to being listened to and participate in decisions about their life choices. In 
some discussions freedom of choice was balanced against the need for intervention 
when a person could no longer look after herself. People found dignity in the ability 
to make choices about one’s life course when faced with the consequences of ageing. 
Whether people chose to cope alone despite the disapproval of society, or chose to 
accept help gracefully, participants felt that people’s life choices ought to be 
respected.157  
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Freedom of choice was also mentioned in the context of discussions about the 
inadequacy of resources spent for the elderly such as pensions, and the level of 
poverty older people suffered from. Without a sufficient level of income, it was 
thought that freedom of choice was reduced, which in turn affected one’s self image 
and sense of dignity.158  
 
Finally, freedom of choice was found to be an important ingredient of what some 
people referred to as a ‘good death’.159 The ability to choose freely how to live one’s 
life but also how to die was very much in the mind of some of the people who took 
part in the research.160 Some considered the artificial prolongation of life to be against 
their sense of dignity and valued instead the freedom to choose to be ‘allowed to 
die’.161  
 
The capacity to choose for oneself loomed large in the list of criteria essential for 
dignity. In life or in death, most participants wished they were left some freedom to 
decide for themselves, even in the confines of institutional livings and even when in 
the throes of illness. They also wished they were given the means to do so. It has been 
shown that autonomy has many interrelated facets. Its loss was difficult for many and 
perceived as an affront to dignity, but could be mitigated by accepting its inevitability. 
 
 
e) Acceptance 
 
Acceptance of one’s inability to be as autonomous as was previously possible often 
coincided with a better and more dignified life for some nursing homes residents.162 
Those who fought the inevitable changes brought on by ageing by refusing help were 
regarded by others as behaving in an undignified manner.163 The acceptance of the 
more regimented style of living offered by some institutions seemed to many 
respondents essential to maintaining some dignity. It appears that the strict routine of 
daily life imposed by institutional living stopped being perceived as an affront to 
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dignity when it was accepted out of free will as an inevitable consequence of a loss of 
autonomy.164  
 
Adjustment to this new life was not always immediate and straightforward. A study 
has shown that people needed time to get used to their new routine and that accepting 
it was not always immediate.165 Overall, acceptance and the ability to adapt to change 
seemed to be a key attribute one should possess in order to maintain dignity in the 
face of the loss of autonomy. A study has indeed related that despite the narrowing of 
possibilities people may encounter because of ageing, those who possessed ‘inner 
strength’ could find meaning in every day life though their family, their memories or 
their appreciation of the moment, and for that reason seemed better able to hold on to 
a sense of dignity.166 People who could put their situation in perspective and focus on 
their abilities, rather than their inabilities, seemed also more able to accept their new 
living arrangements.167 Even though some thought that dignity could not possibly 
prevail once one became ‘demented’, others viewed their loss of cognitive ability as 
an unavoidable consequence of old age, had made peace with it, and were therefore 
better equipped to hold on to their dignity.168 No study has yet revealed whether 
acceptance was an internal quality people already possessed as a personality trait, or 
because of the values they held dear, or whether acceptance could be reached through 
external interventions such as medical help, better care practices or other features of 
care home living.169 
 
The theme of autonomy appeared significantly in many studies. Being relatively free 
to decide on the path of one’s life is something most of us will have had the privilege 
to enjoy. Unsurprisingly, the sudden interference of others with our free will and 
personal choices because of old age translates into a threat to our dignity.  The next 
theme is less straightforward than autonomy, but is certainly a dimension of dignity 
that many mentioned when they tried to define its meaning.  
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4) Humanity 
 
a) Introduction 
 
Most studies have reported on the comments of people who recognised that their 
dignity was an internal quality that was theirs for the sole reason that they were 
human beings. I have devised the theme of humanity to include the themes of ‘human 
worth, human rights and equality’. 170  It is difficult to describe humanity thus 
understood succinctly, but it includes these particular traits that make a person human 
and differentiate that person from other living organisms. Respondents referred to 
their human condition alone as reason enough for dignified care. Equality of treatment 
was also spoken about under various guises, but surprisingly, human rights, 
understood as legal tools to protect from undignified treatment, were only mentioned 
in the study conducted in the UK by Woolhead et al.171  
 
b) Intrinsic worth 
 
Intrinsic worth in this context can be compared to the Kantian’s concept of inherent 
dignity, the notion that all humans must be treated as an end in themselves, and that 
human dignity cannot be extinguished.172 Some people interviewed felt they deserved 
to be ‘treated as individuals’ on the sole basis of their human nature and inherent 
human dignity.173 Sentences such as ‘every human being has dignity’ or everyone 
should be treated as an individual’ reflects this sense of intrinsic human dignity some 
of the people interviewed felt they possessed.174 A study revealed that being treated as 
a human, and not a ‘job to be done’, was an intrinsic part of dignity.175  
 
Being treated as a human being meant that there should be no difference of treatment 
between an older person and other people, hence the importance of equality as part of 
dignity.  
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c) Equality 
 
Equality of treatment and the idea that all people deserved dignity were felt strongly 
by participants. Someone commented that older people were in a position of 
inferiority when they were in hospital because they were in a far more vulnerable 
state than the knowledgeable, younger and stronger staff in charge of their care.176 
Some related that they felt that they were excluded from society and that once you 
were old ‘you no longer counted’, reflecting this idea that older people are less 
important than the young.177 
 
Inequality was also felt in a financial way. The lack of resources allocated through 
public funding and pension provisions for older people were branded woefully 
inadequate and unable to meet care needs, creating societal inequality but also 
personal suffering.178 It has been reported that a total of 13% of pensioners or 1.6 
million people live in poverty, with incomes of less that £224 a week after housing 
costs.179 Out of this total 900,000 are considered to be in a state of material 
deprivation.180 Lower standards of living mean less choice in the care provided. 
Whereas the cost of private care remains prohibitively expensive,181 locally funded 
care has been described as too task oriented and of inadequately short duration due to 
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restricted budgets and staff shortages. 182  The low level of state pensions also 
translates into the poorer segment of the population being portrayed as a burden on 
public resources.183 This state of affairs reinforces the stereotype that the elderly 
constitutes an inferior class of citizens.184 The income gap between those who earn 
and those who do not made some older people feel that they were second class 
citizens whose opinions were not valued.185 Similarly some felt that their needs for 
medical treatment were not viewed as essential and urgent as those of other patients, 
and that they were treated unequally in the provision of healthcare.186 
 
Some older people felt that societal perceptions tended to readily assimilate them into 
a group whose status was perceived as inferior to others. This inequality was 
confirmed to some by how they were treated by others, especially in the health care 
sector. Although people mentioned equality, they did not extend its reach to that of a 
right to non-discrimination. In fact, human rights figured little in the discussions 
people had about dignity. 
 
  
      d) Human rights  
 
Human rights were not mentioned directly by those interviewed as a mode of defence 
against undignified treatment. They were mentioned as ‘the right to choose how they 
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lived’. 187 The word ‘right’ was also brought up in conversation in the context of the 
right to live or die according to one’s wishes, or the right be treated equally. These 
correspond to the human rights to freedom/private life and the right to non- 
discrimination, but they were not referred to as human rights. Other studies into older 
people and their perception of human rights have tended to bolster these findings.188 
Human rights were recognized as other people’s concerns in war torn countries and 
did not concern them directly. It remains to be seen whether this attitude will evolve. 
Those who have lived all of their adult lives in a society imbued by a human rights 
discourse might be more eager and able to invoke them in later life should their 
treatment in care homes affect their dignity. Although it could have been expected 
that a dialogue focused on the meaning of dignity would lead to conversations about 
human rights, these did not feature prominently at all. The participants’ education, 
culture and age could explain this absence.  
 
As I mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, it must be noted here that although 
dignity defined from the perspective of the person cared for is rare in policy and 
governmental research papers on this topic, it is not an entirely novel idea. Defining 
dignity from the perspective of the individual cared and those involved in that care 
was at the heart of a report published by the Social Care Institute for Excellence in 
2009 about dignity in care.189 There, the concept of dignity was gathered from the 
perspectives of care providers, representatives of care users, carers and individuals 
cared for.190 Dignity was defined as a set of expectations that individuals in care ought 
to have with regard to the services they received. In order to respect dignity, services 
were to 
1. Have a zero tolerance of all forms of abuse.  
2. Support people with the same respect you would want for yourself or a 
member of your family  
3. Treat each person as an individual by offering a personalised service  
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188‘Rights for Real: Older People, Human Rights and the CEHR’ (May 2006), 63 
<http://www.edf.org.uk/news/0406%20Rights%20for%20Real%20Report.pdf> Accessed 01/12/2014 
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4. Enable people to maintain the maximum possible level of independence, 
choice and control  
5. Listen and support people to express their needs and wants  
6. Respect people’s right to privacy  
7. Ensure people feel able to complain without fear of retribution  
8. Engage with family members and carers as care partners  
9. Assist people to maintain confidence and a positive self-esteem  
10.  Act to alleviate people’s loneliness and isolation.191  
The report then examines each of these areas individually, giving examples of best 
practice from various Primary Care Trusts. Although this conception of dignity is the 
result of a larger variety of individuals’ opinions in a broader spectrum of care 
settings, it is comparable to that used in this dissertation reached focused on the 
responses of older individuals. This definition of dignity is also interesting in two 
respects. The first one is that it stems from a similarly subjective approach to the 
conceptualisation of dignity as that adopted in this dissertation, and the second is that 
it intimates that dignity requires positive action when individuals are in a vulnerable 
state. In the area of care dignity ought to be understood from the perspective of the 
person cared for, and that certain conditions need to be present for dignity so defined 
to flourish. 
 
5) Conditions for dignity based on concrete autonomy 
  
a) Setting capabilities for dignity in care 
 
In this section, I will argue for the use of the capability theory of rights as a 
framework upon which to hang this discursive ethical approach to dignity, as 
understood and applied in the contemporary world. As I have written above, human 
rights do acknowledge our embodiment and finite nature, and the need we have for 
certain minimum conditions to exist in order for life to be worth living. I have also 
elaborated on the complex, relational and personal concept of autonomy, and that has 
led me to conclude that dignity is best understood through a discursive approach. 
Nussbaum writes that ‘the basic idea (behind the capabilities approach) is that some 
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living conditions deliver to people a life that is worthy of the human dignity that they 
possess, and others do not. In the latter circumstances, they retain dignity, but it is like 
a promissory note whose claims have not been met’.192  Whether or not the conditions 
necessary for this promissory note of dignity to be delivered for elderly people in 
institutional care settings are met depends heavily, amongst other things, on the 
meaning of dignity that is adopted by care policies and legislation. I will argue here 
that understanding elderly individuals’ own idea of what dignity means to them would 
enable policy and lawmakers to fashion laws and policies conducive to those 
conditions needed for dignity in long term care institutions.  
 
In order to create the conditions necessary for dignity in this context, the language of 
human rights as traditionally framed appears too limiting. In fact, traditional 
conceptions of human rights fail to address the very fact that dignity is personal and 
contextual, and that conditions needed for its realisation are very much environment 
and person dependent. They are claims to certain capabilities, but they fail to engage 
on a deeper level as to whether an individual can ever possess that capability. 
Nussbaum believes that the capabilities approach ‘is a good idea because we then 
understand that what is involved in securing a right to people is usually a lot more 
than simply putting it down on paper’.193 The language of capabilities ‘gives us a 
benchmark in thinking about what it is really to secure a right to someone’.194  
 
Arguably, the particularisation of human rights under international instruments such 
as for instance the Convention on the Elimination of All Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention 
on the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD), or the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD), all show that it is necessary to go beyond the universal character of rights 
and acknowledge that for some groups, the conditions necessary to their dignity need 
added protection. Some have made a case for the implementation of a convention for 
the rights and dignity of older people.195 If we want rights to give rise to conditions 
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amenable to dignity to flourish, then we must take into account the wide variety of 
individuals they concern, and so tailor rights to their particular situations. The 
capability theory can be viewed as a phenomenological approach to rights that is 
especially concerned with particular cases and the nature of the self in relation to its 
social situation.  
 
Robeyns defines the capability approach as ‘a broad normative framework for the 
evaluation and assessment of individual well-being and social arrangements, the 
design of policies, and the proposals about social changes in society’.196 As its 
founding theorists, the philosopher-economist Amartya Sen,197 and the philosopher 
Martha Nussbaum, 198 have written extensively about the capability approach albeit 
according to different perspectives. Whereas Sen has used the capability approach in 
an economic context to address a human development agenda,199 Nussbaum has 
concentrated her efforts on using it as the basis of a partial theory of justice that 
critically responds to Rawls’ contractarian theory of justice as fairness.200 
 
The capability approach has been defined by Nussbaum as ‘an approach to 
comparative quality-of-life assessment and to theorizing about basic social justice’.201 
The capability theory is anchored in the liberal tradition, based on the belief that 
individual freedom is essential to the pursuit of a life worth living.202 Sen has 
criticized traditional economic enquiries that have focused on assessing whether a life 
is worth living by measuring utility, 203 (or a person’s ability to fulfil their interest), in 
the form of happiness under classic utilitarianism,204 or desire-fulfilment under the 
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modern strand of the tradition.205 In contrast, the capability approach focuses on the 
actual opportunities people have in ‘beings and doings’, which Sen calls 
‘functionings’ and which together ‘constitute what makes life valuable’.206 This 
theory concentrates on how policies can achieve certain functionings (i.e. being 
healthy, working, being educated), and capabilities, which provide the ‘substantive 
opportunities’ or ‘freedoms’ to choose to do and be what matters to individuals.207  
 
The benefit of the capability theory as a framework for the conditions necessary to 
dignity is that it encourages an in-depth analysis of the journey a person would have 
to undertake to possess those capabilities in the world they live in. For instance, the 
capability approach has been useful in highlighting the plight of disadvantaged groups 
such as women. Nussbaum gives the example of women who, despite their legal right 
to seek employment, may be prevented from doing so de facto, because of the threat 
of violence they may face in doing so.208  
 
The main value of the capability approach, for the purpose of my analysis, however, 
is that it forces us to look into the obstacles a person may face in order to have the 
actual possibility of those functionings.  This is a particularly helpful exercise to carry 
out for the dignity in care of older individuals, because they are part of a group hidden 
from society and whose concrete autonomy has been depleted by age. Accordingly, 
having set out the meaning of dignity from the perspective of elderly people in care, 
the next goal of this dissertation is to evaluate whether the conditions necessary for 
the realisation of dignity exist. Are elderly people in care actually capable of 
functioning in a way that accords with their understanding of what it means to lead a 
dignified life? To answer this question I will need to identity which main obstacles 
there are, and whether and how current laws help overcome them. 
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b) Conversion factors and practical implications 
 
In order to assess whether and how the law could play a part in upholding or creating 
the conditions necessary for dignity, it is important to consider a variety of internal 
and external influences. Under his focus on human development, Sen has put forward 
the idea that the impact of means onto a functioning will be different depending on a 
variety of factors. 209   Particular resources will allow for the possibility of a 
functioning for certain people but not others. An able bodied person who has learned 
to ride a bike will get far more out of the bike as a means of transport than a disabled 
person who has never been taught to ride.210 These are personal factors that will 
influence whether certain goods and services, but also institutional arrangements can 
transform into a particular functioning. The capability theory is useful in that it 
recognises different challenges faced by differently situated people, and that one 
particular mean to a capability cannot always translate into a functioning. For 
example, state benefit to fund care cannot always mean good care if the person has no 
information as to the best care for them, or no access to it within their preferred 
locality near family and friends. 
 
The possibility an individual will have to transform capabilities into actual 
functionings therefore depends on personal, social and environmental factors. 
Robeyns has cited ‘metabolism, physical condition, sex, reading skills or intelligence’ 
as examples of personal conversion factors, ‘public policies, social norms, 
discrimination practices gender roles societal hierarchies and power relations’ as 
examples of social conversion factors, and ‘climate, or geographical location’ as 
examples of environmental conversion factors. 211  Inspired by the concept of 
conversion factors as an evaluative framework, I will analyse here the factors that I 
believe are most influential in the ability of the elderly dependent person to achieve 
the functionings implied by the idea of dignity as understood by that person.  
 
On a personal level, the vulnerability of the person in care is the prominent obstacle to 
the possibility of dignity. Care homes are an environmental factor to dignity, 
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regulating the lives of the individuals who live there. On a wider societal level, 
ageism can also be identified as a conversion factor to dignity, making its flourishing 
more difficult. In the next chapters my analysis will focus on how the law is engaging 
with those conversion factors, and whether it is able to shape them in a way that may 
allow the possibility of dignity in elderly care.  
 
 
6) Conclusion 
 
The legal meaning of dignity tends to be gathered from historical or jurisprudential 
analysis, rather than based on empirical social research.212 Here I have used social 
studies to identify three major themes that define dignity for elderly people in care 
homes, namely identity, self-determination and humanity. In order of importance it 
appears that identity is the subject most mentioned by the participants of the research 
carried out, followed by self-determination and humanity. The various elements that 
make up a person’s sense of identity are numerous and depend for the most part on 
external influences. Many themes are recurrent, although not always approached or 
perceived in the same manner by those interviewed. Some themes are found in some 
studies but not in others, which explains the different amount of data for each 
category.  
 
From the research examined, self-respect, relationships, privacy, communication, 
participation and loss, all affect a person’s identity within the environment of a care 
home. Self-respect is the one element described as internal or intimate to those 
questioned and varies from person to person. Some have an inner sense of self they 
feel others could reach and change, others find their self-respect through religious 
beliefs, assertiveness or the positive image they have of themselves. External 
influences on the identity a person holds are numerous. The relationships people have 
with others deeply influence many aspects of their lives, which ultimately reflect on 
their sense of dignity. The quantity and quality of the relationships people have with 
care staff, family and friends shape their perception of self, their place in the world 
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and their sense of worth. How carers interact with people in need can either sustain or 
deteriorate their sense of dignity. Upholding privacy, listening carefully, speaking 
respectfully and openly, and taking the time to treat residents as individuals are all 
features of care relationships that bolster dignity.  
 
Keeping a link to the life once led outside the care home with family and friends is 
also cherished and helps people hold on to the whole of their personhood, not only the 
person they have become in the care home, but also the person they were throughout 
their life. Being able to communicate, or the ability to be heard and put one’s point 
across, also supports a person in feeling dignified and worthy. Participation was 
mentioned time and again as an ingredient of identity and was derived from a sense of 
belonging and a sense of purpose. The many physical changes people go through in 
old age, those that ultimately force them to live in a place that can cater for their 
dependency, make up a large part of their new identity and so have a large influence 
on how they perceive themselves. Finally, loss is expressed as redefining identity. 
Whether the loss is one of a lifelong partner, friends or a home, it means a break from 
the anchorage to the familiar and is experienced by many as a fracture of the self.  
 
Self-determination is the next theme linked with dignity. This combines 
independence, control, freedom of choice and acceptance. Self-determination may 
mean many things and can be associated with the notion of freedom to do or be 
whatever one chooses. Although people in care homes are realistic about the kind of 
autonomy they can enjoy, they still wish to be allowed to make some decisions. The 
aim to protect frail elderly people can have the undesired consequence of impinging 
on their ability to make their own choices. Elderly people’s will for autonomy also 
stems from the fear of being a burden on their carers, relatives and the wider society. 
This is why retaining control is considered important to retain dignity. The loss of the 
ability to control movements or thoughts is depicted as the loss of independence and 
therefore the loss of dignity.  This is balanced nonetheless by the capacity to accept 
one’s reduced autonomy because of ageing or even dementia, and to redefine dignity 
according to these parameters. In those situations it appears that dignity is able to 
remain and flourish, even when independence has been lost. 
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Humanity is the last theme that makes up dignity for older people in care. It is in fact 
the category least populated by the data gathered from the various interviews used. 
This could be explained by the fact that some sub themes are closely linked to others 
in other categories and, although they could have been treated under the heading of 
humanity were discussed elsewhere. For example human dignity or that inner quality 
some people refer to, is often assimilated to self-respect, which has been here 
categorised under the theme of identity. Humanity is the hardest aspect of dignity to 
define. It is that intrinsic quality that defines our human status and differentiates us 
from other living creatures. It implies we should all be treated equally and 
paradoxically as individuals. Within humanity, human rights are the least mentioned 
subject in relation to dignity. This could be explained by the age of the people who 
took part in the various studies. Most of the people interviewed are from a generation 
that is not used to the language of human rights, especially as a legal concept that 
could vindicate undignified treatment.  
 
On a practical level, it is essential to protect dignity because ‘a fractured sense of 
dignity has been found to be associated with depression, hopelessness and a desire for 
death’.213 In order to assess whether conditions exist that can foster a person’s dignity 
as understood here, and inspired by the capability theory, I am going to review each 
of the conversion factors to dignity that I have identified above. These are 
vulnerability (Chapter III and IV), care home regulations (Chapter V), and ageism 
(Chapter VI). I will examine under each of those areas the impact laws have on the 
possibility of dignity as presented in this chapter.  
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Chapter III 
 
Personal Conversion Factor: Vulnerability I    
            
 
1) Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter I set out the theoretical framework upholding the use of a 
discursive ethical model to understand the meaning of dignity for the dependent 
elderly in long-term care. I suggested that dignity ought to be understood in this way 
(that is, from the perspective of elderly people in care) because it is grounded in 
concrete autonomy, and concluded that it necessitated certain conditions to become a 
possibility. In the last chapter, I also mentioned the use of the capability theory as an 
evaluative tool to assess ‘policies according to their impact on people’s capabilities as 
well as their actual functioning’.1 Evaluating the impact laws have on the realisation 
of dignity as understood in this dissertation means looking at how they help or hinder 
a person in care to actually experience dignity. As we have seen under the capability 
approach, Robeyns elaborates on the notion of conversion factors: these can be 
personal, social and environmental. 2  Conversion factors determine ‘how much 
functioning one can get out of a good or service’.3 In other words, those factors affect 
how a person transforms the possibility of a capability into a functioning.  
 
Inspired by this evaluative framework, I will examine in the following chapters how 
current laws affect the conditions necessary for dignity. Some laws will contribute 
favourably to the realisation of dignity by, for example, setting out a regulatory 
framework for care homes that enables identity creation, promotes opportunities for 
participation in their social environment and allows respectful treatment of the person. 
Other laws will have an impact on the amount of resources available to the social care 
sector, and so influence the recruiting of staff and quality of care. I will argue that 
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new laws may help certain dignity-enabling conditions to come about, but that other 
such conditions may remain unaffected by legislative initiatives, and require deeper 
cultural changes.  
 
In the next two chapters, I will focus on the personal conversion factor affecting 
elderly people in care homes, that of vulnerability. In order for care services to deliver 
the kind of conditions needed for dignity, it is essential for policy makers to 
understand who the individuals in long-term care are. In this instance, it is crucial to 
take into account the physical and mental frailty of those in such circumstances. 
Figures from the National Institute for health Research show that the care home 
population is made up of a majority of women over the age of 85, is steadily getting 
older and has a high prevalence rate of ‘cognitive impairment (conditions such as 
dementia), co-morbidity (people who have more than one illness) and poly-pharmacy 
(people who take several prescribed drugs)’.4  
 
Mitigating the effects of vulnerability in long-term care is a pre-requisite element to 
any possibility of dignity realisation as understood under a discursive ethic. Care 
policies must be alive to the fact that the realisation of dignity as understood here as 
resting on conditions amenable to identity, self-determination and humanity, can be 
compromised if they do not adequately mitigate the effects of physical and mental 
vulnerability induced by ageing on the person’s ability to access those conditions. 
Institutional care is set out to respond to heightened levels of vulnerability brought on 
by the physiological effects of ageing. As Hall remarks, ‘a coherent social response to 
the vulnerabilities of old age requires and rests on a coherent understanding of old age 
as a way of being in the world; meaningful response is impossible without first 
understanding the nature of the phenomenon to which that response is intended to be 
useful or ameliorate’.5  
 
In this particular chapter I will firstly explore various theoretical conceptions of 
vulnerability and examine which one is most compatible with the realisation of 
dignity under a discursive model. I will conclude that in order for vulnerability to be 
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conducive to dignity, it ought to be apprehended as a universal principle, rooted in, 
rather than opposed to, autonomy in a relational sense. Secondly, I will look at how 
laws set to protect vulnerability through the prohibition of certain conducts - such as 
criminal and human rights laws - respond to the vulnerability of those in long-term 
care. I will review whether such laws are conducive to the realisation of dignity. 
Finally, I will analyse the case of McDonald, pertinent here not only because of the 
discussions it elicited about Article 8 in the context of dignity in care services, but 
also because it illustrates the importance of courts’ role in the conceptualisation of 
dignity through their judicial reviewing functions.6 
 
2) Vulnerability meaning 
 
a) Three conceptions of vulnerability 
 
The manner in which vulnerability in long-term care is understood will influence 
social care policies and so the possibility of dignity. In order to formulate a 
conception of vulnerability that will be conducive to dignity, it will need to allow 
individuals in care to hold on to a sense of identity, self-determination and humanity. 
Measures put in place to alleviate or compensate for vulnerability cannot frustrate 
these other parameters: I will argue, in other words, that interventions set out for the 
protection of vulnerability must not come at the complete expense of identity, 
humanity and self-determination. Dunn et al have highlighted that the law constructs 
vulnerability from two different standpoints.7 One is that of inherent vulnerability, 
pertaining to ‘a person’s particular characteristics’, such as amongst others, ‘age, 
gender, or the presence of a particular illness or disability’.8 Inherent vulnerability is 
attached to certain traits. This particular approach to vulnerability can be illustrated by 
Munby J’s declaration in the case of ReSA that ‘I would treat as a vulnerable adult 
someone who, whether or not mentally incapacitated, and whether or not suffering 
from any mental illness, or mental disorder, is or may be unable to take care of 
himself or herself, or unable to protect him or herself against significant harm or 
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exploitation, or who is deaf, blind or dumb, or who is substantially handicapped by 
illness, injury or congenial deformity. (This) is not intended to be a definition. It is 
prescriptive, not definitive’.9  
 
Classifying someone as vulnerable allows the law some targeted interventions.10 
Children are considered vulnerable and to that effect are protected from death or 
serious injury in the context of home life by statutes such as the Domestic Violence, 
Crime and Victims Act 2004 (DVCVA).11 They are also afforded specific protection 
in the context of sexual offences12 and offences against the person.13 Adults deemed 
vulnerable are also protected by a particular legal regime according to the same 
DVCVA, the Mental Health Act 1983 and the Mental Capacity Act 2005. In 
conjunction with the coming into force of the Human Rights Act in 2000, the 
government published guidance for those policies intent on protecting vulnerable 
adults.14 Under the ‘No Secrets’ guidelines a vulnerable adult was defined as someone 
‘who is or may be in need of community care services by reason of mental or other 
disability, age or illness; and who is or may be unable to take care of himself, or 
unable to protect him or herself against significant harm or exploitation’.15 Other 
measures have been taken on the basis of protecting gender vulnerability, such as the 
regulation of abortion rights for women in the United States.16  
 
I argue that a conceptualisation of vulnerability based on such pre-defined 
characteristics may not be conducive to dignity as it can reinforce ageist stereotypes 
and hence distort a person’s sense of identity, particularly by giving the impression of 
homogenised inferiority. Under a discursive ethical model, and according to the 
studies used in Chapter II, the capacity to maintain a sense of identity free from 
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stereotypes that subsume the individual to a group emerged as an essential element to 
dignity. Conceptualising vulnerability as inherent in old age is problematic because 
vulnerability is traditionally associated with ‘victimhood, deprivation, dependency, or 
pathology’,17 and ideologically understood as diametrically opposed to autonomy in 
the liberal sense of the term. In the case of old age, Hall writes that ‘legal theory 
focusing on personal vulnerability increases social vulnerability (…) to the extent that 
it reinforces ageist presumptions of weakness and incapacity’.18 Self-image may 
become warped through the discriminatory eyes of society and influence negatively 
how elderly people in care perceive themselves. For instance, it transpired through the 
studies used in Chapter II that individuals resented the fact that they were, or 
understood themselves to be a burden to others.  
 
Attaching vulnerability to certain individuals also ‘seems to locate the cause of the 
abuse with the victim, rather than placing responsibility with the actions and 
omissions of others’.19 It reinforces inequality by supposing that some individuals are 
in some way deficient in relation to a yardstick that is fully autonomous and self-
supporting. It implies that the group in question is dysfunctional in comparison to the 
golden standard of the autonomous legal individual. Code defines this individual as 
  
Self-sufficient, independent, and self-reliant, a self-realizing individual who 
directs his efforts towards maximizing his personal gains. His independence is 
under constant threat form other individuals: hence he devises rules to protect 
himself from intrusion. Talk of rights, rational self-interest, expediency, and 
efficiency permeates his moral, social and political discourse.20  
 
Vulnerability understood in this way may therefore be considered as a defect, 
something for the state to fix in order for the vulnerable to remain functionally self-
                                                
17 Fineman M.A., ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’ (2008) 20(1) 
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism, 8 
18 Hall M.I., ‘Equity Theory: Responding the Material Exploitation of the Vulnerable but Capable’ in I. 
Doron (Ed.) Theories on law and Ageing (Springer, 2009), Preface viii 
19 The Association of Directors of Social Services (ADSS) ‘Safeguarding Adults’ (October 2005), 4 
<https://www.adass.org.uk/adassmedia/stories/publications/guidance/safeguarding.pdf> Accessed 28th 
October 2016 
20 Code l., What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge (Cornell 
University Press, 1991), 77-78 
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sufficient under the liberal order.21 It challenges the possibility of dignity by not only 
compromising substantial equality and so a person’s sense of humanity, but by 
possibly curtailing a person’s free choice through rehabilitative interventions that 
negate individual choice.  
 
A more refined view of vulnerability is that based on intersectionality. Following 
Meyers  
 
the idea of intersectional identity is premised on the general philosophical thesis 
that who one is depends on one’s social experience. However, the intersectional 
conception is specific to societies that exhibit certain kinds of social 
stratification, for it derives from a social-psychological view about how 
individuals internalize gender, sexual orientation, race, class and ethnicity in 
sexist, homophobic, racist, classist and xenophobic societies.22  
 
Intersectionality emerged as a response to the criticism that the feminist critique of the 
patriarchal order was only reflecting the perspective of the white heterosexual 
woman,23 and that other aspects of a person’s identity such as race and sexuality 
ought to be taken into account simultaneously.24 Intersectionality offers a more 
sophisticated lens through which to understand social oppression by examining the 
cumulative effects of confluent identity markers. For instance, Crenshaw has 
highlighted the fact that ‘although racism and sexism readily intersect in the lives of 
real people, they seldom do in feminist and antiracist practices.’25 By omitting to take 
into account that a person is often at the intersection of multiple identities, policies 
fail to adequately respond to oppression or unequal treatment.26 Importantly for my 
purposes, the intersectional view on vulnerability conceives of it not as inherent in 
                                                
21 Fineman M.A., Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency (The New Press, 2005) 
22 Meyers D. T., ‘Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self? Opposite attract!’ in N. Stoljar and C. 
Mackenzie (Eds.) Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social 
Self (Oxford University Press, 2000), 153 
23 Crenshaw  K., ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’ (1989) 1, Article 8 University of 
Chicago Legal Forum  
24 Ibid 620 
25 Crenshaw K., ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against 
Women of Color’ (June 1991) 43(6) Stanford Law Review 1241, 1242 
26 Ibid 1246 
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certain individuals, but as the end result of the convergence of different practices of 
subordination or axes of social disadvantage. 
 
A third view on vulnerability is proposed by Fineman who has argued that focusing 
on a narrow view of equality, one that rests on prohibiting the discrimination of 
certain pre-defined identity characteristics, fails to address the ‘persistent forms of 
subordination and domination’,27 and the ‘structural disadvantages and debilitating 
institutional and societal arrangements’ that are part of the problem of persisting 
inequality.28  I have argued above how unequal treatment and stereotypes can be 
pernicious to the realisation of dignity by damaging a person’s sense of identity. 
Fineman’s perception of vulnerability, Kohn argues, ‘suggests that it can replace 
group identity (e.g. race, gender, poverty) as a basis for targeting social policy’.29 
Rejecting even the idea of ‘intersectionality and multiciplicities of identities’, 
Fineman’s theory aims at moving ‘away from the fragmentation of the legal subject to 
the creation of a vigorous universal conception’.30  
 
According to Fineman, relying on identities, or even intersectionality, ‘will tend to 
direct critical attention to discrimination by and against individuals or, at best, 
individual institutions, and not to the failure, distortions or corruption of societal 
structures more systematically’. 31  According to her, equality as ‘sameness-of-
treatment’ focuses too heavily on individuals, leaving out of the law’s reach those 
arrangements that produce ‘material, cultural and societal imbalances’.32 Instead, she 
proposes that ‘a legal subject with which to replace the abstract liberal subject  … 
must be based on an appreciation of the human condition’, and as ‘the liberal subject 
is a universal construct, … so must be its alternative’.33 Fineman therefore suggests 
that vulnerability is universal and inescapable, anchored in our embodied self.34  
 
                                                
27 Ibid 1737 
28 Ibid 1739 
29 Kohn N. A., ‘Vulnerability Theory and the Role of Government’ (2014) 26(1) Yale Journal of Law 
and Feminism 1 
30 Fineman M.A., ‘Feminism, Masculinities and Multiple Identities’ (2013) 13(101) Nevada Law 
Journal 619, 636  
31 Ibid 635 
32 Ibid 636 
33 Ibid 620 
34 Fineman M.A., Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics 
(Routledge, 2016), 20 
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From the premise that vulnerability forms an intrinsic part of our life journey, and is 
not a deficiency that needs to be fixed, it would generate a more subtle and 
cooperative approach to social policies that could prove far more beneficial to the 
possibility of dignity under a discursive ethical approach. Fineman returns us to the 
idea of inherent vulnerability, but her version of inherent vulnerability is much more 
attractive than the one that limits inherent vulnerability to specific groups of people. 
Fineman’s approach shares with intersectional vulnerability a substantive rather than 
formal approach to equality; but one way in which it may have the edge over 
intersectional vulnerability is that it rejects the traditional idea that only certain 
individuals or groups are vulnerable and need help. 35 It would put a stop to the over 
simplification of people’s identities according to particular features,36 which risks 
creating and perpetuating stigma, but instead would underpin all policies with the idea 
that all human beings need, at some time in their lives, support due to their 
vulnerability.  
 
 
b) Universal vulnerability and dignity 
 
Fineman is clear on one point: inherent universal vulnerability ought to be guiding a 
responsive state in its quest to social justice and substantive equality.37 Nevertheless, 
drafting effective social welfare policies that will be compatible with the possibility of 
dignity based on a universal principle of vulnerability raises some objections. In fact, 
state intervention in responding to vulnerability may result in paternalistic policies 
that encroach on the autonomy of the individual, and so have the very effect Fineman 
reproaches current anti-vulnerable policies to have.38 Oddly, Fineman has herself 
suggested intrusive social policies in the case of the elderly, prioritising their safety 
and security over their self-determination.39 In doing so, she not only espoused the 
stigmatising effect of vulnerability she so adamantly rejects, but also compromised 
                                                
35 Ibid 3  
36 Fineman M.A. and Grear A., ‘Introduction: Vulnerability as Heuristic. An Invitation to Future 
Exploration’ in ‘M. A. Fineman and A. Grear (Eds) Gender in Law, Culture and Society: 
Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics (Routledge, 2013) 
37 Fineman (n34) 
38 Kohn (n29) 14-21 
39 Fineman M. A., ‘”Elderly” as Vulnerable: Rethinking the Nature of Individual and Societal 
Responsibility’ (2012-2013) 20 Elder Law Journal 71 
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the possibility of dignity. Her approach may be explained in part by her theoretical 
model of the Mother-Child relationship she adopts.40 Applying to ‘all forms of 
inevitable dependency’41 policies based on this carer/cared for paradigm may result in 
a kind of beneficent protectionism that would suit children but not the older 
dependent adults. 
 
This paternalistic outcome can also be explained by Fineman’s understanding of 
autonomy as a liberal paradigm that advocates freedom from state intervention to 
promote the ability of the individual to organise her life trajectory unburdened.42 
Fineman presents the rhetoric of autonomy as a justification for the abdication of the 
state in its social welfare duties, exposing it as an obstacle to substantial equality and 
social justice. 43 Kohn, however, contends that ‘the fact that the language of autonomy 
can be used rhetorically to justify the avoidance of (state) responsibilities does not 
mean that valuing autonomy must be sacrificed to enhance resilience to 
vulnerability’.44 Denying individual autonomy in order to address vulnerability may 
actually hinder the possibility of dignity and be harmful to the individual. 45 
Conditions favourable for dignity require the dual and seemingly contradictory goals 
of respect for autonomy and protection for vulnerability. 
 
The key to a conception of vulnerability that is amenable to dignity is one that fosters 
rather than denies autonomy. In order to achieve such a goal, autonomy has to be 
understood within the context of relational autonomy rather than as autonomy in the 
political liberal sense.46 Established under Chapter I as the ground of dignity and the 
justification for a discursive ethical framework upon which to understand it within 
care policies, relational autonomy must also be embraced within a conceptualisation 
of vulnerability for it to enable dignity. Mackenzie argues that ‘responding to 
                                                
40 Fineman M.A. The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies 
(Routledge, 1995)  
41 Ibid 235 
42  Mackenzie C., ‘The Importance of Relational Autonomy and Capabilities for an Ethics of 
Vulnerability’ in C. Mackenzie, W. Rogers and S. Dodd (Eds.) Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics 
and Feminist Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2013), 41 
43 Fineman (n17) 
44 Kohn (n29) 22 
45 Kohn (n29) 15 
46 Mackenzie (n42) 
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vulnerability by promoting autonomy is a matter of social justice’.47 Vulnerability and 
autonomy cannot be considered as mutually exclusive without fettering the possibility 
of dignity. Relational autonomy rests on the basic proposition that in order for 
individuals to develop and retain their capacity to self-determinate, essential to their 
thriving, they need the support of social, emotional and institutional relationships, and 
that the state’s role is to set out such policies and laws that not only facilitate these 
links, but also prevent their frustration because of oppression, disadvantages and 
social control.48  
 
Arguably then, policies aimed at tackling universal vulnerability ought to bear 
relational autonomy in mind in order to allow the possibility of dignity. It means that 
they have to respect the fact that individuals ‘form, sustain and revise (their) self 
identities in relational connections to specific others, and we negotiate our sense of 
individual selfhood in a specific geographical, historical and political context in 
relation to intersecting social determinants, such as gender, race, ethnicity, ability and 
class’.49 Just as Fineman advocates a state responsive to universal vulnerability, 
relational theorists advocate that the state must have a central role in the setting out of 
conditions that promote the relationships at the core of autonomy competencies.50  
 
 
c) Refining universal vulnerability 
 
Collins argues that creating policies responsive to a universal approach to 
vulnerability is impractical as ‘it sets a very low standard for vulnerability’ that fails 
to ‘be an illuminating argument’ for intervention, as everyone is vulnerable by virtue 
of being human.51 According to her, vulnerability should be defined as a ‘real-life 
concept’ to warrant appropriate legal responses.52 Fineman-type vulnerability may be 
used as a focus for attention, but then the reasons behind vulnerability ought to be 
                                                
47 Ibid 34 
48 Ibid 42 
49 Ibid 43 
50 Ben-Ishai E., Fostering Autonomy: A Theory of Citizenship, the State and Social Services Delivery 
(Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012) 
51 Collins J., ‘The Contours of Vulnerability’ in J. Herring and J. Wallbank (Eds.) Vulnerabilities, Care 
and Family Law (Routledge, 2013) 27, 28 
52 Ibid 29 
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examined to offer pertinent solutions. Defining vulnerability as a ‘real-life concept’ 
would mean making ‘evaluative judgments’.53  Mackenzie concurs that Fineman 
‘gives too much weight to unavoidable ontological vulnerabilities arising from 
biological processes’, giving less importance to the compounding effect of ‘physical, 
human, social and environmental’ resources on vulnerability.54A universal conception 
of vulnerability based solely on our biological nature will also hinder the efficient 
allocation of finite public resources to effectively alleviate it,55 which, as we saw, was 
the strength of intersectional views on vulnerability. Setting out a threshold for 
intervention requires us to refine the universal and inherent view of vulnerability 
espoused by Fineman. 
 
As to the conceptualization issue, Mackenzie suggests that vulnerability should be 
analysed according to three different dimensions. The first type of vulnerability she 
refers to is inherent, the type of vulnerability that is, as Fineman conceives it, 
‘ineradicable’, and for which the state’s response ought to be the mitigation of its 
disproportional effect on the disadvantaged. 56  This means amongst others the 
provision of adequate welfare and health care. Hall’s conceptualisation of old age is 
particularly pertinent here because it offers a simple but useful lens through which to 
understand the specificity of inherent vulnerability in elderly individuals in long-term 
care.57 She explains that ‘old age is a distinct quality of embodiment, and therefore of 
vulnerability, experienced on both the corporeal and social level’.58 Old age is 
depicted as a phenomenon that takes over the body and ‘dethrones’ self-perception by 
not only changing how the social world perceives the person, but by how the person 
perceives herself too. Some have gone as far as advancing that ‘the body … in deep 
old age … becomes the bottom line: socially constructed differences such as race and 
gender blur and blend into the final triumph of the natural over the social’.59  
 
                                                
53 Ibid  
54 Mackenzie (n42) 38-39 
55 Kohn (n29) 15 
56 Mackenzie (n42) 38-40 
57 Hall (n5) 
58 Ibid 5 
59 Featherstone M. and Helpworth M., ‘Ageing, the Lifecourse and the Sociology of Embodiment’ in 
G. Scambler and P. Higgs (Eds.) Modernity, Medicine and Health (Routledge, 1998), 148 
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The stranglehold of embodiment on the identity of those who rely on care is at the 
source of their vulnerability. The inherent vulnerability of old age so conceptualised 
resides in the process of ‘increased and intensified embodiment despite whatever one 
“is” on the inside’.60 The specific biological vulnerability spoken of here should alert 
policy makers of the need for a high degree of intervention to facilitate everyday 
living tasks, and protect from increased risk from harm. Nevertheless, such 
intervention ought not to be at the complete expense of those conditions necessary for 
dignity. Policy makers should always consider the impact they will have on them, so 
as to minimise their interference as much as possible. Mitigating the effects of 
‘extreme embodiment’ should not be the only target of care policies. 
 
Secondly, Mackenzie identifies situational vulnerability, vulnerability that is ‘context 
specific’ and so influenced by ‘social, political, economic or environmental factors’.61 
Situational vulnerability for the elderly arises specifically out of the relationship 
between the individual and the care home environment. Kohn believes that situational 
vulnerability is the only possible practical application of universal vulnerability in a 
prescriptive context.62 Dunn et al, however, warn that ‘the incorporation of situational 
vulnerability into the construction of the ‘vulnerable adult’ draws upon an 
understanding of the vulnerability as universal’, and that under the premise of 
situational vulnerability, ‘vulnerability becomes a concept tied to the personal, social, 
economic and cultural circumstances within which individuals find themselves at 
different points in their lives’; this could lead to ‘interventions that are infinite in 
scope and application’.63 It is therefore important once again that this appreciation of 
vulnerability be restricted to justifying only interventions that sit within the confines 
of relational autonomy.  
 
Thirdly and lastly, Mackenzie refers to pathogenic vulnerability,64 borne out of 
‘prejudice or abuse in interpersonal relationships and from social domination, 
oppression, or political violence’.65 It is far more complex to mitigate this kind of 
vulnerability, as its roots are often cultural and pervasive. Furthermore, actions taken 
                                                
60 Ibid 8 
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62 Kohn (n29) 23 
63 Dunn et al (n7) 241 
64 Mackenzie (n42) 39 
65 Ibid 
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in good faith to ameliorate the negative impact of inherent or situational vulnerability 
may actually engender pathogenic vulnerability.66 For example, a measure taken to 
protect care home residents from abuse, based on their situational vulnerability, may 
increase the stigma attached to the old that they are victims and weak. Pathogenic 
vulnerability may be likened to a sophisticated intersectional approach to identity, 
where vulnerability is situated at the confluence of various identity categories that are 
at the source of prejudice and inferior treatment.67 It is paramount for the care sector 
to address pathogenic vulnerability and offer services that are sensitive and alive to 
the possibility of prejudice and abuse towards the people they care for. This may 
come from abusive interpersonal relationships (within family members, relatives, 
friends or care staff), or from wider social negative bias towards particular 
characteristics (age, gender, sexuality or ethnicity for instance). 
 
It may be contended that this segmented approach to vulnerability harks back to one 
based on certain characteristics and is far from universal. I would respond that this 
multi-dimensional approach to vulnerability for policy purposes does not contradict 
but rather sits within a universal conception of vulnerability, one that justifies a 
responsive state and acknowledges that ‘our vulnerabilities range in magnitude and 
potential at the individual level’.68 Vulnerability so understood is a fluctuating and 
individually experienced phenomenon, but one that touches us all and so sustains the 
proposition that over a life course, ‘no individual can avoid vulnerability entirely’, 
and that we ought to ‘look to societal institutions to mediate, compensate and lessen’ 
its effect.69 I will now turn to policies currently in place to protect individuals in care 
homes, and discuss whether they do so on the basis of an appropriate understanding of 
vulnerability as universal vulnerability, and whether they allow for dignity by 
anchoring them in relational autonomy. 
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Women of Color’ (1991) 43 Stanford Law Review 1241 
68 Fineman (n34) 10 
69 Ibid  
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3) Protection of vulnerability 
a) Criminal law  
 
A state responsive to universal vulnerability must set out laws that forbid and punish 
the infliction of harm. It is the task of the responsive state to fashion policies that will 
effectively protect vulnerability as understood above, without encroaching on the 
possibility of dignity anchored in relational autonomy. In order to evaluate whether 
this is achieved I am going to review laws set out for the purpose of protecting the 
multi-dimensional vulnerability of the elderly in long term care homes, and see 
whether they create conditions favourable to the three components of dignity in 
elderly care: identity, self-will and respect for humanity. In the specific context of 
care homes, the criminal law acts to punish those who harm those in their care, either 
by their action or by their omission. Individuals in care homes are dependent on the 
care of others for their physical and psychological wellbeing, and so are particularly 
prone to being harmed by the withdrawal of that care.  
 
The Social Care institute for Excellence (SCIE) has published a list of ‘types of 
abuse’ under their adult safeguarding section.70 Physical abuse includes the physical 
harm inflicted by a person to another (assault, hitting, punching, kicking…), the 
unlawful use of restraint, the purposeful withdrawal of care, the forcible feeding or 
withholding of food, the misuse of medication or the imposition of physical isolation. 
To this list can be added the harm caused by sexual assaults, a harm that may be both 
physical and psychological. Psychological abuse is defined by the SCIE as 
encompassing social isolation, verbal abuse in the form of intimidating, patronizing or 
humiliating language, lack of opportunity to express one’s religious beliefs or take 
part in meaningful activities, lack of privacy or lack of opportunity to express oneself 
and have choices. Some of these types of abuse have been addressed by the criminal 
law, and I will address each one in turn. 
 
Physical harm inflicted on an elderly person is not specifically designated as ‘elder 
                                                
70 Social Care Institute for Excellence, ‘Adult Safeguarding: Types and indicators of abuse’ (January 
2015)   
<http://www.scie.org.uk/publications/ataglance/69-adults-safeguarding-types-and-indicators-of-
abuse.asp> Accessed 5th September 2016 
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crime’. The criminal system is intent on avoiding stigmatizing older people and so has 
not defined crime against the elderly as a discreet category of offence. The Crown 
Prosecution Services (CPS) guidance states that ‘whatever the age of a victim or 
witness, their needs and case management issues should be assessed on an individual 
basis. Reliance should not be placed on pre-conceived or stereotypical notions and 
norms about older people in general’.71 Crimes against older people do not attract the 
statutory sentencing uplift set out under sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 that can be applied to racist, religious, homophobic or transphobic crimes, 
or hate crimes against disability. 72  Despite this statutory disparity, ‘sentencing 
guidelines do however invite the court to increase the sentence for offences against 
older people on the basis that their perceived vulnerability is an aggravating factor 
increasing the seriousness of the crime’.73 Unlike crimes motivated by racism or 
religion (for instance the racially or religiously aggravated offences listed under the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998),74 there is no statutory aggravated offence for crimes 
committed against an older person, although the CPS qualifies any crime motivated 
by hostility towards older people as a hate crime, amounting to an aggravating 
factor.75 Once more, this reflects the concern expressed by the CPS to avoid ageist 
stereotypes that assume that vulnerability occurs de facto past a certain age, whilst 
sending the message that this type of prejudice is reproachable.   
 
Although the use of restraints is not prohibited in care homes, their improper use can 
lead to criminal charges. I will examine this issue in more details in the next chapter 
as one example of the difficulties faced by policy makers intending to protect the 
person whilst enabling dignity. Although the CPS mentions the use of restraints as a 
potential crime, there is no specific offence that addresses the issue. Rather, the CPS 
holds that ‘when considering matters such as whether a criminal offence has been 
committed or whether the public interest requires a prosecution, prosecutors may find 
                                                
71 CPS, ‘Prosecuting Crimes against Older People’ 
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these Regulations and guidance helpful in assessing whether the use of restraint was 
appropriate and proportionate’.76 The purposeful withdrawal or force-feeding of food 
could amount to ill treatment. Indeed, under sections 20 and 21 of the Criminal 
Justice and Courts Act 2015 the ill treatment and willful neglect of a person by a care 
worker or a care provider are now criminal offences. The Act recognizes the need to 
protect those who, by the nature of the services they use, are not only inherently but 
also situationally vulnerable, and so at higher risk of harm. 77  The misuse of 
medication can be dealt with by the Medicines Act 1968, whilst sexual assault is 
covered under the Sexual Offences Act 2003.  
 
Other criminal offences more specifically address psychological abuse. The CPS lists 
‘humiliation, intimidation, emotional blackmail, verbal abuse, being shouted or sworn 
at’ as offences punishable under the Public Order Act 1986, the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997, or the Theft Act 1968.78 This list shows that the criminal law 
falls short of protecting all categories of psychological abuse as defined by the SCIE. 
In particular, it offers no protection against being patronized, lacking privacy and 
being isolated. The kind of harm that may result from such treatment may have a 
profound effect on a person’s dignity because it goes to the heart of a person’s sense 
of identity, self-determination and humanity. Institutional support is essential to the 
sustaining of the relational autonomy of the person in care who has been displaced 
from her environment and cut off from those inter-subjective and social relationships 
that had previously defined and sustained it. Nonetheless I would argue that the 
criminal law may not be the appropriate tool to protect every type of indignity 
committed against the person in care homes. This may be better addressed, as I will 
examine in chapter V, by the regulatory framework governing care provisions, or may 
originate from deeper changes in societal behaviours.  
 
The conclusion to draw from this panoply of criminal offences is twofold. Firstly, the 
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harassment/causing another to fear (Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s.1 and s.4; Protection from 
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type of protection offered by the criminal law reveals that there is a focus on 
situational vulnerability, by setting out offences linked to a particular environment, in 
this instance that of healthcare settings where individuals go to when they require the 
help of others. This contributes to the positive message that elderly people are not a 
homogenously vulnerable sub-group but that it is the situation they are in that 
heightens the risk of harm they may face. I discussed in Chapter II the fact that the 
image elderly people have of themselves is often influenced by the idea society has of 
them, and this in turns has an impact on their identity, a founding block of dignity. It 
must also be noted that some important elements to dignity that may result in 
psychological abuse are not protected by the criminal law. As I argued, this is not 
necessarily inappropriate – certain forms of damaging behaviour, may be better 
addressed by other means and a change in cultural environment. I will address this 
particular aspect in the chapter examining ageism. 
 
Secondly, the very need for criminal law to be involved in protecting those who use 
healthcare settings specifically ought to be questioned. Understanding the reasons 
why these types of offences occur is complex. Abusing frail dependent elderly people 
may be caused by a wide variety of factors, some of them personal to the caregiver, 
others linked to the conditions of work experienced in the care home, including the 
challenging behaviour of some residents. Individuals in care homes need to be free 
from physical and psychological abuse for dignity to flourish. Although the criminal 
law appears to be responsive to this need by forbidding and punishing physical abuse, 
the root causes of that abuse also need to be assessed in order to offer the possibility 
of conditions amenable to dignity. Preventing situational vulnerability ought to be 
part of the same policies that seek to protect it. Some of these issues will be explored 
in the next chapter under the regulatory framework and staffing issues that prevail in 
the care industry. 
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b) Human rights  
 
Protection from physical and psychological abuse is also found under national and 
international human rights laws. Domestically, the articles engaged in the protection 
of physical and psychological integrity are Article 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA), the absolute right ‘not to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment’,79 as well as Article 8, the right to respect for private life, 
and Article 5, the right not to be deprived of one’s liberty. These rights are 
particularly potent for the protection of vulnerability of the older person in care 
homes. Despite this fact, there exist three potential problems against the effective 
protection offered by human rights in this context. 
 
Firstly, the scope of protection against personal integrity is limited by the fact that 
only public bodies are caught under the obligations of the Human Rights Act.80 Under 
the Care Act 2014, any care provider who is delivering care that is arranged, or paid 
for (directly or indirectly, in whole or in part) by a local authority, will be deemed to 
be exercising a function of a public nature.81 Any provider of care that is organised 
and paid for privately is not legally required to comply with the Human Rights Act.  
 
Secondly, the scope of the protection offered by each article is not absolute, hinging 
on judicial interpretation, and public interest qualifications. Article 3 protection 
depends on the definition of the terms ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’ and the level 
of harm reached. This must be deemed sufficient for the protection of the right to be 
engaged. According to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 
treatment has been held to be ‘inhuman because, inter alia, it was premeditated, was 
applied for hours at a stretch, and caused either actual bodily injury or intense 
physical and mental suffering’, whereas ‘degrading treatment is that which is said to 
arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority, capable of humiliating 
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and debasing them’.82 The case of Ireland v UK has clarified that the minimum level 
of severity was dependent on the situation and that ‘the sex, age and state of health of 
the victim’ should be taken into account.83 This caveat recognizes the element of 
vulnerability under the protection of Article 3. AgeUK gives the following example of 
a potential Article 3 abuse: 
 
Mrs S, aged 102, felt isolated, disrespected and neglected while she was in 
hospital. Despite being blind, her meals and drinks were left on a trolley – in 
most cases without even letting her know they were there. For the most part, 
staff also did not offer any assistance with eating or drinking. As a result, many 
of the meals were removed untouched. Mrs S also suffered a great indignity 
when she asked for a commode, but was told by a nurse that she could use her 
incontinence pad.84  
 
The protection against abuse that is offered by Article 3 demands a certain threshold 
of harm (apparently a relatively high one, as the example above may suggest) and so 
does not cover all abusive behaviour. It may leave out again the harm that results 
from lacking privacy or being talked to in an infantilizing way, which may 
nonetheless contribute to a feeling of indignity. 
 
Article 8 has also been interpreted as including the right to physical and psychological 
integrity, in cases where the interference was of a lesser degree than those under 
Article 3.85 Although the court has held that measures against integrity must be 
‘substantial’ before Article 8 is engaged,86 it has also declared that only minor 
interference could be regarded a breach of Article 8 ‘if carried out against the 
individual’s will’.87  Article 8 protection is also limited by the caveat that ‘there shall 
be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as 
is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
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of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others’.88  Although the threshold of harm is 
lower than for Article 3, the engagement of Article 8 is limited by the state’s margin 
of appreciation. I will discuss the application of Article 8 in care situations in the next 
part of this chapter when I discuss the case of Ms McDonald. 
 
The third obstacle to the effectiveness of the protection of human rights legislation 
against abuse is the attitude of those it aims to help, a topic I touched on under the 
theme of humanity in Chapter II. A sample panel study conducted by AgeUK 
revealed that older people thought that ‘the HRA is about political correctness, not 
older people’s treatment; human rights are in issue in dictatorships, not Britain; 
people shouldn’t have to use legal rights to get action; using the Act will not make 
any difference, and there is a lack of information and system navigations kills.’ 89  
As to the perceived ‘political correctness’ of the HRA the people interviewed thought 
it was a mechanism to legitimise bad behaviour (‘It means you can get away with 
murder, literally, it means the victims don’t get a say’).90 Human rights were also 
confused with democratic rights and considered mostly suitable for use in countries 
where a change of ruling regime is needed (‘Its why they got rid of Saddam’).91 It was 
apparent to those interviewed that having to legalise human rights meant that society 
was deteriorating (‘It’s sad that we need them’).92 Although people were reluctant to 
‘make a fuss’ and use the courts to enforce their rights, they were far more prepared to 
do so for a relative.93 According to this study, it appears that should care providers act 
in a way that is incompatible with their human rights obligations, the older people 
concerned may not use the mechanisms in place to challenge them. Despite recent 
initiatives to break down the psychological barriers that are preventing people from 
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using the protection of the HRA in cases of abuse,94 it seems that the language of 
human rights does not sit well with current generations of older people who regard 
them with a certain ‘antipathy’ and suspiciousness, a reaction that is not conducive to 
their enforcement.95 This may change with future generations of individuals in care 
who are more familiar with the human rights discourse.  
International human rights instruments are even more removed from the grasp of 
those in institutional care settings who may wish to invoke them to combat abuse. 
Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,96 as well as the 
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 97  or Article 15 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities,98 offer individuals freedom from serious harm. Individual complaints 
procedures exist, but they can only be used once all domestic remedies have been 
exhausted.99 It is easy to imagine that individuals who do not rely or trust in the use of 
national human rights laws will be even more reluctant to use the even more removed 
mechanism of international complaints procedures. Another difficulty with 
international human rights law in this context arises in connection with the 
responsibility of states to report on their implementation of International Covenants. 
States may report less well so on the subject of the elderly in care system if there is no 
international human right treaty specifically elaborated for the protection of the rights 
of the older person. I will discuss this possibility further in chapter VI under the topic 
of ageism. 
 
To conclude, using human rights laws for the specific goal of protecting the 
vulnerability of those elderly individuals who are cared for in institutions is not the 
most efficient of legal tools. The protection they offer requires a certain level of harm 
and can be qualified by wider public concerns. The human rights discourse is also – at 
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least for current generations of elderly people – considered irrelevant and too 
removed from those they seek to protect. It may be that with time and the right 
campaigning strategy, the use of human rights may become more prominent in the 
fight against all forms of abuse against personal integrity in care homes.  
 
It must be remembered, however, that human rights laws are not just about providing 
victims with an avenue for redress when their human rights are violated. They are also 
there to guide public bodies in the exercise of their functions. Public bodies are under 
a positive obligation, mainly under Article 3 and 8, to safeguard, in the exercise of 
their public functions, those adults at higher risk of abuse. Care homes, under the Care 
Act 2014, are considered to assume the functions of a public body, unless the care is 
organized and/or paid for privately.100 Safeguarding measures are devised to protect 
the person’s vulnerability, but they may also represent an intrusion on the person’s 
self-determination, specifically in those cases where the level of vulnerability is such 
that the law requires intervention. I will examine those measures set out to safeguard 
individuals in care in the next chapter, and consider whether they manage to do so 
without compromising the possibility of dignity. Before I do so, it is important to 
examine the case of McDonald, a case that has explored in greater details the use of 
Article 8 in the context of dignity in social care.101 
 
 
4) The case of McDonald 
 
The case of McDonald is interesting because it deals directly with the issue of dignity 
in care, and the way in which the courts interpret social care and human rights laws.102 
This case shows the significance of the courts’ interpretation of legal rules on the 
conceptualisation of dignity in care. I am going to explore how although Ms 
McDonald argued that her dignity was hers to define, the courts suggested otherwise.  
Ms McDonald had suffered a stroke and subsequent falls, which had affected her 
mobility quite severely. As a result, she needed to urinate often during the night, 
relying on the help of a carer to get to the commode. As a consequence of budget 
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tightening, the borough of Kensington and Chelsea decided to withdraw the night 
time help the applicant had been receiving, offering her in lieu of a carer some 
incontinence pads. The applicant challenged the legality of the decision taken by the 
local authority on the ground that her needs had not changed and so did not justify her 
care to be changed, and that the new care package proposed was not compatible with 
Article 8, the right to respect for private and family life, due to the indignity it would 
cause her.103  
 
The High Court refused to grant permission to bring judicial review, determining that 
the need in question was to be interpreted as one of safety and that the council was 
entitled to meet that need ‘in the most economic manner’.104 Having considered the 
ground of Article 8 to be ‘parasitic’ upon this issue, it was not discussed any 
further.105 The case went to the Court of Appeal before reaching the Supreme 
Court.106 For the purpose of this dissertation, I will concentrate my analysis on the 
main grounds of appeal, that emanating from the statutory duties public authorities are 
under in their social care functions, and that of their welfare obligations arising out of 
Article 8. The appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected by a majority of four to one, 
Lady Hale dissenting. It was argued that the public authority had followed due 
process in the assessment of Ms McDonald’s needs, and that Article 8, if engaged at 
all, was justifiably curtailed on the ground of the economic wellbeing of the wider 
public. I will concentrate here on reviewing the grounds of appeal of Article 8 breach 
and failure to follow statutory duties for care assessment, leaving aside those relying 
on breaches of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. 
 
a) Article 8 ground 
 
Lord Brown accepted that Article 8 demanded a positive obligation from the state to 
respect a person’s private life, stating that  
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[t]here is no dispute that in principle it can impose a positive obligation on a 
state to take measures to provide support and no dispute either that the provision 
of home-based community care falls within the scope of the article provided the 
applicant can establish both (i) “a direct and immediate link between the 
measures sought by an applicant and the latter’s private life” – Botta v Italy 
(1998) 26 EHRR 241, paras 34 and 35 – and (ii) “a special link between the 
situation complained of and the particular needs of [the applicant’s] private 
life”: Sentges v The Netherlands (2003) 7 CCLR 400, 405.107  
Lord Brown went on to note that even if such links were established in the present 
case, case law showed that the triggering of Article 8 to demand positive state welfare 
was very high, quoting the case of Anufrijeva v Southwark London Borough Council 
where the court had held that ‘[w]e find it hard to conceive . . . of a situation in which 
the predicament of an individual will be such that article 8 requires him to be 
provided with welfare support, where his predicament is not sufficiently severe to 
engage article 3’.108 There the court sets a very low threshold for the council’s positive 
duty of welfare to be discharged.  
In fact, the court settled the Article 8 question more on the procedural aspect of this 
positive obligation than its substance. The court held that the council had ‘gone to 
great lengths both to consult the appellant (…) about the appellant’s needs and the 
possible way of meeting them’.109  Doing so, in the court’s view, ‘respected (her) 
human dignity and autonomy, allowing her to choose the details of her care package 
within their overall assessment of her needs’.110 Here, Ms McDonald invoked dignity 
as an argument against using pads, whereas the council and the court invoked dignity 
as an argument in favour of using them. As I noted in Chapter I, critiques have 
identified the problem that dignity, if left undefined, can be used for and against the 
same argument, putting the usefulness of the concept in doubt. This case illustrates 
that very problem.  
The court then referred to the state’s legitimate interference with Article 8. Lord 
Brown cited the Strasbourg jurisprudence as establishing a wide margin of 
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appreciation, allowing to strike ‘a fair balance between the competing interests of the 
individual and the community as a whole’, especially in situations such as this one, 
when ‘the issues involve an assessment of the priorities in the context of the 
allocation of limited state resources’.111 He argued that even if the court established 
that an interference with Article 8 had taken place, it would be justified under Article 
8(2), as necessary in a democratic society in the interest of the economic wellbeing of 
the country. 112  Furthermore the interference would have been found to be 
proportionate to the appellant’s needs, because ‘it afforded her the maximum 
protection from injury, greater privacy and independence and resulted in a substantial 
costs savings’.113 Once more, the court disregards the wishes of Ms McDonald by 
imposing its own views as to the kind of outcomes her care ought to provide her with.  
 
The case of McDonald then reached the Strasbourg court.114 Quoting the case of 
Pretty,115 the Chamber acknowledged that ‘it was under Article 8 that the notions of 
the quality of life took on significance because, in an era of growing medical 
sophistication combined with longer life expectancies, many people were concerned 
that they should not be forced to linger on in old age or in states of advanced physical 
or mental decrepitude which conflicted with their strongly held ideas of self and 
personal identity’.116 Here, the court recognized that  
 
[A]lthough the facts of the present case differ significantly from those of Pretty, 
insofar as the present applicant believed that the level of care offered by the 
local authority would have undignified and distressing consequences, she too 
was faced with the possibility of living in a manner which “conflicted with [her] 
strongly held ideas of self and personal identity”. In the Supreme Court, 
Baroness Hale, in her dissenting opinion, appeared to accept that considerations 
of human dignity were engaged when someone who could control her bodily 
functions was obliged to behave as if she could not (…). The Court agrees with 
this general assessment of the applicant’s situation and it does not exclude that 
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the particular measure complained of by the applicant in the present case was 
capable of having an impact on her enjoyment of her right to respect for private 
life as guaranteed under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. It therefore finds that 
the contested measure reducing the level of her healthcare falls within the scope 
of Article 8.117  
 
This statement made by the court is important because it recognises that Article 8 is 
engaged when measures taken by public bodies are shown to have negative 
consequences on the healthcare of individuals.118 Beforehand the court had only 
recognised the engagement of Article 8 in cases when the public authority had refused 
to provide funding for treatment or equipment.119 This new development could be 
interpreted as an acceptance by the court that a certain level of care is required to be 
provided by public authorities in order to be compliant with Article 8.  
Although ‘prepared to approach the present case as one involving an interference with 
the applicant’s right to respect for her private life’, the court did so ‘without 
discussing whether or not Article 8 s.1 imposes a positive obligation on the 
Contracting States to put a level of entitlement to care equivalent to that claimed by 
the applicant’.120 The court did not discuss which level of entitlement was required to 
be compatible with Article 8. It avoided making dignity the yardstick of compliance, 
and instead concentrated on the process followed by the council, holding that the 
interference was acceptable as far as it was in accordance with the law, pursued a 
legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society, as per Article 8(2).121 
Breach was found to have occurred only during a short period of time during which 
the council had failed to formally review Ms McDonald’s care plan despite having 
made changes to her care, thereby doing so in a manner that was not in accordance 
with the law. 
 
The decision by the council to cut the amount spent on Ms McDonald’s care package 
was held to be a proportionate measure balanced against ‘the more general interest of 
the competent public authority in carrying out its social responsibility of provision of 
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care to the community at large’.122 A ‘particularly wide margin of appreciation’ was 
afforded to nations ‘when the issues involve an assessment of the priorities in the 
context of the allocation of limited State resources’.123 I agree with Jones that this 
case was a ‘missed opportunity’ to ‘flesh out the concepts of dignity and autonomy in 
relation to claims made by older disabled adults’.124 The case focused essentially on 
procedures, avoiding more substantial debates about care, human rights, autonomy 
and dignity. 
 
Although a note of cautious optimism may follow on from the remarks made by the 
Strasbourg court linking level of care and Article 8, it may still prove difficult to 
challenge further care funding decisions on the ground of Article 8. Councils can still 
breach this obligation by showing that it followed the demands of Article 8(2); the 
problem posed by a wide margin of appreciation still persists. Using Article 8 to 
demand that social care services be delivered to a level that will uphold dignity as 
defined by the person cared for seems therefore unlikely to succeed if it implies 
demands for additional public resources. In its guide on Article 8, the European Court 
of Human Rights notes that ‘[w]hen it comes to access to health care services, the 
Court has been cautious to extend Article 8 in a manner that would implicate 
extensive State resources because in view of their familiarity with the demands made 
on the healthcare system as well as with the funds available to meet those demands, 
the national authorities are in a better position to carry out this assessment that an 
international court’.125  
 
b) Statutory duties of public authorities  
The decision of the council to amend Ms McDonald’s care was also challenged on the 
ground of its legality, more particularly on the ground that the council had illegally 
changed her care plan although her needs had not been reassessed and remained 
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unchanged.126 The role of the court in its judicial review capacity was to ascertain the 
legality of the decision made by the borough in its social care duties. Lord Brown 
referred to the various statutory obligations public authorities were then under, pre-
Care Act 2014. Most particularly he pointed to the requirement laid out by the 
Community Assessment Directions 2004 issued under section 47(4) of the National 
Health Service and Community Care Act 1990 for local authority to consult the 
person and their carer at the time of assessment.127 The focus remained on the 
compliance of the local authority with this duty to consult, but did not engage with 
how much weight the wishes of Ms McDonald should have in the final decision taken 
about her care. Part of Ms McDonald’s care review was quoted in the Supreme Court 
case, showing that the overriding concern of the local authority was for her safety. It 
concluded by stating that ‘Ms McDonald’s need to be kept safe from falling and 
injuring herself’ and that this aim ‘can be met by the provision of equipment (pads 
and/or absorbent sheets)’.128  
Although Ms McDonald was adamant that this solution was ‘an affront to her 
dignity’, the council held that other service users who had felt the same way and who 
also had been offered the option of pads had realised that they ‘improved quality of 
life by protecting them from harm and allowing a degree of privacy and independence 
in circumstances which [were] (…) less than ideal’.129  
When assessing her needs, the council imposed on Ms McDonald ideas about dignity 
that were not her own. It is disputable that the fact that other individuals had 
eventually found some advantages to the use of incontinence pads should have had so 
much weight in the council’s decision about her particular care. Despite this, since 
there was no statutory requirement to presume that the person receiving care is best 
placed to know which care services best meet her needs, both the council and the 
court could conclude that giving these other perspectives priority over Ms 
McDonald’s own was lawful. The majority of the Low Lords in this case agreed that 
due process had been respected and that the local authority had complied with its 
statutory duties to assess and provide Ms McDonald with care.  
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Lady Hale took a very different view by questioning the rationality of the local 
authority’s interpretation of Ms McDonald’s needs under their duty to assess set out 
by section 47 of the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990. She 
noted that the need to get to ‘a safe and hygienic place’ in which to ‘urinate and 
defecate’ was not the same as the need some people have for ‘equipment designed to 
cater for the fact that they cannot avoid performing these natural functions in the 
wrong place’.130 Lady Hale remarked that these two needs were very different indeed. 
She continued by suggesting that ‘the fact that (the local authority) have been trying 
so hard for so long to persuade (Ms McDonald) to accept their point of view does not 
mean that it is a rational view or one she is bound to accept’.131  
 
She therefore allowed the appeal, qualifying as ‘Wednesbury irrational’ the decision 
of the council, which had ‘characterised the appellant as having a different need from 
the one she in fact has’.132 Lady Hale also drew attention to the respect for dignity 
obligations set out by health and social care regulations. She reminded the court that 
‘Regulation 17 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) (…) 
requires a registered person, so far as reasonably practicable, to make suitable 
arrangements to ensure the dignity, privacy and independence of service users’.133 She 
concluded that ‘in the United Kingdom we do not oblige people who can control their 
bodily functions to behave as if they cannot do so, unless they themselves find this the 
most convenient course. We are, I believe, a civilized society’.134 Her argument failed 
to convince the majority. 
 
Under the new overarching statutory wellbeing principle guiding the Care Act 2014, 
which now sets out the duty of care assessments of local authorities, the decision of 
the majority may have had a different outcome. The guidance accompanying the Care 
Act 2014 states that ‘the core purpose of adult care and support is to help people to 
achieve the outcomes that matter to them in their life’.135 The Care Act also sets out 
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that in the exercise of their function, local authorities ‘must have regard’ to ‘the 
importance of beginning with the assumption that the individual is best-paced to 
judge the individual’s wellbeing’.136 This is an important shift in social care law, one 
that seeks to respect the wishes of vulnerable individuals; it echoes those principles 
underpinning the Mental Capacity Act 2005 that presume capacity and place the 
person at the centre of best interests determination, a topic I will examine in more 
details in the next chapter.137 The wellbeing principle of the Care Act adopts the view 
that ‘the local authority should assume that the persons themselves know best their 
own outcomes, goals and wellbeing’, and that on this basis ‘should not make 
assumptions as to what matters most to the person’.138  
The case law emerging from the Care Act 2014 will no doubt over time flesh out the 
meaning of the wellbeing principle, and will hopefully demand that public authorities 
pay substantial attention to the wishes of the person needing care. The case of R (On 
The Application of Luke Davey) v Oxfordshire County Council,139 is one such recent 
judicial review case in the High Court. The Claimant, a disabled man with extensive 
care needs, argued that the decision of the council to reduce his care budget was 
Wednesbury unreasonable, citing inter alia, the failure of the council to follow the 
statutory wellbeing principle established under the Care Act. Morris J agreed that 
sections 1(1) and (2) of the Care Act ‘imposed a distinct duty upon the Defendant, in 
each individual case, to promote the individual’s wellbeing, including mental health 
and emotional wellbeing’ and that section 1(3) contained a separate ‘have regard to’ 
duty to the items listed under that subsection.140  
One of the items under this ‘have regard to’ duty is the presumption, under section 
1(3)(a) that the person cared for is best placed to assess his or her own wellbeing. The 
claimant in this case held that due to his care funding being decreased, he would be 
left alone during the day for longer periods of time, causing him anxiety, and so 
impacting negatively on his wellbeing.141 He also held that in this respect ‘the 
Defendant was purporting to know the Claimant's needs better than he knows them 
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himself and in this way the Defendant failed to have regard to the relevant 
considerations identified in section 1(3)(a)’.142 The court did not discuss how much 
weight the local authority ought to give to the presumption that the person assessed 
knows best when it comes to his wellbeing. Morris J confirmed that 
 
[t]he duties upon the Defendant in ss.1(3)(a) and (d) are duties to "have regard". 
These duties are a starting point and did not prevent Ms Lovelock and Ms 
Collins from taking a different view as to the Claimant's needs, based on their 
objective professional judgment and experience.143 
The weight that ought to be given to Mr Davey’s own perception about his wellbeing 
was not discussed here, only that in the end the professional opinion of the social 
worker as to what amounted to his wellbeing prevailed. Here, ‘developing 
independence’ through longer periods of time spent alone was taken to be more 
important for Mr Davey’s wellbeing than avoiding his anxiety to be alone.144 The 
procedural aspect of the assessment was held to comply with the wellbeing 
requirements of the Care Act 2014. The ‘having regard to’ duty established under 
section 1(3) of the Care Act could be complied with as long as the council showed it 
had considered the opinion of the person cared for about wellbeing.  
In the case of R (JF) v London Borough of Merton, the Claimant who suffered from 
autism and severe learning difficulties challenged the lawfulness of a decision by the 
local authority to move him from his current accommodation in a college, to one in a 
residential care home for adults.145 The importance of the person’s own view about 
their wellbeing under section 1(3) of the Care Act is not discussed directly here, but 
the comments made by the judge are interesting:  
[i]f the Assessment failed to assess the impact of JF's needs for care and support 
upon the factors of wellbeing listed in section 1(2) of the Act, then it is an 
unlawful assessment. Likewise, if it failed to assess the outcomes that JF's 
wishes to achieve in day-to-day life, and whether, and if so to what extent, the 
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provision of care and support could contribute to the achievement of those 
outcomes, it is unlawful.146 
 
The judge referred in this latter statement to the importance of the presumption of 
wellbeing being best understood by the person assessed. She also made this clear 
when she concluded that ‘[t]here is a clear statutory theme placing the individual at 
the heart and centre of the process so that he or she is fully involved in decision 
making. This is emphasised by the duty to have regard to the wishes and preferences 
of the individual’.147 These comments illustrate how the wellbeing principle can be 
interpreted by the court to give real weight to the wishes of the person cared for.  
At the same time, both the cases of Davey and JF have also quoted authorities that set 
out the position the court should adopt in reviewing the legality of social care 
assessments: 
Community care assessments are prepared by social workers ordinarily, for the 
benefit of their employers. The courts have frequently said, as in R (Ireneschild) 
v Lambeth Borough Council [2007] EWCA Civ 234 at [57] and [71] that 
community care assessments must not be subject to over-zealous textual 
analysis. It is not for the court to be prescriptive about the detail required in an 
assessment. Social workers are better placed to assess need than courts so long 
as they act rationally. It is not the function of the court itself to come to a 
decision on the merits of the decision. Parliament conferred the powers and 
duties applicable here to local authorities and the court's function is therefore 
one of review. There must be a respectful distance between the functions of the 
decision maker and of the reviewing court.148 
This statement reminds us that the court is only meant to rule on the legality of the 
council’s decisions, in order to respect their democratic legitimacy. It is difficult on 
the basis of these recent cases to imagine that the application of the principle of 
wellbeing in the case of McDonald would have changed the outcome regarding the 
legality of the decision taken by the local authority to change her night-time care 
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arrangements. Although the court is acknowledging that councils are now under a 
new duty to ‘have regard to’ the presumption that the person assessed knows best 
regarding her wellbeing, it discharges the council from this duty on procedural 
ground, as long as the views of the person have been taken into account. Eventually, 
however, developments in the Care Act jurisprudence may move towards giving more 
weight to this presumption in the application of the wellbeing principle. This would 
reflect the increasingly person-centred approach the courts have been taking when 
determining best interests under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 discussed in the next 
chapter.  
 
Clements has commented that ‘the absence of judicial ‘cri de coeur’ concerning the 
rights of disabled people shows that some judges ‘appear to comprehend dignity on an 
objective intellectual plane but are unable to express (or perhaps ‘experience’) 
subjectively the meaning of what it is to suffer indignity’.149 This may change in time 
with the statutory interpretation of the wellbeing principle that now underpins the 
Care Act. It may evolve to become amenable to dignity as understood in this 
dissertation, by giving real weight to the person’s viewpoint in the provision of social 
care services. On the other hand, McDonald shows that using Article 8 as a ground to 
enable a person-centred conception of dignity in care is less likely to succeed. 
Although the Strasbourg court has recognised that Article 8 placed a positive duty on 
states to provide certain welfare provisions, it has not discussed the question of 
threshold, and has also justified its curtailment on the ground of the economic 
wellbeing of the country. It is ironic to note that the term ‘wellbeing’ in the context of 
social care law could prove an influential principle for the promotion of dignity under 
a discursive model, whereas the use of ‘wellbeing’ under Article 8(2) may prove a 
barrier to it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
149 Clements L., ‘Disability, dignity and cri de coeur’ [2011] 6 European Human Rights Law Review 
675, 676 
 123 
5) Conclusion 
 
In order to be amenable to dignity under a discursive model, social policies have to 
fulfil two goals. They have to be responsive to the effects of vulnerability, whilst at 
the same time foster conditions amenable to the person’s identity, self-determination 
and humanity grounded in relational autonomy. Vulnerability used to be 
comprehended under an etic perspective. 150  This particular approach, which 
originates from anthropology, means ‘describing a phenomenon as viewed by 
someone outside the experience’. 151  An etic approach applied to vulnerability defines 
it on the basis of certain traits that assign to particular individuals or groups a higher 
‘probability of health or social problems’. In the case of the elderly, the supposition of 
their vulnerability is based on their age, and translates into the assumption that they 
are at higher risk of harm and so need a higher level of intervention.152  
 
An etic perspective on vulnerability assumes that it is a ‘deficient functioning’ in 
comparison to the social values adopted by society.153 The value of autonomy reigns 
supreme in our western liberal societies, and so the label of vulnerability will be 
attached to those who fall short of that autonomous functioning. Ferguson has 
established that the interventions that will follow will also reflect the same value of 
autonomy and so will have for aim to improve autonomy for the vulnerable individual 
whilst at the same time avoid imposing limits on the autonomy of others.154 To avoid 
paternalistic interventions and respond to human needs means that intervention will 
be justified ‘when endangerment or threat of objective harm can be proved’.155 This in 
turn limits the meaning of vulnerability which, assessed by external objective 
evaluation against societal values, may differ to that experienced by the individual.  
 
In order for the law to be more responsive to dignity as understood in this dissertation, 
it could benefit from following nursing perspectives on vulnerability, which have 
                                                
150 Spiers J., ‘New perspectives on vulnerability using emic and etic approach’ (March 2000) 31(3) 
Journal of Advanced Nursing 715, 716 
151 Ibid  
152 Ibid 
153 Ibid 717 
154 Ferguson E. J. Protecting the Vulnerable Adult: A Perspective on Policy and Program Issues in 
Adult Protective Services (Institute of Gerontology, University of Michigan State University, 1978) 
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brought to the fore the idea that it can be understood as an experienced phenomenon 
rather than a label of inferiority attributed to certain groups according to certain 
criteria. This approach to vulnerability is called ‘emic’, a term used to refer to ‘a 
description of the phenomena as understood by the person’.156 Under this perspective, 
‘vulnerability is based on the experience of exposure to harm through challenges to 
one’s integrity’.157 Under an emic perspective, the main assumption made is that 
‘vulnerability exists as lived experience’.158 In this instance, vulnerability is assessed 
internally, grounded in the individual’s perception of self, the challenges that self may 
face and the means with which those challenges can be met.159 Parse notes therefore 
that only the person experiencing vulnerability is ever able to define it, similarly to 
other experienced notions such as wellbeing, now embraced by the Care Act 2014, 160 
and that of dignity I argue for here.  
 
This emic version of vulnerability is at the core of Fineman’s approach to 
vulnerability and refined for policy purposes by Mackenzie. It is grounded in the fact 
that we are by our very biological nature, inherently and universally vulnerable, but 
that this vulnerability is experienced at different levels of intensity according to 
personal, environmental and social circumstances, or as McKenzie labels it, it is a 
vulnerability that is multi-dimensional; inherent, situational and pathogenic. A 
responsive state must mitigate this multi-dimensional vulnerability without relying on 
over paternalistic policies that would compromise a person’s ability to experience 
dignity, and so must anchor them within the bounds of relational autonomy. 
 
Laws play an important role in protecting vulnerability. In the area of criminal law, 
the CPS is purposefully refraining from treating elderly crime as a discreet category, 
whilst still sending the message that those who prey on the vulnerability of elderly 
people will receive harsher punishment through the flexible sentencing powers of the 
court. Criminal offences created to protect those who use health and social care 
services reflect the situational vulnerability of those who depend on these services. 
The human rights regime on the other hand seems to give direct remedy to those 
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perspective’ (1996) 9 Nursing Science Quarterly 126 
 125 
individuals whose vulnerability may have been abused in care. The threshold for 
human rights protection to be triggered is very high, especially under Article 3.  
Breaches can be justified under Article 8, as the case of Ms McDonald has shown, 
under economic considerations – a reminder that economics may, as I mentioned in 
the introduction, be a conversion factor to dignity. I have also argued that the new 
statutory paradigm of wellbeing under the Care Act 2014 may prompt a change in 
how much the council should consider a person’s wishes in their delivery of care 
provisions. Although Ms McDonald’s idea about what dignity meant to her was not 
upheld by the courts, future judicial interpretation of the wellbeing principle under the 
Care Act may promote a more subjective conceptualisation of dignity in care. Cases 
such as that of Davey may so far fail to reassure on the ability of the wellbeing 
principle to achieve this goal. 
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Chapter IV 
 
Personal Conversion Factor; Vulnerability II 
 
 
1) Introduction 
 
Keeping elderly people safe from harm is paramount to the realization of dignity. 
Elderly individuals in care suffer from multi-dimensional vulnerability. The inherent 
vulnerability of elderly people in care is heightened by a high degree of embodiment, 
one that affects physical and psychological faculties and compromises identity. 
Situational vulnerability exists because of the high level of dependence of these 
individuals on care services, and pathogenic vulnerability may be due to prejudices 
and harmful relationships.  The role of the responsive state is to intervene to alleviate 
the affects of vulnerability, without compromising on other aspects of dignity. Indeed, 
questions of self-determination and autonomy loom large in situations where frail 
individuals are cared for in institutions.  
 
Human rights obligations placed on care home providers have had the beneficial 
effect of developing a safeguarding regime for the purpose of protecting individuals’ 
vulnerability through intervention.1  The protection a person receives because of her 
vulnerability is often imposed by law but may jar with the possibility of autonomy, a 
paramount element of dignity. Agich suggests that ‘respecting the autonomy of 
persons in long-term care entails a commitment to identifying and establishing the 
concrete conditions that encourage individuals to face adversity and threats to self that 
are the inevitable result of the chronic illnesses and functional deteriorations that 
bring elders to long-term care in the first place’.2 In such situations, it is important to 
understand autonomy in a relational and phenomenological perspective, looking at 
elderly people in care ‘as concrete agents who exhibit complex experiential relations 
with the world and others’.3  Setting out measures within a relational grasp of 
                                                
1 Care Act 2014 s.73 
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(Cambridge University Press, 2003), 123 
3 Ibid 163 
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autonomy is essential for these measures to be compatible with and conducive to 
dignity.  
 
In this second chapter about vulnerability I will therefore focus my attention on the 
legal measures that are in place to protect vulnerability through intervention. For this 
purpose, I will consider current safeguarding laws, the rules on capacity determination 
for decision-making and best interest under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and those 
defining the use of restraints. I will examine whether those rules aimed at protecting 
the person from the effects of vulnerability can do so within the bounds of concrete 
and relational autonomy, in order to be amenable to dignity as understood here. 
 
 
2) Safeguarding 
 
Under the Care Act 2014, safeguarding is for the first time a duty of the local 
authority spelt out under sections 42 to 46, and is clarified by new guidance. In this 
new format, safeguarding is aimed at any adult who ‘has needs for care and support 
… is experiencing, or is at risk of abuse and neglect, and as a result of those care and 
support needs is unable to protect themselves from either the risk of, or the experience 
of abuse or neglect’.4 Safeguarding is independent of setting and applies to all adults 
in such situation, whether they have capacity or not.5 The adult is no longer referred 
to as vulnerable based on the characteristic of age. Instead, safeguarding is defined as 
‘protecting an adult’s right to live in safety, free from abuse and neglect. It is about 
people and organisations working together to prevent and stop both the risks and 
experience of abuse or neglect, while at the same time making sure that the adult’s 
wellbeing is promoted including, where appropriate, having regard to their views, 
wishes, feelings and beliefs in deciding on any action’.6 It is the ‘risk to independence 
and wellbeing’ that is assessed here, giving the state the responsibility to investigate 
and mitigate the undesirable effects of vulnerability.  
                                                
4 Department of Health ‘Care and support statutory guidance’ Updated October 2016 
< https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/care-act-statutory-guidance/care-and-support-statutory-
guidance> Accessed 25th October 2016 
5 Ibid 14.6 
6 Ibid 14.7 
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The accompanying guidance sets out the aims to protect the person at risk, whilst 
taking into account her right to self-determination. Safeguarding adults must be done 
‘in a way that supports them in making choices and having control about how they 
want to live’.7 It involves making enquiries, the setting up of Safeguarding Adult 
Boards, arranging for an independent advocate if necessary.8 The guidance sets out 
six principles that underpin adult safeguarding. These are Empowerment, Prevention, 
Proportionality, Protection, Partnership and Accountability.9 These principles are 
aimed at engaging with the person’s own wishes and identity, to enable them to seek 
out protection from abuse, whilst minimizing the intrusion of safeguarding on their 
lives. Safeguarding measures are to be tailor-made to the person concerned, because 
‘we all have different preferences, histories, circumstances and life-styles, so it is 
unhelpful to prescribe a process that must be followed whenever a concern is 
raised’.10 I have argued here that interventions are only dignity-enabling if they 
mitigate vulnerability whilst also taking into consideration a person’s relational 
autonomy. Safeguarding guidance, in theory at least, appears to adhere to that aim. 
 
Safeguarding rules within the Care Act show that state intervention is rooted in 
mitigating the effects of vulnerability. It acknowledges the negative effects of 
inherent and situational vulnerability and moves away from a definition of 
vulnerability linked to certain identifiable characteristics (disability, age or illness). 
This is a welcome step towards the creation of conditions amenable to dignity. Under 
the Care Act vulnerability is now located within the relationship of dependency a 
person has with others due to their inherent vulnerability. The onus is on the council 
to protect the person at risk of harm, but it is to be done with the person’s autonomy 
in mind, an autonomy defined in a relational context. This particular way to mitigate 
vulnerability is in theory amenable to dignity as defined in this dissertation.  
 
Nonetheless, safeguarding policies have their limits and may be inept at mitigating the 
effects of pathogenic vulnerability. According to Mackenzie’s definition exposed 
above, pathogenic vulnerability arises ‘from social domination, oppression or political 
                                                
7 Ibid 14.11 
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9 Ibid 14.13 
10 Ibid 14.4 
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violence’, and so can be extremely difficult to identify and alleviate.11 Policies that, in 
order to avoid the use of blunt and stereotype-inducing identity characteristics, are 
designed to alleviate vulnerability on a situational level may fail to take into 
consideration the negative effects that social or political oppression can generate. 
Safeguarding alone remains inefficient to mitigate the intersectional effects of 
multiple prejudices on an older dependent person (for instance the combination of age 
and gender, or age and sexual orientation and ethnic origins). Although safeguarding 
policies offer a short-term solution to protection against harm, they should go hand in 
hand with other social policies aimed at addressing the wider problems of ageism, 
racism, or sexism, and their cumulative effects on the vulnerability of dependent old 
age. Safeguarding policies alone cannot address the insidious effects of pathogenic 
vulnerability.  
 
Safeguarding measures can be directed at anyone thought to be at risk, but the 
threshold of capacity is the usual trigger for third party interventions in the name of a 
person’s welfare. I will now examine how the law defines that threshold, and whether 
it is conducive to dignity. 
 
 
3) Capacity 
 
Although the council’s safeguarding duties enable state involvement in any cases of 
high level of vulnerability, the traditional legal threshold triggering interventions is 
usually that of capacity. Capacity is defined under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
(MCA). It states that ‘a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if at the material 
time he is unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter because of an 
impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain’.12 The 
inability to make a decision is that to ‘understand the information relevant to the 
decision, retain that information, use or weigh that information as part of the process 
of making the decision, or to communicate that decision’.13 Once a person is declared 
                                                
11  Mackenzie C., ‘The Importance of Relational Autonomy and Capabilities for an Ethics of 
Vulnerability’ in C. Mackenzie, W. Rogers and S. Dodd (Eds) Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and 
Feminist Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2013), 39 
12 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.2(1) 
13 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.3(1) 
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to lack capacity regarding a particular issue pertaining to her welfare, decisions can be 
made on her behalf, following the determination of her best interests.14 The legal 
construct of capacity is set out to protect a person’s vulnerability due to her cognitive 
impairment. I will examine here whether capacity setting is compatible with dignity 
as understood in this dissertation. 
 
 
a) Capacity and dignity 
 
Before I do so, it is necessary to address the argument that dignity defined under a 
discursive model cannot be applied to persons without capacity. This is particularly 
pertinent in care homes where many residents are affected by conditions such as 
dementia that prevent them from communicating in any meaningful way. Indeed, the 
Alzheimer’s Society has reported that ‘70 per cent of people in care homes have 
dementia or severe memory problems’, and that there were currently over 850,000 
people with dementia in the UK, a figure set to rise to over one million by 2025.15 As 
I set out in the introduction and based on the writings of Nussbaum, we all possess 
dignity, but it may merely be a promissory note if conditions around us are not fertile 
to its flourishing.16 A discursive understanding of dignity is one that can guide the 
creation of those conditions, even when the person concerned is not able to articulate 
what those conditions ought to be.  
 
We can start to appreciate the reason why we must reject the view that dignity, as 
defined under a discursive model, cannot be applied to persons without capacity by 
looking at the case of unconscious individuals – an extreme case of people lacking 
capacity. Foster defines dignity as ‘objective human flourishing’, where ‘flourishing 
is primarily about being, and only secondarily (although often more spectacularly) 
about doing’.17  It could be argued that flourishing in the sense of being requires life, 
requires conscious through. But Foster explains that even in the case of dead or 
                                                
14 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.4 
15 Alzheimer’s Society, ‘Facts for the media’ 
<https://www.alzheimers.org.uk/info/20027/news_and_media/541/facts_for_the_media> Accessed 13th 
December 2017 
16 Nussbaum M., Creating Capabilities (Harvard University Press, 2011), 30 
17 Foster C., Human Dignity in Bioethics and Law (Hart Publishing Ltd, 2011), 6 
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unconscious individuals (no longer able to flourishing), their dignity still demands 
that their bodies be respectfully treated because of several potential reasons:  
 
1) Because they still live in the mind of others and for that part of them to flourish 
their body must be respected.  
2) Because a wish not to be abused also survives them, and ought to be presumed. 
3) Because knowing, when they were conscious, that abuse could occur when they 
became unconscious or died would have interfered with their flourishing. 
4) Because whoever abuses the body of a person no longer alive or unconscious also 
compromises his or her dignity by compromising his or her flourishing. 
5) That rules prohibiting of such abuses have a generally beneficial effect on all 
individuals’ flourishing in society at large.18 
 
The reasons therefore for acting in a certain way, one that respect the body of the 
inanimate person, is justified on the ground of the person’s own flourishing, but also 
on the impact it has on the flourishing of others; the individuals who remember the 
person, the one who abuses the person’s body, and the wider society. Foster calls this 
the ‘transactional nature of dignity’.19 I would agree in as much as dignity is indeed to 
be understood in the context of the relational nature of our autonomy, discussed in 
more details in Chapter I. As to determining the conditions necessary for this 
flourishing, Foster does agree that the answer is empirical and that ‘what is good for 
humans will inform our ethical, and hence legal conclusions’.20 
 
I have put forward here that understanding dignity through direct dialogue can help 
understand flourishing. Doing so has put to the fore the importance of identity, self-
determination and humanity. The more vulnerable a person is, the greater the need to 
situate her in her relational world in order to give meaning to her identity and enable 
her self-determination, always bearing in mind the equal status of the person on the 
ground of her shared humanity. Dignity under a discursive model situates the person 
at the very centre of its meaning, even when that person is no longer able to 
communicate. As Donnelly writes, ‘respect for will and preferences regardless of 
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capacity impairment may be justified on dignity principles’.21 When dialogue is no 
longer possible with the person cared for, identity, self-determination and humanity 
still ought to guide care, and may need to be determined through communicating with 
those who know and care for that person. 
  
The courts have discussed the role of dignity in the treatment of individuals without 
capacity or even consciousness in the case of Bland. 22  Here the House of Lords 
discussed the legality of terminating the medical treatment of a person in a Permanent 
Vegetative State (PVS) that would lead to his death. The matter of the decision 
making in this instance was rendered ethically complex by the fact that the 
incapacitated person concerned by the decision had made no previous declaration as 
to how he would like to be treated should such a situation occurred to him. The Law 
Lords discussed the main ethical issues at stake, focusing on self-determination, 
dignity and the sanctity of life. In his evaluation of those principles, Hoffman LJ 
stated that ‘the sanctity of life is only one of a cluster of ethical principles which we 
apply to decisions about how we should live. Another is respect for the individual 
human being and in particular for his right to choose how he should live his own life. 
We call this individual autonomy or the right of self-determination. And another 
principle, closely connected, is respect for the dignity of the human being: our belief 
that quite irrespective of what the person concerned may think about it, it is wrong for 
someone to be humiliated or treated without respect for his value as a person’.23  
 
Despite the lack of capacity of Mr Bland, Hoffman LJ declared that it was wrong to 
believe in the argument that ‘we have no interests except in those things of which we 
have conscious experience. (…) It is demeaning to the human spirit to say that, being 
unconscious, he can have no interest in his personal privacy and dignity, in how he 
lives or dies’.24 He concluded that in balancing these various ethical principles 
 
the choice which the law makes must reassure people that the courts do have 
full respect for life, but that they do not pursue the principle to the point at 
                                                
21 Donnelly M., ‘Best Interests in the Mental Capacity Act: Time to Say Goodbye?’ (August 2016) 
24(3) Medical Law Review 318 
22 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] A.C. 789 (HL) 
23 Ibid 826 
24 Ibid 829 
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which it has become almost empty of any real content and when it involves the 
sacrifice of other important values such as human dignity and freedom of choice. 
I think that such reassurance can be provided by a decision, properly explained, 
to allow Anthony Bland to die.25  
 
The case of Bland highlights the importance of dignity in guiding the way in which 
individuals ought to be treated, even when they are not fully functioning rational 
beings. As Finnis writes, ‘the fact that Bland could indeed have been subjected to 
indignities, e.g. by being treated as a sex object or thrown, living, into the hospital 
rubbish, confirms that he remained a person with some interests’.26   
 
Beyond this, the court also appealed to Mr Bland’s right to self-determination and 
identity in order to guide its decision. Although Anthony Bland had no way of 
expressing his wishes, either alone or supported, the court still recognised a need to 
make a decision on his behalf that respected his interests by taking into account the 
views of those who knew him best and those who cared for him. Lord Goff of 
Chieveley identified this important element when he related that ‘(a)fter careful 
thought his family agreed that the feeding tube should be removed and felt that this 
was what Mr Bland would have wanted. His father said of his son in evidence: ‘He 
certainly wouldn’t want to be left like that’.27 The application to the court to lawfully 
discontinue treatment was made by the NHS Trust ‘with the concurrence of Mr 
Bland’s family, as well as the consultant in charge of his case and the support of two 
independent doctors’.28  
 
This case illustrates how even when individuals are unconscious, appeals to dignity 
help guide their treatment. Here, it is interesting to see how the court gathers from 
those individuals Mr Bland was connected to some idea as to the way in which he 
would have liked to be treated should he had been able to decide for himself. The 
court here accepts the principle that ‘the wishes of the family will be given great 
weight’,29 although ‘the relatives’ views cannot be determinative of the treatment’.30 
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It appears to embrace the idea of relational autonomy, one that identifies individuals 
as embedded in a web of relationships. The court takes into account the views of 
those who knew and cared for Mr Bland as the best way of approximating the ideal of 
upholding his self-determination.  
 
 
b) The Mental Capacity Act 2005 and best interests determination 
 
Bland is an extreme case where capacity is not at issue. In many other cases making a 
decision on behalf of someone hinges on a decision of lack of capacity. Capacity 
determination is the current legal mechanism used to decide whether an individual 
can be left to make his or her own decision. The Mental Capacity Act is underpinned 
by principles that reflect a will to enable independent decision-making and avoid 
unnecessarily paternalistic interventions. 31  The model of capacity setting is rooted in 
welfare and best interest paradigms that dictate that when a person is held to lack 
capacity, a third party may step in and make a decision on her behalf according to her 
best interests. This model of decision-making appears at first blush not to take the 
incapacitated person’s view into account, thereby disregarding her self-determination 
and equal status on ground of shared humanity. It does not seem conducive to 
conditions amenable to dignity under a discursive ethical framework.  
 
Nonethless, a closer reading of the principles and related guidelines underscoring the 
MCA reveals that the Act does strive to embrace a relational view of the person 
assessed, and to take her views and wishes into account. The first principle is a 
presumption in favour of capacity, reinforcing the idea that autonomous decision-
making is a valuable paradigm, and that one cannot be deemed unable to make 
autonomous decision merely on the basis of certain characteristics (disability or age 
for instance).32 The Act reinforces the view that vulnerability should not be associated 
with particular traits. All individuals must be presumed to have capacity unless 
proven otherwise. For instance, there cannot be the assumption that because a person 
                                                                                                                                      
30 Ibid 
31 Department for Constitutional Affairs, ‘Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice’ (The Stationary 
Office, 2007) 
< https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mental-capacity-act-code-of-practice> Accessed 1st 
February 2018 
32 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.1(2) 
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is diagnosed with dementia they lack capacity about all their financial affairs.33 A 
case must be made to prove that it is so.  
 
The second principle mentions that, except in emergency medical situations, there 
must be an attempt to get individuals to make their own decision.34 This principle 
advocates for the engagement of the person in communication through various means. 
The guidance suggests that this may be achieved through ‘using a different form of 
communication, for example non-verbal communication’, ‘providing information in a 
more accessible form, for example photographs, drawings, or tapes’, or ‘treating a 
medical condition that may be affecting the person’s capacity’.35 This espouses a 
dialogical approach to decision-making, one that acknowledges the support 
individuals gain from inter-subjective relationships to form value judgments. 36 
Indeed, help from ‘a family member, support worker, interpreter, speech and language 
therapist or advocate’ is encouraged in helping communicate with the person making 
the decision.37 This approach also suggests the importance of the legitimacy of the 
decision arrived at, one that rests on the accountability of the autonomous choice.38 
This aspect of the principle gives value to the decision someone makes, because 
whether good or bad, it can be explained. 
 
Indeed, the third principle states that ‘a person is not to be treated as unable to make a 
decision merely because he makes an unwise decision’.39 This has been referred to as 
the authenticity conditions of autonomy, conditions that demand that ‘to count as 
autonomous, a person’s decisions, values, beliefs and commitments must be her 
‘own’ in some relevant sense; that is, she must identify herself with them and they 
must cohere with her ‘practical identity’, her sense of who she is and what matters to 
her’.40 Dworkin’s work can shed some light on the importance of this particular 
principle. Dworkin explains that we are indeed often not the best judges of our own 
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38 Benson P. 'Taking Ownership: Authority and Voice in Autonomous Agency', in J. Christman and J. 
Anderson (Eds.), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism. (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
101–126 
39 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.1(4) 
40 Mackenzie and Rogers (n36) 43 
 136 
best interests, making choices that can potentially harm us, and so questioning the 
validity of the claim that there is a welfare value attached to autonomy.41 Instead, 
autonomy is valuable on the basis of ‘the integrity rather than the welfare of the 
choosing agent’.42 It is found in the capacity to ‘express one’s character, values, 
commitments, convictions, and critical as well as experiential interests, in the life one 
leads’.43 Experiential interests are those things we do ‘because we like the experience 
of doing them’, whereas our critical interests are those ‘convictions about what makes 
a life good on the whole’.44 
 
The fourth principle stipulates that ‘an act done, or decision made, under this Act for 
or on behalf of a person who lacks capacity must be done, or made, in his best 
interest’. 45  Capacity determination is conducted by ‘the person who is directly 
concerned with the individual at the time the decision needs to be made’.46 Once 
incapacity has been determined, a third-party decision will be made on behalf of the 
person following their best interest. This is achieved following ‘the person’s past and 
present wishes and feelings, the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence 
his decision if he had capacity, and the other factors that he would be likely to 
consider if he were able to do so’.47 The guidance also states that ‘expressions of 
pleasure or distress and emotional responses will also be relevant’48 showing that the 
person’s current state of mind is to be taken into account to inform the best interest 
decision. Part of the best interest procedure demands that those who know and care 
for the person who lacks capacity be consulted.49 The determination of best interest 
strives to incorporate the views of the person deemed incapacitated by situating them 
within their relational world. 
 
The fifth principle demands that when an act or decision is made on behalf of the 
incapacitated person, ‘regard must be had to whether the purpose for which it is 
needed can be effectively achieved in a way that is less restrictive of the person’s 
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48 Department for Constitutional Affairs (n31) 82 
49 Mental Capacity Act 200,5 s.4(7) 
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rights and freedom of action’.50 When a person is deemed to lack capacity, the 
decision to act on their behalf must always be questioned before it is taken; the person 
must always try to take the ‘less restrictive alternative’ to achieve the purpose of the 
decision.51 The guidance gives the example of a man with severe learning disabilities 
who suffers from a type of epilepsy that can cause him to fall and hurt himself. As he 
is deemed to lack capacity to decide on the best course of action to avoid this harm, 
his carers guided by the ‘less restrictive alternative’ decide that he should wear a 
protective helmet rather than be closely supervised, an idea he was not in favour of.52 
 
The principles underscoring capacity determination strive to give weight to the views 
of the cognitively impaired individual, through efforts made in dialogical engagement 
before, during and after capacity determination, at the time of best interests 
determination. These principles embrace a relational approach of the individual under 
the welfare/best interest paradigms that underpin the Mental Capacity Act, and 
therefore seem compatible with a discursive approach to dignity.53 Following the 
enactment of the MCA, some proceedings of the Court of Protection have illustrated 
how best interest determination can be decided with the individual’s identity and self-
determination at its heart, placing them in the context of their relational autonomy.  
 
A London Authority v JH is a case in point.54 The court was asked to rule as to 
whether the best interest of Mrs H meant placing her in a care home after being 
discharged from hospital Mrs H was held to lack capacity, but her preferences, that of 
remaining at home, and the strength of her husband’s wish to have her stay at home 
and look after her, were given real weight in the decision of the court to return Mrs H 
home with a package of care.  In his summary about best interest determination 
District Judge Eldergill reflected that ‘in coming to my decision, (…) [t]he quality of 
Mrs H’s relationship with her husband, the strength of their marriage, and the 
fundamental importance of that relationship to her happiness and indeed her care, 
have deserved considerable weight’.55  
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The judgement also referred to the unreported case of Re: GC.56 The court quoted the 
approach taken by Hedley J in the determination of a person’s residence:   
 
I have approached this case on the basis that (GC’s) primary need is for 
emotional warmth, emotional security and the commitment of human 
relationship. That has been a huge feature of his life to date and one that is not 
readily to be set aside (…) it seems to me that for the elderly there is often an 
importance in place which is not generally recognised by others; not only the 
physical place but also the relational structure that is associated with a place.57  
 
This case demonstrates a concern with identity because of the importance placed by 
the court on the inter-personal networks that sustain it, and also a concern with self-
determination because those individuals close to the vulnerable person are consulted 
to help make a decision that second-guesses, as it were, the preferences of the 
vulnerable individual.  
HH Judge Hazel Marshall QC has also given an eloquent appraisal of the MCA’s aim 
to take the incapacitated person’s wishes into account. In the case of Re: S and S she 
declares that 
[T]here has been a whole sea change in the attitude of the law to persons whose 
mental capacity is impaired. The former approach was based on a stark division 
between those who had capacity to manage their own affairs, and those who did 
not. The former took their own decisions for better or worse, and the latter fell 
under a regime in which decisions were made for them, perhaps with a 
generous, and in some cases patronising, token nod to their feelings by asking 
them what they wanted, and then deciding what nonetheless was objectively 
"best" for them. This is no longer appropriate. The statute now embodies the 
recognition that it is the basic right of any adult to be free to take and implement 
decisions affecting his own life and living, and that a person who lacks mental 
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capacity should not be deprived of that right except insofar as is absolutely 
necessary in his best interests.58 
For this reason she concluded that ‘the views and wishes of P in regard to decisions 
made on his behalf are to carry great weight’,59 and that ‘justification for overruling P 
and “saving him from himself” must, in my judgment be strong and cogent’.60 This 
particular way of giving true weight to the wishes and views of the incapacitated 
person is conducive to conditions amenable to dignity under a discursive model, as it 
strives to take into account the identity, self-determination and equal status of the 
person concerned in best interest determination.  
 
The case of James was the first one to reach the Supreme Court after the enactment of 
the MCA, clarifying the way in which to proceed in complex cases of best interest 
determination.61 In giving the judgment of the court, Lady Hale stated that  
 
[i]n considering the best interests of this particular patient at this particular time, 
decision-makers must look at his welfare in the wider sense, not just the medical 
but social and psychological; they must consider the nature of the medical 
treatment in question, what it involves and its prospects of success; they must 
consider what the outcome of that treatment is likely to be; they must try and 
put themselves in the place of the individual patient and ask what his attitude to 
the treatment is or would likely to be; and they must consult others who are 
looking after him or interested in his welfare, in particular for their view of what 
his attitude would be.62  
 
In this particular instance, the importance of the patient’s family life, held by the court 
to be ‘of the closest and most meaningful kind’, weighed heavily in determining the 
value of the burdensome medical treatment Mr James was to receive.63 
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Rejecting the objective test of ‘what the reasonable patient would think’ used by the 
Court of Appeal, Lady Hale emphasised that ‘the purpose of the best interests test is 
to consider matters from the patient’s point of view. This is not to say that his wishes 
must prevail, any more than those of a fully capable patient must prevail’.64 A more 
subjective approach is put forward, one where ‘insofar as it is possible to ascertain the 
patient’s wishes and feelings, his beliefs and values or the things which were 
important to him, it is those which should be taken into account because they are a 
component in making the choice which is right for him as an individual human 
being’.65  Lady Hale reinforced the importance of the person’s wishes and her 
empowerment in the context of the duty to protect the Act demands. This case shows 
how the application of the MCA principles to the welfare practice of best interest 
determination can be conducive to dignity conditions under a discursive model. This 
is done by taking into account the incapacitated individual’s place within her 
relational world to support her identity, and by giving considerable weight to her 
interest in self-determination, through empathetic decision-making, with a view to 
treating her with equal respect on the ground of her humanity.  
 
Prior to this ruling cases occurred where the court did not give real weight to the 
wishes of the incapacitated person. In the case of Re P,66 Lewison J. pointed out that 
‘the Act does not of course say that P's wishes are to be paramount, nor does it lay 
down any express presumption in favour of implementing them if they can be 
ascertained. Indeed the paramount objective is that of P's best interests’.67 For this 
reason he declared that Judge Marshall QC in the case quoted above ‘may have 
slightly overstated the importance to be given to P’s wishes’.68 
 
Even after James, some cases have interpreted best interests in a way that makes it 
unclear whether any real weight was paid to the incapacitated person’s point of view. 
In the case of RB v Brighton and Hove City Council,69 the Court of Appeal held that it 
was in the best interest of the Appellant to remain in a care home in order to prevent 
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him from hurting himself,70 despite the fact the he wished to live independently.71 
Although Judge Horowitz declared that he had taken the Appellant’s wishes into 
account, there is no detail in his judgment as to how much they contributed to his final 
decision.  
 
The problem remains that away from the courtroom best interest determination may 
be poorly implemented in every day care practice. A House of Lords report published 
in 2014 has confirmed that the application of the MCA in a person centred way is 
failing to be implemented in social care settings:  
 
The empowering ethos of the Act has not been widely implemented. Our 
evidence suggests that capacity is not always assumed when it should be. 
Capacity assessments are not often carried out; when they are, the quality is 
often poor. Supported decision-making, and the adjustments required to enable 
it, are not well embedded. The concept of unwise decision-making faces 
institutional obstruction due to prevailing cultures of risk-aversion and 
paternalism. Best interest decision-making is often not undertaken in the way 
set out in the Act: the wishes, thoughts and feelings of P are not routinely 
prioritised. Instead, clinical judgments or resource-led decision-making 
predominate. The least restrictive option is not routinely or adequately 
considered.72  
 
A lack of awareness by professionals, the individuals cared for and their relatives, of 
the ‘rights and responsibilities’ that the Act sets out has been blamed for this lack of 
implementation.73 The report furthermore points to a need for a ‘fundamental change 
of attitudes among professionals (…) from paternalism to enablement’.74 The report 
notes that the presumption of capacity especially ‘is widely misunderstood’, and that 
it is ‘sometimes used to support non-intervention or poor care, leaving vulnerable 
adults exposed to risk of harm’, or ‘misappropriated to avoid taking responsibility for 
                                                
70 Ibid [83] 
71 Ibid [81] 
72 House of Lords, Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, Report of Session 2013-2014, 
‘Mental Capacity Act 2005: post-legislative scrutiny’ (The Stationary Office Limited, 13th March 
2014), [104] 
73 Ibid [106] 
74 Ibid [108] 
 142 
a vulnerable adult’.75 This report highlights how without adequate implementation of 
the principles guiding the MCA to respect the relational autonomy of the individual, a 
strict mechanism of substituted decision making may hinder the creation of conditions 
amenable to dignity realisation for the cognitively impaired person.  
 
The application of the MCA has had wide-ranging and deeply personal consequences 
on the lives of those deemed to lack capacity, denying them the possibility to live 
where they would like,76 removing from them the freedom to have contact with their 
family,77 or denying them the choice of sexual partners.78 Free from the person-
centred interpretation of best interests determination set out by James, the MCA can 
give the court the power to strictly control the autonomy of the person deemed to lack 
capacity in the name of protection. These interventions have curtailed the self-
determination and identity of the individual, and undermined their equal status on the 
ground of their humanity, creating conditions where dignity remains, as Nussbaum 
puts it, ‘but a promissory note’.79 It is essential therefore, in order to create conditions 
amenable to a discursive meaning of dignity, that the incapacitated person’s wishes be 
given true weight in the determination of best interest. As Lady Hale reminded the 
court in the case of James, the MCA ‘is concerned with enabling the court to do for 
the patient what he could do for himself if of full capacity, but it goes no further’.80 
 
Munby J. has provided a useful checklist to follow in relation to ‘the weight and 
importance to be attached to P’s wishes and feelings’.81 He suggests to take into 
account 
 
a) the degree of P's incapacity, for the nearer to the borderline the more weight 
must in principle be attached to P's wishes and feelings; 
b) the strength and consistency of the views being expressed by P; 
c) the possible impact on P of knowledge that her wishes and feelings are not 
being given effect to; 
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d) the extent to which P's wishes and feelings are, or are not, rational, sensible, 
responsible and pragmatically capable of sensible implementation in the 
particular circumstances; and 
e) crucially, the extent to which P's wishes and feelings, if given effect to, can 
properly be accommodated within the court's overall assessment of what is in 
her best interests.82 
 
Although this list not prescriptive, it gives a practical example of how the court and 
care professionals on the ground could make best interests decisions informed by the 
wishes and feelings of the incapacitated person. 
 
 
c) The supported decision-making model 
 
The MCA model may also undermine a person’s dignity by failing to be responsive to 
her vulnerability in cases where individuals are on the margins of capacity. Under the 
current law, once a person is deemed to have capacity, they are deemed able to 
determine their own fate and make unfettered decisions. In elderly care, many 
individuals are situated on the edges of capacity. Herring argues for a more 
sophisticated model of capacity that would be more responsive to those with 
degenerative conditions such as dementia and Alzheimer’s. 83 He gives the following 
hypothetical example: 
 
Andrew has early stages Alzheimer’s disease. At night times he has taken to 
wandering off in the local woods for hours at a time, often without sufficient 
clothing to keep him warm. Further, it has been discovered that he has been 
spending substantial sums of money viewing internet pornography. This is 
despite the fact that previously he had been a devout religious and of conservative 
moral views who has been carefully saving money for his care in old age. His 
wife and relatives are concerned for his wellbeing. This is not, they think, how he 
would have wished to live his life. It is accepted by Andrew’s doctors that the 
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case is not a straightforward one, but they are persuaded, just, that he has capacity 
to make decisions about his lifestyle.84  
 
Herring argues that ‘not all autonomous decisions carry the same weight’,85 and so 
‘where a person is on the borderline of incapacity, but who wishes to engage in 
behaviour which may be harmful to himself, it may be properly said that, even if 
technically competent, his decision does not reflect a decision based on a higher-order 
preference’.86 Consequently, he concludes that ‘the harm that he is risking with its 
consequent impact on autonomy later is such that autonomy requires the decision not 
to be respected’.87 Herring is right in arguing that a model based on capacity setting 
may not be adequate to respond to the needs of those at the edges of capacity, but I 
believe that his conclusion – limiting current autonomy in the interest of future 
autonomy – risks letting paternalism back in through the backdoor.88  
 
A more flexible way to respond to Andrew’s heightened state of vulnerability without 
completely impinging on his autonomy could exist in the opportunity of formal 
support. A model of supported decision-making may be more responsive to 
individuals’ vulnerability in cases of degenerative cognitive diseases brought on by 
age than that of strict capacity setting. In the case of Andrew, the support of a trusted 
third party may be more responsive to his vulnerable state by considering the harm he 
is likely to suffer, whilst at the same time considering his autonomy and identity. 
Support would not be there to forbid a person from making decisions they would not 
have made before they were ill, but it may be more responsive to their vulnerability 
than a strict application of capacity, which would not offer any support until 
incapacity was agreed upon. 
 
Supported decision-making is endorsed by Article 12 of the Convention of the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) entitled ‘Equal recognition before the law’, 
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which seeks to ‘provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may 
require in exercising their legal capacity’.89 Here legal capacity is a given, not a 
threshold to be cleared, and support is to be available to give rise to it for those who 
need it. It is underpinned by a more egalitarian viewpoint that considers that ‘persons 
with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others’.90 This support 
may come in various forms and includes the help of trusted persons, peer support, 
advocacy, or assistance with communication, verbal or non-verbal. 91  
 
The support model has been adopted in various jurisdictions.92 In Sweden, a system of 
Personal Ombudsmen (PO Skåne) has been in force to help support the decision-
making process of individuals with mental health problems.93 The website dedicated 
to this system highlights the ethos behind its existence; 
 
The social model of disability says that the problem is not within the individual, 
but in the society which does not meet this person in such a way that he can 
function. This applies also to problems with legal capacity. It’s not a problem 
inside the individual – which should be met by forced intervention or 
guardianship – but society must relate in another way to this person, so that his 
disabilities regarding legal capacity diminishes. 
Supported decision-making is an example of this. If some persons find it hard to 
express and communicate their wishes, the solution is not to put in a guardian, 
but to develop a relation and ways, which make it possible for this person to 
express and communicate what he wants. 
In our service with personal ombudspersons the most important thing has been 
to develop ways to work which are adjusted to this special group of persons 
with mental health problems of the most difficult kind. In other projects it is 
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usually the clients who have to adjust themselves to a bureaucratic system, but 
we work in the opposite way. The PO’s have to be very flexible and creative 
and unconventional in finding ways to work with this group.94 
In Canada the Representation Agreement Act 1996 (RRA) is another example of an 
application of the support model of decision-making. It provides that ‘an adult may 
authorize his or her representative to help the adult make decisions, or to make 
decisions on behalf of the adult’ in the areas of the person’s care, financial affairs, 
purchases of services and goods, or the obtaining of legal services.95 Under the MCA 
model, it is also possible for a person to give to another Lasting Powers of Attorney 
(LPA), in order for that person to make for them decisions regarding their welfare, 
property and affairs.96 The person requesting a LPA to be set up must, under the 
MCA, have capacity to do so.97 Furthermore, the person with Lasting Powers of 
Attorney (the donee) is not authorised to help the person who has appointed her (the 
donor) until it has been shown that the donor lacks capacity.98 
 
The setting up of support under the RRA is not so strict and does not hinge on the 
determination of capacity, making it more responsive to vulnerability. Section 8 of the 
RRA specifies that 
 
(1) An adult may make a representation agreement consisting of one or more of 
the standard provisions authorized by section 7 even though the adult is 
incapable of 
(a) making a contract, 
(b) managing his or her health care, personal care or legal matters, or 
(c) the routine management of his or her financial affairs. 
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The decision to refuse a person to enter into an agreement does exist, but it is not 
taken likely by the RRA; many safeguards are to be followed before such a decision is 
taken.  
 
(2) In deciding whether an adult is incapable of making a representation 
agreement consisting of one or more of the standard provisions authorized by 
section 7, or of changing or revoking any of those provisions, all relevant 
factors must be considered, for example: 
(a) whether the adult communicates a desire to have a representative make, help 
make, or stop making decisions; 
(b) whether the adult demonstrates choices and preferences and can express 
feelings of approval or disapproval of others; 
(c) whether the adult is aware that making the representation agreement or 
changing or revoking any of the provisions means that the representative may 
make, or stop making, decisions or choices that affect the adult; 
(d) whether the adult has a relationship with the representative that is 
characterized by trust 
 
Thus although Andrew may have been allowed to organise an agreement of LPA 
under the MCA (although in the example he is deemed to have capacity for his 
welfare and finances, he may not be deemed to have capacity to enter into a contract), 
he would not have been supported by it until he was assessed as lacking capacity. 
Under section 15 of the RRA, on the other hand, ‘a representation agreement becomes 
effective on the date it is executed unless the agreement provides that it, or a 
provision of it, becomes effective later’. 
 
The capacity threshold, as Herring’s example shows above, may prevent a person 
from being supported when their vulnerability becomes harmful to them. The main 
difference between the agreements made under the RRA and those of made under the 
Lasting Powers of Attorney is that of degree of responsiveness to vulnerability. There 
is no need to lack capacity in order to be supported under the RRA; the person can 
choose third parties to act on her behalf before incapacity is determined, and so be 
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more responsive to her vulnerability whilst considering her relational autonomy. Even 
when we have capacity, we all tend to refer to others when making important 
decisions, and this model formalises this natural process.99  
In order to balance the two paradigms of empowerment and vulnerability protection 
in a way that would be more respectful of the person’s wishes and preferences, it has 
been suggested that the MCA could be amended to be compliant with Article 12 of 
the CRPD. At the moment the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
has held in its first General Comment that ‘“best interpretation of will and 
preferences” must replace the “best interests” determinations’, suggesting that the 
MCA was not compatible with the equal recognition before the law paradigm set out 
under Article 12 of the CRPD.100 The work of the Essex Autonomy Project highlights 
that  
[in the MCA] the best-interests decision-maker [must] CONSIDER the wishes 
and feelings, values and beliefs of the person lacking in capacity. But Article 
12(4) requires RESPECT for the will and preferences of disabled persons. 
Whatever “respect” means in this context, it must be something stronger than 
“consider,” even though it is less than “be absolutely bound by.” For it is 
possible to consider someone’s rights, will and preferences without respecting 
them. The safeguards in the MCA’s best-interests provisions must therefore be 
strengthened in order to achieve compliance with the CRPD. 101  
This incompatibility does not mean that I believe that the MCA ought to be replaced 
by other legal provisions. I believe that amending the MCA in order to comply with 
the ethos of the CRPD would offer the best compromise between vulnerability 
protection and respect for the person’s wishes and make the MCA amenable to 
dignity. I would agree with Donnelly that the ‘MCA’s potential to provide a legal 
framework of principled, open, and accountable decision-making should not be 
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underestimated’.102 As Keene and Auckland have argued, the MCA can become 
compatible with the ethos of the CRPD by providing a fully supported decision 
making model whilst at the same time being responsive to the person’s 
vulnerability.103 Referring to HH Judge Hazel Marshall’s reasoning in the case of Re: 
S and S,104 the Essex Autonomy Project suggests that this can be achieved by the 
application of ‘a rebuttable presumption that it is in the best interest of P to bring 
about the course of action that P prefers’.105 Considering her approach, the Essex 
Autonomy Project report suggests that the person’s wish shall be fulfilled in best 
interest determination if it meets the following conditions: 
1. W is a wish which a person of full capacity might reasonably have.  
2. W is physically implementable.  
3. A person with full capacity having resources such as P’s might reasonably 
consider it worth using the resources necessary to fulfil W.  
4. There is no potential sufficiently detrimental effect that would provide a 
strong and cogent justification for overruling P’s wishes.106  
This is just one suggestion of how to make the MCA CRPD-compliant. There is no 
answer in the report as to the definition of what would constitute this ‘potential 
sufficiently detrimental effect’ that could justify overruling P’s wishes.107 Keene and 
Auckland argue that going against P’s wishes ought to be backed up by substantial 
justifications, just as those required when restricting a person’s right to respect for 
private and family life under Article 8.108 The threshold of detriment ought to be high, 
so as to avoid falling back into a model where the opinion of a third party can too 
easily override P’s wishes. Such a model of decision-making, one endorsed by a 
CRPD-compliant MCA would give rise to conditions amenable to dignity under a 
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discursive model. It would do so by giving true weight to the wishes of the 
incapacitated person under a legal scheme aimed also at protecting her vulnerability.  
 
4) Restraints and deprivation of liberty 
 
Measures set out to counteract the effects of vulnerability are also found within the 
regulatory regime that rules care provision. Providers are under the obligation of 
keeping residents safe, 109 and free from harm.110 This specifically allows ‘acts that 
are intended to control or restrain a service user that are not necessary to prevent, or 
not a proportionate response to, a risk of harm posed to the service user or another 
individual’.111 These particular measures reflect the difficulty carers are faced with in 
dealing with patients with dementia who may feel the need to wander outside of the 
care home, or become aggressive towards them.112  
 
The law governing the use of restraint is also found under the Mental Capacity Act 
2005. Under the Act, only those who lack capacity may be restrained without their 
consent, and this must be done so for their best interest.113  Restraining someone is 
defined under the Act as using or threatening to use force to make someone do 
something they are resisting doing, or restricting someone’s liberty of movement, 
whether the person agrees to it or not.114 As the report on restraint published by the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission concludes, ‘unless older people do not have 
capacity, restraint may only take place with their consent or in emergency to prevent 
harm. Used inappropriately, restraint can constitute abuse – which is subject to 
referral under the local multi-agency procedures for safeguarding adults – as well as 
being a criminal offence’.115 The unjustified use of restraint may amount to common 
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assault, battery, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, or harassment.116  
 
Restraints can be physical (where residents can be tied to beds or chairs), but can also 
be chemical (use of drugs to sedate the person), technological (keypads on doors or 
electronic tagging), environmental (lay out that prevents people from freely moving 
around), or passive (refraining from helping someone get around can be restrictive).117 
A report compiled by the SCIE suggests that a variety of reasons are invoked for the 
use of such restrictions on a person’s liberty.118 The literature review this report is 
based on is a compilation of studies done in the context of care homes about the use 
of physical restraints. These highlighted that restraints were used in a majority of 
cases for the person’s safety (to prevent falls or injury), to manage agitation (again to 
prevent harm), to stop people wandering off, but also to help staff manage their 
workload.119 The latter reason could be read as a safeguarding measure, but the 
overriding concern should rest with the safety of the person restrained, and not the 
speedier delivery of care.  
 
Restraining someone may become a deprivation of her liberty and so breach her right 
to liberty and security guaranteed under Article 5 of the Human Rights Act. Under the 
Mental Capacity Act, deprivation of liberty is defined as having the ‘same meaning as 
in Article 5(1) of the Human Rights Convention’. 120  Article 5(1) states that 
‘[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of 
his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed 
by law’. This includes ‘the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the 
spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug 
addicts or vagrants’. 
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 The Supreme Court has clarified the meaning of deprivation of liberty in the 
Cheshire West case.121 Considering the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights on the subject, Lady Hale held that an ‘acid test’ to find out whether 
there was a deprivation of liberty consisted in determining whether the person was 
subject to continuous supervision and was not free to leave.122 It was held that 
depriving a person without capacity of her liberty had little to do with the quality of 
her care, and that ‘a gilded cage was still a cage’.123  
 
A restraint can therefore become a deprivation of liberty and so require additional 
safeguards. Following this acid test, it can be envisaged that many situations within 
care homes could amount to deprivations of liberty. The Law Society cites the 
following example as one that could amount to a deprivation of liberty because of the 
degree of supervision and control involved, and the fact that the individual concerned 
is not free to leave: 
 
Mrs Neville is eighty-five. She lives in a care home with nursing and has 
Alzheimer’s dementia which is now advanced. She is very confused and 
disorientated, and can now only manage very simple conversations. She is 
physically fit and mobile. She spends much of the day wandering in the 
corridors of the nursing home. The doors are locked and there is a sensor on the 
doormat at each entry to the home. On one occasion Mrs Neville found her way 
out of the back door of the home, which had been left open in warm weather. 
She was spotted walking towards the main road and immediately escorted back. 
Mrs Neville frequently shouts and screams and is gently escorted from the 
communal areas when she is making a noise, to reduce disturbance to other 
residents. Mrs Neville is resistant to personal care and can lash out at staff. All 
her personal care is delivered by two members of staff.124 
 
As this example illustrates, it may be very complex for care professionals to identify a 
case of deprivation of liberty so as to comply with the additional safeguard procedures 
                                                
121 P v Cheshire West Council; P&Q v Surrey County Council [2014] UKSC 19 
122 Ibid [48] [49] 
123 Ibid [46] 
124 Law Society, ‘Identifying a deprivation of liberty: a practical guide’ (9th April 2015)  
< http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/advice/articles/deprivation-of-liberty/> Accessed 9th 
November 2016 
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it entails. Once the need for a deprivation of liberty has been identified, Deprivation 
of Liberty Safeguards (DOLS) set out under the Mental Health Act 2007, require the 
care home to seek authorization from the local authority when it requires depriving a 
person of her liberty.125 Failing to do so will mean that the home is in breach of its 
obligation under Article 5. Depriving someone of their liberty can be used for the 
purpose of ‘giving life-sustaining treatment’ or ‘doing any vital act’ that will ‘prevent 
a serious deterioration’ of the condition of the person concerned.126 The onus on the 
care home to keep a person safe whilst respecting their right to freedom is a difficult 
balancing act that is made all the more complicated by the vague definition of 
deprivation of liberty and the burdensome administrative safeguarding process that 
ensues. 
 
Following the West Cheshire ruling defining the test for deprivation of liberty, it was 
reported that requests for DOLS soared. In the year 2015-2016, care homes requested 
local councils to approve 195,840 applications of DOLS, the most ever recorded since 
their introduction in 2009.127 Out of all these applications, only 105,055 (or a little 
better than half) were completed by the local authorities, of which 73 per cent 
(105,055) were approved. These alarmingly high figures have resulted in delays in the 
application process and the commission by government of a Law Commission 
consultation of the DOLS process.128 In this report, DOLS are criticised for focusing 
too narrowly on Article 5,129 and failing to consider the impact that a deprivation of 
liberty may have on Article 8 obligations of respect for family life and home.130  
 
As I illustrated above, recognising a situation of deprivation of liberty on the ground 
can be extremely difficult, leading many healthcare professionals to ultimately ‘lack 
knowledge of, and confidence in, the DOLS’, seeing them as a bureaucratic process 
rather than a benefit to the person concerned, and so relying on their local authorities 
                                                
125 Mental Health Act 2007, s.50 
126 Ibid  
127 NHS Digital, ‘Mental Capacity Act 2005, Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (England), Annual 
Report 2015-2016’ (September 2016)  
< http://content.digital.nhs.uk/catalogue/PUB21814> Accessed 20th October 2016 
128 Law Commission, ‘Mental Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty: A Consultation Paper’ 
Consultation Paper No 222 (The Stationary Office, 2015) 
< http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/cp222_mental_capacity.pdf> Accessed 9th 
November 2016 
129 Ibid 2.14 
130 Ibid 2.16 
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to set them in motion.131 Finally, the Law Commission highlights the fact that DOLS 
only deal with the ‘fait accompli’, once a person reaches a stage where her liberty 
needs to be restricted, but does not address any preventive measures.132 
 
The Law Commission suggests that DOLS should be replaced with a new system it 
refers to as ‘protective care’. 133  This new system would follow the principles 
espoused by the Mental Capacity Act exposed above, would be easier to follow, 
tailored to the individual and the setting involved, and be compliant with Convention 
rights and the UN Disability Convention. 134  This proposal acknowledges that 
depriving individuals of their liberty may be unavoidable in order to care for them 
safely and protect their vulnerability, but that it may be done in a way that involves 
the individuals as much as possible, respects their wider relationships and identity, is 
designed for the benefit of their overall wellbeing (and not only to comply with 
bureaucracy), and is as little imposing as possible on their self-determination.135  
 
These proposals focus far more on the person and her place within her own narrative 
than the previous system, largely anchored in procedures rather than the individual. 
Although these proposals are yet to be detailed, it seems that they would be far more 
aligned to the understanding of dignity put forward here than the previous DOLS 
regime. This is because, although they are an imposition on the person’s autonomy for 
the sake of the protection of their inherent vulnerability, they are more designed with 
the person’s relational autonomy in mind. 
 
Others have advanced the idea that caring for the elderly ought to be done without 
restraint, because restraint is seldom justifiable and harms individuals more than it 
preserves them from harm.136 Researchers in behavioural management have observed 
that conflictual tendencies in residents who suffer from dementia can be managed 
through appropriate responses from care professionals. For instance, Hall and 
Buckwalter have found out that patients with Alzheimer’s disease needed to be 
                                                
131 Ibid 2.15 
132 Ibid 2.17 
133 Ibid 3.2-.3.23 
134 Ibid 
135 Ibid 
136 Evans, L.K. and N. Strumpf ‘Myths about elderly restraint’ (1990) 22 Image: Journal of Nursing 
Scholarship 124 
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exposed to less stimulation in order to reduce their level of stress and prevent 
aggressive behaviour.137 A change in approach from ‘custodial’ safety to ‘behavioural 
management’ safety could create an environment more amenable to the possibility of 
dignity. Williams and Finch consider this type of restraint-free care to be ‘an 
alternative philosophy’ in care, one that could replace the ‘task driven, staff oriented 
care now practiced’.138 Reforming current laws on restraints by placing the individual 
at its heart may enhance the possibility of dignity, but removing restraint altogether 
may prove even more effective in the creation of conditions amenable to dignity. 
 
 
5) Conclusion 
 
Legal measures in place to intervene in the protection of the person in care from the 
effects of their vulnerability are slowly beginning to reflect a more concrete 
understanding of autonomy. The Care Act and the Mental Capacity Act are now built 
on a more universal approach to vulnerability, rejecting the old characteristics-based 
model of previous guidance. Although still more weight could be given to the voice of 
the person whose vulnerability these measures are meant to be responsive to, these 
legislative reforms are beginning to facilitate, in social care, the creation of conditions 
conducive to dignity under a discursive model.  
 
Safeguarding is now a statutory duty of local authorities under the Care Act 2014. 
Safeguarding appears to embrace a universal idea of vulnerability, to take the 
individual’s relational autonomy into account, and to be responsive to all adults who 
need care and support and are at risk of harm. Nonetheless, some have argued that the 
duty of enquiry by local authority under section 42 is only ‘facially neutral’.139 The 
duty to make enquiry is triggered when the local authority ‘has reasonable cause to 
suspect that an adult in its area has needs for care and support is experiencing or is at 
risk of abuse or neglect, and as a result of those needs is unable to protect himself or 
                                                
137 Hall G.R. and Buckwalter K.C., ‘Progressively lowered stress threshold: a conceptual model for 
care of adults with Alzheimer’s disease’ (1987) 1(6) Archive of Psychiatric Nursing 399 
138 Williams C.C. and Finch C.E., ‘Physical Restraint: Not Fit for Woman, Man or Beast’ (June 1997) 
45(6) Journal of the American Geriatric Society 773, 774 
139 Flynn E. and Arstein-Kerslake A. ‘State intervention in the lives of people with disabilities; the case 
for a disability-neutral framework’ (2017) 13(1) International Journal of Law in Context 39, 44 
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herself against the abuse or neglect or the risk of it’.140  They argue that as needs for 
care meet the eligibility criteria when they ‘arise from or are related to a physical or 
mental impairment or illness’,141 they create a bias for intervention directed at 
disabled individuals.142 It has been argued that this problem could be remedied by the 
use of a more neutral form of language in the Care Act that would trigger 
safeguarding interventions on the basis of the occurrence or risk of occurrence of 
‘serious adverse effects’ a person may experience.143 This form of interventionism 
would be more disability neutral, and encourage safeguarding measures to be rooted 
in the effects of vulnerability rather than its causes. Although the Care Act 2014 has 
moved away from defining vulnerability as attached to particular characteristics, 
progress could still be made to embrace an even more inherent and universal view of 
vulnerability. 
 
I have argued that dignity under a discursive ethics is not capacity dependent, and that 
the relational situation of the individual helps give rise to it. The principles 
underpinning the Mental Capacity Act are promoting an ever more person-centred 
view of capacity and best interests determination, creating conditions more amenable 
to dignity. Some measures now reflect the understanding that individuals are 
anchored in their relational narrative, and that this fact needs to be respected when 
protecting a person from their vulnerability. The supported model of decision-making 
enshrined in the CRPD brings novel ideas to the model of capacity and best interests 
determination. Article 12 sets out that all individuals have legal capacity, but that 
some individuals need support to give rise to it. It thrives to uphold equality and self-
determination, and so could further improve on the possibility of dignity.  I have 
discussed the possibility of amending the MCA to make it compatible with the 
egalitarian ethos of Article 12 of the CRPD; this could be achieved by giving even 
more weight to the views and wishes of the incapacitated individual through 
reinforcing the presumption of capacity strand of the MCA. 
 
The laws that govern restraining practices are being targeted for reform. At the 
moment safeguards are in place to make restraints considered to be deprivations of 
                                                
140 Care Act 2014 s.42(1) 
141 The Care and Support (Eligibility Criteria) Regulations 2014, s.2(1)(a) 
142 Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake (n139) 
143 Ibid 47 
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liberty compliant with Article 5. Unfortunately, these safeguards are adding to the 
weight of bureaucracy faced by councils without effectively protecting the human 
rights of the person being restrained. The Law Commission has therefore suggested 
further reforms under the label of  ‘protective care’, a framework of rules that seeks to 
manage restraints with the person concerned and all her human rights at its heart. 
Once again, giving rise to dignity by striking the right balance between 
responsiveness to vulnerability and respect for the person’s own wishes is proving 
hard to achieve. Although a care environment free of restraints is a goal that may 
never materialise,   legal reforms are moving towards the creation of conditions more 
amenable to dignity.  
 
In the next chapter I will look at the environment the older people in care live in, and 
how the regulations controlling it - enacted because of the vulnerability of those who 
live there - impact on the possibility of dignity. 
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Chapter V 
 
Environmental Conversion factor: the care home regulatory 
framework 
 
 
1) Introduction  
 
In the last two chapters, I examined the personal conversion factor of vulnerability. I 
established, as a starting point, that vulnerability should be understood as universal 
and inherent, according to Fineman’s approach, one that demands a responsive state. I 
also argued that in order to be a practical basis for policy-making, vulnerability 
required a thicker conceptualisation. To that effect I adopted Mackenzie’s definition 
of vulnerability as inherent, situational and pathogenic, and applied it to individuals in 
care. I also suggested that to be amenable to dignity, the protection of vulnerability 
needed to take into consideration the relational autonomy of the individual. I then 
proceeded to evaluate, in light of these considerations, the defensibility and 
effectiveness of specific legal provisions set out to protect but also manage the multi-
dimensional vulnerability of the dependent elderly, (such as safeguarding, the 
establishment of capacity and the use of restraints).  
 
In this chapter I will consider the regulatory framework that shapes the care home 
environment, making it an environmental conversion factor to dignity- that is, a factor 
which, like the personal conversion factor of vulnerability, mediates the ability of 
elderly people in care to experience dignity. Indeed, these two conversion factors are 
intimately connected: the extreme and multi-dimensional vulnerability of those who 
live in long-term care facilities means that the care home environment is heavily 
regulated.  
 
The way care homes are run in England is under the scrutiny of the Care Quality 
Commission (CQC). The CQC is an independent regulator that was set up in 2009 
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under the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (HSCA),1 to streamline costs and replace 
three different regulatory bodies, the Healthcare Commission, the Commission for 
Social Care Inspection and the Mental Health Act Commission.2 My intention is to 
assess whether and how the current regulatory framework is conducive to the 
establishment of those conditions necessary for dignity as conceptualised in this 
paper. This means looking at the substance of the rules that shape the kind of care 
residents receive, the means at the disposal of the CQC and beyond to enforce those 
rules, but also the impact they may have on the working practices of the care 
professionals who work in those regulated environments.  
 
I will firstly expound the meaning, causes and aims of regulation generally, and then 
focus more particularly on the regulatory framework applied by the CQC to long-term 
aged care. I will review the relatively new care home regulation framework in place, 
concentrating specifically on the regulatory outcome of dignity. Drawing on the work 
of Braithwaite et al who have observed the regulatory system at play in care homes 
over many years in England and abroad,3 I will argue that in order for regulation to be 
effective in the upholding of dignity as understood here, the regulation framework 
ought to set out broad standards for quality of care instead of adopting disempowering 
objective rules. In order to avoid vagueness, these broad standards should be 
complemented by subjective criteria obtained from conversations with residents and 
those who care for them. In order for conditions amenable to dignity as to be fostered 
by regulation, this dialogical engagement ought to be used to define regulatory 
objectives so as to move away from set rules externally imposed on residents. 
 
 
2) Purpose of Regulation 
 
Institutional living may pose considerable dangers to the possibility of dignity: 
                                                
1 Health and Social Care Act 2008, Part One 
2 The Gershon Review noted that ‘front line delivery bodies often ad to deal with a plethora of bodies 
as funders and regulators, leading to significant additional delivery costs’ in Gershon P., ‘Releasing 
resources to the front line. Independent Review of Public Sector Efficiency’ July 2004, 45 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/efficiency_review120704.pdf> Accessed 31st March 2015 
3 Braithwaite J., Makkai T. and Braithwaite V., Regulating Aged Care: Ritualism and the New Pyramid 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007) 
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Nursing homes are total institutions,4 … in the sense that they isolate, control, 
and reconstitute the daily lives of their residents. Stripping away and 
reconstituting the identities of their residents through rituals of initiation and 
degradation accomplish this.5 
 
 
Regulations play an important part in determining the kind of environment a person in 
isntitution lives in. Regulation is deployed in two different ways: economically and 
socially. Regulating a particular sector of the economy has been justified in cases of 
‘market failures’, where the market-place cannot ‘produce behaviours or results in 
accordance with the public interest’.6 It has also been recognised as grounded in 
human rights, as a mean to promote social solidarity.7 Indeed, regulation has been 
defined as ‘the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others 
according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly 
identified outcome or outcomes, which may involve mechanisms of standard-setting, 
information-gathering and behaviour modification’.8 It is, according to Ogus, ‘an area 
of public law which implements collectivist goals, that is, by which the state seeks to 
direct or encourage behaviour which (it is assumed) would not occur without such 
intervention’.9  
 
In the case of healthcare, social care included, regulation can indeed come about due 
to market failures. For example regulation can be used to correct the monopolistic 
supply of healthcare, to rebalance the information asymmetry that exists in favour of 
providers, to avoid the scarcity of supply in certain areas, or to limit and rationalise 
access to a public system of healthcare that depends on finite resources.10 In the 
                                                
4 Goffman E., ‘Characteristics of total institutions’ in A.S. Goldstein and J. Goldstein (Eds.), Crime, 
Law and Society (The Free Press, 1971) 
5 Agich. G. J., Dependence and Autonomy in Old Age: An ethical framework for long-term care 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003), 5 
6 Baldwin R., Cave M. and Lodge M., Understanding Regulation, Theory, Strategy and Practice (2nd 
Ed.) (Oxford University Press, 2013) 15 
7 Prosser T., ‘Regulations and Social Solidarity’ (2006) 33 Journal of Law and Society 364-87 
8 Black J., Critical Reflection on Regulation’ (2002) LSE Centre for the Analysis of Risk and 
Regulation Discussion Paper 4, 20  
<https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/219186.pdf> Accessed 2nd February 2017 
9 Ogus A. ‘Regulation: The Public Interest and the Private Interest’ In T. Kirat and B. Deffains (Eds.) 
Law and Economic in Civil Law Countries (Routledge, 2003) 
10 Walshe K., Regulating Healthcare: A Prescription for Improvement? (Open University Press, 2003), 
22-26 
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specific case of health and social care provision, however, it can be argued that the 
predominant cause for regulation is social, to promote healthcare as a public good.11 
The reason for regulation may then underscore certain social values. In the case of 
healthcare, such values have been identified as equity and fairness through a 
regulatory model that enables access to all regardless of means; social solidarity 
through regulation that sets out a system of universal contribution to cost; respect for 
diversity through regulation that promotes non-discriminatory services; a need for 
accountability, reflected in regulation that demands from providers that they achieve a 
certain level of performance; and paternalism in the sense of protectionism, via a 
regulatory scheme that monitors standards for the sake of its users.12 
 
This long list of social goals shows how regulation may be used to fulfil a multitude 
of aims, some of them potentially contradictory in nature. These social goals also 
reflect a commitment to a particular ethical model. Brownsword illustrates this point 
in the domain of new technologies such as embryonic stem cell research, and the 
challenges they pose to regulators due to the multiple ethical commitments they aim 
to underscore simultaneously.13  In this case, he explains how the tripartite ethical 
perspectives of utilitarianism, human rights and dignity may promote conflicting 
aims, making regulating complicated. Whilst a utilitarian ethical commitment will stir 
towards progress for the greatest number regardless of the potential harm it may 
inflict, (in this instance the potential harm done on the embryos used), an ethical 
commitment to human rights will demand that all rights holders have their rights 
respected (embryos are not considered rights holders, but the biological source of that 
embryo is, and requires consent).14 A third ethical commitment, one made to dignity, 
can be used either as a claim to empowerment, as the enhancement of one’s ‘capacity 
for making one’s own choice’, or as a justification for constraint, against, for instance, 
‘the commercialization of the human body’.15 Whereas the potential benefits to 
humanity that embryonic stem cell research could generate through new cures for 
diseases may pose relatively little or no ethical quandary to the utilitarian or the 
human rights view, it certainly goes against the dignity as constraint perspective that 
                                                
11 Ibid 26 
12 Ibid 27 
13 Brownsword R., Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution (Oxford University Press, 
2008) 
14 Ibid 35-41 
15 Ibid 42-43 
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upholds respect for each and every human life form.16 The juxtaposition of different 
ethical commitments shows the complexity faced by regulators. In this case, they need 
to allow the furtherance of science for the benefit of mankind, whilst at the same time 
restrain its development within the bounds of human dignity.  
 
This example of regulatory complexity also demonstrates how an ethical commitment 
to dignity alone can promote conflicting aims. In the domain of stem cell research, 
dignity can be understood as a control mechanism that forbids certain actions in the 
name of respect for human life, but can also be used as a force for improvement for all 
human beings through the instrumentalisation of those living cells for curing diseases. 
Whereas dignity in the first instance is one that attaches to the ‘integrity’ of the human 
species, the other is rooted in a more individualistic perspective, one that sees dignity 
as concerned with, inter alia, the capacity for autonomy and setting one’s own ends.17 
It may therefore not be surprising to come across the opinion that ‘human dignity is so 
vague an idea to be fit for regulatory perspective’.18 Regulating a particular activity 
under a dignitarian ethical commitment may indeed seem an implausible and 
impractical goal, one that would seek to protect and emancipate individuals at the 
same time. This is why, once more, it is essential to define dignity. 
 
For the purposes of my arguments in this dissertation, the key point is that – as we 
have already seen in the context of vulnerability – a policy commitment to dignity 
may actually ‘subvert rather than enhance choice, and in some circumstances may 
limit rather than extend the scope of traditional “first generation” rights and 
fundamental freedoms’. 19  In order to prevent dignity from becoming solely 
understood as a directive for protection, I argue here that the voice of the person under 
the regulated regime ought to be heard. Whereas in the example of cell stem research 
there is no such possibility, and so precaution and protection ought to be taken into 
account, in the case of the regulation of care homes, there is an argument for that kind 
of subjective participation.  
                                                
16 Ibid  
17 Feldman D., ‘Human Dignity as a legal value: Part 1’ (1999) Public Law 682 
18 Brownsword (n13) 52 
19 Ibid 685 
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Braithwaite and Braithwaite advocate for the use of standards to regulate care homes, 
instead of formal rules, because they allow for the beneficial input of subjectivity.20 
They write that: 
 
[T]he impetus to reform subjectivity in standards through objective criteria and 
protocols is dangerous because quality of life, which is what nursing home care 
should be about, is ultimately an irreducibly subjective matter. The paradox of 
objectivity is that its pursuit undercuts a desideratum on which the industry, 
politicians, consumer groups and gerontologists (if not the lawyers) generally 
agree. This is that the regulatory process should be more outcome-oriented. The 
trouble is that inputs (the temperature of the food as it leaves the serving line; 
the size of the room) are usually more objective than outcomes (satisfaction of 
the residents with the food and the comfort of the room). Objectivity 
disempowers residents and empowers nursing home managements who know 
how to get objective inputs in a row for inspection day. (…) Subjectivity, in 
contrast, means that residents are empowered because (…) it is what they as 
residents think and want that counts.21  
 
Others have also found that excluding the opinion of service users in the regulatory 
system of the care sector was detrimental to its effectiveness.22 It could be contended 
that replacing formal rules with objectives would leave regulations too vague, and so 
jeopardize their effectiveness.23 The solution, Braithwaite advances, ‘is to leave the 
words vague so [as] to specify the interpretive evidence that is privileged and to 
require a regulatory dialogue about this evidence’.24 The evidence that is privileged 
here is the opinion of the service users and those in direct relation with them. Indeed, 
as the previous chapter established, the vulnerability of the residents must be situated 
within their relational autonomy, and so seeking the opinion of those who are part of 
the person’s relational world may also help gather their input. Involving the 
                                                
20 Braithwaite J. and Braithwaite V., ‘The Politics of Legalism: Rules versus Standards in Nursing 
Home Regulations’ (1995) 4 Social and Legal Studies 307 
21 Ibid 327 
22  Kerrison S. and Pollock A., ‘Absent voices compromise the effectiveness of nursing home 
regulation: a critique of regulatory reform in the UK nursing home industry’ (2001) 9(6) Health and 
Social Care in the Community 490 
23 Diver C. S., ‘A Theory of Regulatory Enforcement’ (1980) 28 Public Policy 25 
24 Braithwaite and Braithwaite (n20) 335 
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individuals whose environment regulations seek to shape avoids the vagueness 
problem. 
 
Dialogic accountability ought to be a feature of the regulatory model used for nursing 
homes, avoiding the disempowering effect of objective rules. Although some critics 
may argue that relying on the requirements and comments of residents who are prone 
to cognitive impairments is not a reliable basis for regulation, others have argued to 
the contrary.25 I have established in Chapter II that dignity for older individuals 
revolved around three areas of importance: identity, self-determination and humanity. 
Regulation set out to uphold an environment where dignity can flourish should 
therefore have these areas set out as objectives, and a mechanism in place that would 
allow for service users to not only express what that means to them, but also whether 
they felt it was being achieved by the service provider.  In the next part of this chapter 
I will therefore examine the place and meaning dignity holds in the current regulatory 
framework care homes are under, and assess firstly whether the outcomes of identity, 
self-determination and humanity are considered, and secondly whether service user 
participation has a place within them.  
 
 
3) The Care Quality Commission 
 
a) Care homes regulatory framework  
 
The Care Standards Act 2000 sets out the compulsory registration of care homes.26  
National bodies regulate all registered care homes in the UK.27 They are the Quality 
of Care Commission (CQC) in England, the Care Inspectorate in Scotland, the 
Regulation and Quality Improvement Authority (RQIA) in Northern Ireland and the 
Care and Social Services Inspectorate Wales (CSSIW) for Wales. I will focus my 
attention on the regulatory framework of the CQC. Following Orders made under 
                                                
25 Braithwaite J. et al, ‘Raising the Standard: Resident-Centred nursing home regulation in Australia 
(1993, Australian Government Publishing Service) 
<https://www.anu.edu.au/fellows/jbraithwaite/_documents/Reports/Raising_standards_resident_home.
pdf> Accessed 22nd February 2017 
26 Care Standards Act 2000 s.3 and s.11 
27 AgeUK, ‘Care Homes: Finding the right care home’ (July 2014), 37 
<http://www.ageuk.org.uk/Documents/ENGB/Informationguides/AgeUKIG06_Care_homes_inf.pdf?dt
rk=true> Accessed 29th January 2015 
 165 
section 24(2) of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, the CQC is under 
the statutory obligation to have regard to the Regulators Code when drafting its 
policies.28 The Code establishes six principles that ought to be followed by the 
regulators. They include supporting regulated activities, engaging and listening to the 
views of those involved in regulated activities, basing regulatory activities on risk, 
sharing information, supporting and guiding the regulated activities through the 
publication of guidance, and upholding transparency.29  
 
A risk-based approach to regulation focuses on minimising harm. Risk-based 
regulation is based on the idea that ‘rather than preventing all possible harm, risk-
based approaches promise to rationalise and manage the inevitable limits of what 
regulation can hope to achieve by focusing regulatory standard-setting and 
enforcement activity on the highest priority risks, as determined through formal 
assessments of their probability and consequences’.30 In response to tragic incidents in 
the NHS in the late 1990s, including that of the abnormally high death rates in the 
children cardiac unit of the Bristol Royal Infirmary, risk management has developed 
‘in order to avoid repeats of situations where clinical craft loses sight of patient safety 
and quality of care’.31 A loss of trust in medical expertise and the need for stronger 
accountability have led to a monitoring system of regulation that strives to standardise 
and rationalise practice.32 Risk management has been presented as a method of 
regulating practice able to deal with the ‘the dark side’ of the ‘craftsmanship’ of 
medicine,33 where the medical work in itself becomes more important than the effect 
                                                
28 Department for Business Innovation & Skills, “Regulators’ Code: Summary of regulators and 
regulatory functions covered’ April 2014 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/320713/regulators-
code-summary-cover.pdf> Accessed 8th March 2017 
29 Department for Business Innovation & Skills, ‘Regulators’ Code’ April 2014 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/300126/14-705-
regulators-code.pdf> Accessed 8th March 2017 
30 Beaussier A-L, Demeritt D., Griffiths A., and Rothstein H., ‘Accounting for failure: risk-based 
regulation and the problems of ensuring healthcare quality in the NHS’ (2016) 18(2-3) Health, Risk & 
Society 205 
31 Brown P. and Calnan M., ‘The Risks of Managing Uncertainty:  The Limitations of Governance and 
Choice, and the Potential of Trust’ (2009) 9(1) Social Policy and Society 13 
32 Checkland K., Marshall M., and Harrison S., ‘Re-thinking Accountability: Trust versus confidence in 
medical practice’ (2004) 13(1) Quality and Safety in Health Care 130 
33 Sennett R., The Craftsman (Allen Lane, 2008)  
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it actually has on the patient.34 The management of risk is therefore presented as a 
reassuring tool that appears to ‘eradicate uncertainties through reasoned calculation’.35 
 
Hillman et al have argued that the influx of risk-based governance in the provision of 
care has had negative effects on the possibility of dignity for older patients in NHS 
acute hospitals.36 They explain that the practice of risk-based regulation distorts the 
practice of care by trying to prioritise the rational diminution of risk over the 
‘irrationality of caring relationships’, to the detriment of the dignity of the patient, 
which necessitates opportunities for recognition through meaningful interactions.37 
The study they conducted shows how the pressure for accountability that ensues from 
risk-based management promotes defensiveness in staff, an attitude that fosters ‘a 
disconnection’ between them and those they care for.38 Just as placing quality of care 
assurance solely in the hands of medical expertise can compromise it, so can the 
rationalisation of care through risk management by de-humanising the person cared 
for.39 Hillman et al conclude that  
 
risk regimes shape the conditions of possibility for acute care provision. These 
conditions are shown to reduce the possibilities for meaningful caring 
relationships between practitioners and patients in which the dignity of older 
people is maintained and instead promotes practices that maintain the system 
rather than meeting the needs of the people the system purports to serve.40 
 
By correlation, a risk-based approach to regulation in care homes may not be the most  
conducive to the development of conditions amenable to dignity. Indeed, it is more 
likely to embrace an idea of dignity that is protectionist in its intent, rather than one 
that is empowering. As I will expose in the next part of this chapter, regulatory aims 
fashioned under a risk based approach focus heavily on safeguard and welfare, and 
tend to adopt a version of dignity that fits into those objectives: dignity is considered 
                                                
34 Brown and Calnan (n31) 13  
35 Hillman A., Tadd W., Calnan S., Calnan M., Bayer A., and Read S., ‘Risk, Governance and the 
experience of care’ (2013) 35(6) Sociology of Health and Illness 939 
36 Ibid 
37 Ibid 952 
38 Ibid 949 
39 Ibid 940 
40 Ibid 952 
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as another parameter to limit harm, but it stops short of setting positive obligations 
beyond that aim. Section 20 of the HSCA 2008 sets out the purposes of regulating 
health and social care as ‘to secure that services provided in the carrying on of 
regulated activities cause no avoidable harm to the persons for whom the services are 
provided’, to ensure that any regulated service is of ‘appropriate quality’, and to 
secure ‘the health, safety and welfare of persons for whom any such service is 
provided’.41 The way in which this is achieved has recently been reformed. 
 
The CQC regulatory regime has gone through significant changes since 1st April 
2015.42 These changes have occurred in response to the publication of various 
government led inquiries such as the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public 
Inquiry, 43 and the Department of Health response to the Winterbourne View Hospital 
scandal,44 into severe failures of the standards of care in the public health and social 
care sector. According to the Department of Health the aim of the new regulatory 
regime is to ‘introduce fundamental standards of safety and quality below which care 
should never fail, make regulations more effective and improve enforcement against 
them, be outcome focused, and reduce the burden on business’.45 It could indeed be 
argued that the old regulatory regime established in 2010 was so lengthy and complex 
that complying with it was confusing and diverted energy from caring priorities.46 It 
took a 278 page long guidance to explain the various outcomes service providers were 
supposed to generate to comply with the regulatory framework.47  
 
                                                
41 Health and Social Care Act 2008 s.20 (1) and (2) 
42 CQC, ‘Guidance for providers on meeting the regulations’ (March 2015)  
<http://www.cqc.org.uk/sites/default/files/20150324_guidance_providers_meeting_regulations_01.pdf
> Accessed 29th March 2017 
43 Francis R. QC ‘Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, Executive 
Summary’ (The Stationary Office, February 2013) 
<http://www.midstaffspublicinquiry.com/sites/default/files/report/Executive%20summary.pdf>  
44 Department of Health, ‘Transforming care:  A national response to Winterbourne View Hospital’ 
(December 2012) 
< https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/213215/final-
report.pdf> Accessed 8th February 2017 
45 Department of Health, ‘Introducing Fundamental Standards, Consultation on Proposals to change 
CQC registration regulations’ (January 2014), 7-8 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/274715/Introducing_F
undamental_Standards_-_a_Consultation.pdf> Accessed 10th February 2015 
46 Statutory Instruments 2010 No. 781, The Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) 
Regulations 2010 <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2010/781/made> Accessed 12th March 2015 
47 CQC, ‘Guidance about compliance, Essential standards of quality and safety’ (March 2010)  
< http://www.cqc.org.uk/sites/default/files/documents/gac_-_dec_2011_update.pdf> Accessed 12th 
March 2015 
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In June 2013 the CQC published a report entitled ‘A new start’, which outlined the 
changes that would be brought in to improve services.48  The new regulatory regime 
shows a willingness to streamline burdensome regulations and ‘get to the heart of 
people’s experience of care’, a goal that suggests the involvement of service users. 
Not all concerned were reassured by this reform. 49 The Relatives and Residents 
Association (R&RA), who campaigns on behalf of care home residents, expressed 
distress at the condensation of the new regulatory regime, claiming that ‘deleting 
regulations’ was tantamount to ‘deleting rights’. 50  They claimed that the new 
regulatory system no longer directly obliged the service provider to tell residents 
about their complaint procedures, to plan for emergencies, or to give residents a 
choice of food.51 Lord Hunt brought these concerns to the fore in a House of Lord 
debate, holding that a general move towards deregulation had resulted in these 
streamlined standards, which lacked detail and could weaken the protection offered to 
residents.52  
 
Despite these concerns, the regulations were not amended. It was held that because 
the new system was outcome based, description of processes were no longer 
required.53 As I suggested above, outcome-based regulatory models - if sufficiently 
focused on empowerment and participation – may avoid the inflexibility and 
paternalistic risk of a strict rules approach - without a trade-off in the specificity of the 
regulations. Therefore, the question arises whether this new lighter regulatory regime 
will be effective in involving those who are cared for within the regulated 
environment, partly on the ground of their multi-dimensional vulnerability, or whether 
too little participation to fill up the blanks will have the effect of lowering standards 
by allowing a minimum compliance mentality to develop.  
                                                
48 CQC, ‘A new start. Consultations on changes to the way CQC regulates, inspects and monitors care’ 
(June 2013)  
<http://www.cqc.org.uk/sites/default/files/documents/cqc_consultation_2013_tagged_0.pdf> Accessed 
12th March 2015 
49 Ibid 8 
50 R&RA, ‘New government commitment on deleted regulations’ 6th November 2014 
<http://www.relres.org/latest-news/2014-11-deleted-reg-hol-debate.html> Accessed 10th February 
2015 
51 These are respectively Regulations 19(1), Regulation 9(2) and Regulation 14(1) from the Health and 
Social Care 2008 (Regulated Activities) 2010 which disappeared in the new regulatory regime 
52 House of Lord, 5th November 2014, Column 1692 
< http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldhansrd/text/141105-0002.htm> Accessed 1st 
April 2015 
53 Ibid, Column 1698 
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The need to involve service users in the development of regulatory criteria is 
compounded by the fact that the CQC regulates an impressive and diverse array of 
services. Annex D of the guidance document for providers identifies a total of 28 
different types of health and social service providers under the responsibility of the 
CQC for quality monitoring.54 These services range from community-based services 
for people with mental health needs, to dental services, hospices or acute services, and 
so cover a multiplicity of service users ranging from new-borns to the elderly, all with 
a wide variety of health conditions and care needs.1  
 
Even groups with similar demographic profiles do not have the same conception of 
dignity. A study used in Chapter II compared the meaning of dignity for patients with 
a terminal disease and that of elderly people in care.55 It concluded that although they 
were similarities in the way in which ill and elderly individuals perceived dignity, 
those in residential care were particularly concerned by the sense of loss they felt and 
they resented that their old age be assimilated to being ill.56 Whether one regulatory 
regime can effectively define the meaning of dignity as an outcome for all individuals 
using healthcare services seems improbable, unless as I mentioned above, service 
users are involved not only in filling in the gaps of how outcomes can be reached, but 
also in the process of checking that they are being fulfilled. I will now turn my 
attention to how dignity is defined and understood under the new regulatory regime 
laid out under section 20, and assess whether it does make room for service user 
participation.  
 
 
b) Dignity regulation and accompanying guidance 
 
For the first time dignity is set out as a stand alone outcome under Regulation 10 
entitled ‘Dignity and Respect’. The previous regulations only addressed dignity 
                                                
54 CQC, ‘Annex D: Service types’  
<http://www.cqc.org.uk/sites/default/files/20150210_guidance_for_providers_service_types_annex_d.
pdf> Accessed 29th March 2017 
55 Hall S., Longhurst S. and Higginson I., ‘Living and dying with dignity: a qualitative study of the 
view of people in nursing homes’ (2009) 38 Age and Ageing 411 
56 Ibid 412 
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indirectly under Regulation 17 entitled ‘Respecting and involving service users’.57 
The new regime stipulates under Regulation 10 that:  
 
(1) Service users must be treated with dignity and respect. 
(2) Without limiting paragraph (1), the things which a registered person is 
required to do to comply with paragraph (1) include in particular— 
(a) ensuring the privacy of the service user; 
(b) supporting the autonomy, independence and involvement in the community 
of the service user; 
(c) having due regard to any relevant protected characteristics (as defined in 
section 149(7) of the Equality Act 2010) of the service user.58 
 
Under Annex C of the guidance, dignity is defined as to be ‘(…) concerned with how 
people feel, think and behave in relation to the worth or value they place on 
themselves and others. To treat someone with dignity is to treat them as being of 
worth and respect them as a valued person, taking into account their individual views 
and beliefs.’59  
 
The idea of ‘treating people as being of worth’ appears to imply that dignity is 
inherent, and so presumes that the person in care already has a sense of worth. The 
role of the provider is limited to respecting this worth by a particular behaviour 
towards the person cared for as directed under Regulation 10. Studies used in Chapter 
II highlighted the impact a move to a care home could have on people’s sense of 
dignity. A longitudinal study revealed that a person’s sense of dignity evolved with 
time,60 and that accepting the changes brought on by age helped to sustain it.61 
Although some residents interviewed mentioned that they possessed an unshakable 
                                                
57 CQC, Regulation 17, Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) 2010 
< http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2010/9780111491942/regulation/17> Accessed 1st April 2015 
58 CQC, Regulation 10, Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) 2014 
< http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2014/9780111117613/regulation/10> Accessed 1st April 2015 
59 CQC, ‘Guidance for providers, Annex C, Glossary of terms’, 5 
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1st April 2015 
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inner strength, 62 and the ability to accept their new life, others revealed the sense of 
loss they felt following the severance they had experienced from all that was familiar 
to them.63 This sense of place in the world and self-worth may be jeopardized by a 
move into a care environment. Thus, the regulatory framework’s assumption that 
elderly people in care already possess such sense of self-worth may narrow down the 
idea of dignity too much, conceiving it merely as a ‘control’ element acting on the 
behaviour of the service provider, rather than as something to be nurtured and 
sustained, that is, as an ‘empowering’ notion for the benefit of the resident.64  
 
Taylor explains that ‘our identity is partly shaped by recognition, or its absence, often 
by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real 
damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a 
confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves’.65 Recognition, Taylor 
continues, is gained through ‘the dialogical in human life’, the interaction we engage 
in with ‘others who matter to us’, ‘through our acquisition of rich human languages of 
expression’.66 Individuals questioned in the studies used in Chapter II revealed that 
communication, relationships, participation, and the physical and psychological 
changes brought on by aging and loss, were important constitutive elements of their 
identity. All these elements hinge on third party recognition and cannot be fulfilled by 
the individual alone. Rather than directing providers to respect an assumed sense of 
worth, the regulatory scheme should emphasise the importance of recognition through 
dialogical participation as an important component part of fulfilling of dignity. 
 
According to Regulation 10, dignity, or the ‘worth that people feel’, demands a 
certain treatment, one that rests on the respect of privacy, autonomy and non-
discrimination. Important aspects of dignity established in Chapter II are addressed by 
this regulation. The guidance breaks down the meaning of treating someone with 
dignity in four main components. Under component 10(1), respectful communication 
                                                
62 Franklin L-L., Ternestedt BM., and Nordenfelt L., ‘Views on Dignity of Elderly Nursing Home 
Residents’ (2006) 13 Nursing Ethics 130 
63 Hall et al (n55)  
64 Brownsword (n13) 
65 Taylor C., ‘The Politics of Recognition’ in A. Gutmann (Ed.) Multiculturalism: Examining the 
Politics of Recognition (Princeton University Press, 1994), 25 
66 Ibid 32 
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is identified as essential to dignified care.67 In this instance the guidance specifies that 
suitable means of communication must be made available to the person cared for, and 
that the choice of non-communication must also be respected. Respecting people’s 
personal preferences in their care choice, but also in the way in which they wish to be 
addressed, are also identified as part of providing dignified care. On the other hand, 
offence to dignity in the form of neglect or undignified treatment is addressed via a 
reference to Regulation 13, which deals with ‘safeguarding service users from abuse 
and improper treatment’. This Regulation prohibits discrimination, regulates the use 
of restraints, defines and forbids degrading treatment and sets minimum standards to 
meet people’s care needs.68  
 
Respect for people’s privacy is addressed prominently under component 10(2)(a).69 
The guidance for this issue identifies that individuals’ particular idea of privacy 
should be followed when possible, that privacy should be respected during care and 
treatment (even when the person is asleep or unaware due to lack of capacity or 
unconsciousness), when care is discussed, when people interact with others such as 
friends, carers or visitors, and via the purposeful segregation of genders in sleeping 
accommodation and bathroom facilities. The issue of privacy was clearly identified by 
those interviewed in Chapter II as a component part of dignity under the heading of 
identity. Under this topic, those interviewed mentioned the importance of being 
shielded from the eyes of others when receiving intimate treatment, or the importance 
of being kept separated from the opposite sex in the context of mixed wards.70 It is 
also true that others found that they got accustomed to the intervention of others in 
their daily lives and accepted it as part of their new life in an institution.71 Privacy is a 
subjective value, which meaning varies from person to person. The person cared for 
ought to be consulted in situations when privacy issues occur (such as personal 
treatment, future care plans, sleeping and washing arrangements etc.), and their 
wishes respected as far as feasibly possible.  
 
                                                
67 CQC (n42) 34-36 
68 CQC (n42) 50 
69 Ibid 35 
70 Chapter II, 8 
71 Ibid 
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Component 10(2)(b) addresses autonomy, independence and involvement in the 
community.72 This guidance seeks to mitigate independence with safety concerns, but 
also to engage service providers to foster the independence of the service user 
according to their wishes. It also encourages service providers to facilitate the 
relationships service users wish to maintain whilst in care. The importance of 
relationships was clearly highlighted during the discussions of the studies used in 
Chapter II. Participation, on a scale suitable to the service user, is also mentioned 
under this sub-section. It recommends this to minimise isolation. This was found 
important for dignity in the studies used in Chapter II. Component 10(2)(c) 
specifically deals with non-discrimination towards service users. 73  Equality of 
treatment was recognized as needed for dignity in Chapter II under the theme of 
humanity in the provision of services in particular, and the treatment of elderly people 
more generally by society. The guidance reminds providers that discrimination on the 
ground of age is forbidden under the Equality Act 2010.  
 
The guidance on Regulation 10 also acknowledges under component 10(2) that the 
areas of dignity as expressly set out in the regulatory regime do not form an 
exhaustive definition of dignity, and that providers should consider offering a 
dignified service at all times. Compared to the previous regulatory regime and 
guidelines, the new rules are far more in tune with the meaning of dignity expressed 
by elderly people in the studies used in this paper. Dignity is singled out as a 
standalone Regulation, which was not the case under the previous regime.74 The 
guidance defining how dignity translates into the provision of services is far more 
comprehensive, clear and person-centred than previously where dignity was defined 
solely in the context of treatment and care.  
 
It is worth noting here the effect the regulatory framework can have in case law. In the 
previously discussed case of McDonald, Lady Hale referred to Regulation 17, the 
regulation concerned with respect for dignity set out under the previous Social Care 
Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2010.75 She reminded the court that this 
                                                
72 CQC (n42) 36 
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74 CQC (n58) 
75 R (on the application of McDonald) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea [2011] UKSC 33, 
[78] 
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Regulation ‘requires a registered person, so far as reasonable practicable, to make 
suitable arrangements to ensure the dignity, privacy and independence of service 
users’.76 She then quoted the relevant CQC guidance about standards of quality with 
reference to toileting facilities, requiring service providers to enable service users to 
have access to such facilities in order to preserve their privacy and dignity.77 This 
argument failed to be persuasive to the other Law Lords, but shows a willingness by 
Lady Hale to use social care regulations to bolster a pro-dignity argument, one that 
respects the person’s wishes, their privacy and self-determination.  
 
The other Law Lords could have disputed this argument by quoting other regulations 
that uphold the safety of service users. Under the current regulatory system, 
Regulation 12 is dedicated to the safe care and treatment of service users.78 However 
no other Law Lords referred to the CQC regulatory regime. Instead, they agreed with 
the decision of the local authority that the safety of Ms McDonald was assured by 
providing her with incontinence pads instead of a night time carer to help her reach 
the toilets, and that this solution was ‘a proportionate response to the appellant’s 
needs because it affords her the maximum protection from injury, greater privacy and 
independence, and results in substantial cost savings’.79 This case illustrates how 
privileging certain outcomes (such as safety) over those favoured by the person 
concerned can lead to situations where the dignity of the person is not respected. 
Dignity defined by a third party cannot be imposed on another on the ground of their 
welfare; for dignity to be meaningful it ought to be conceptualised from the person’s 
perspective. 
 
Although the CQC is responsible for checking the performances of care homes and 
home care providers in the UK, it is not responsible to assess the performance of 
councils in their social care commissioning functions. Nevertheless, the guidance 
published for the Care Act 2014 does stipulate that ‘local authorities should consider 
the emerging revised Care Quality Commission standards for quality and any 
                                                
76 Ibid 
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78 Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) 2014 
79 McDonald (n75) [19] 
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emerging national frameworks for defining outcomes’.80 The regulatory framework 
that sets standards for care providers ought to inform local authorities’ commissioning 
duty of social care provisions, but there is no legal requirement for them to do so at 
present. At the moment, only the principle of wellbeing under the Care Act 2014, 
defined as including the element of dignity, legally binds the council in their social 
care duties.81 
 
Despite these positive regulatory reforms about dignity, there is still little or no built-
in mechanism that seeks to open a dialogue with the person cared for in order to find 
out what dignity is to them, and how it may be fostered for that person. Some of the 
outcomes expected under the regulation are in line with the main findings about 
dignity exposed in Chapter II, but it does not mention that the people who are using 
the service ought to be the ones who help shape how the outcome can be fulfilled. 
This is a considerable limitation of the reformed regime.  
 
Privileging a risk-based approach to the regulatory framework that sets standards of 
care means that dignity has to be interpreted in the context of other standards that 
focus on keeping the person safe. But promoting dignity and ensuring safety are not 
always compatible aims, and privileging the latter in some cases could even be 
detrimental to dignity, as the case of McDonald mentioned above shows.82 Service 
user participation as to the meaning of dignity for them is not required, and although 
the guidance mentions the need to support the autonomy of the service users, it fails to 
require their engagement to achieve such goals.  
 
 
c) Inspection and enforcement regime 
 
In order to enforce the standards set out by the regulation, different models can be 
followed, based on deterrence, compliance or responsiveness.83 A regulatory model 
                                                
80 Department of Health and Social Care, ‘Care and support statutory guidance’ (Updated 17 August 
2017), 4.14 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/care-act-statutory-guidance/care-and-support-statutory-
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81 Care Act 2014 s.1 
82 Hillman et al (n35) 
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based on deterrence assumes that the organization regulated would naturally choose to 
promote its own self-advancement, and so uses inspection and sanctions to seek 
regulatory observance.84 The compliance model on the other hand supposes a less 
confrontational relationship between the regulator and the regulated activity, and 
favours a more cooperative approach, based on the provision of guidance and 
support.85 Most regulation adopts a mixture of these models. Responsive regulation is 
presented as an alternative to these two models, though it can be viewed as a 
particular combination of them. A responsive regulatory model seeks to escalate 
enforcement progressively, but starts by trying to build on the strengths of the 
organisation in order to ‘absorb weaknesses’.86 This model is often represented as a 
pyramid, where the baseline represents cooperation and dialogue, and where the next 
port of call is punishment, to be escalated if needed.87 This system works on dialogue 
and cooperation, with the added bite of potential sanction in cases of recurring failures 
to comply.  
 
The CQC uses a mix of compliance and deterrence in its bid to improve quality of 
care. It follows the compliance model by publishing detailed guidance to help 
registered service providers comply with regulation, but also uses deterrence through 
inspections and enforcement tools in the form of sanctions, fines, criminal prosecution 
and potential de-registration.88  Indeed, it could be argued that its enforcement 
methods are responsive, because they are progressive and incremental. 
 
None of these models are fool proof in the upholding of quality of care. A report into 
the failings of the inspection system employed by the CQC at the Hillcroft Nursing 
Home is an example of how inspection can fail to spot even the worst kind of abuse.89 
A home described by an inspection as ‘compliant with all essential standards’ was 
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later the subject of a police investigation which resulted in four members of staff 
being charged with offences of ill treatment and wilful neglect under section 44 of the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005. Although this is only one example of failure of the 
inspection system, it illustrates how abuses can go uncovered despite the inspection 
regime in place. In this particular instance, a series of warnings had been given to the 
CQC and the local authority, but protocols in place at the time and lack of inter 
agency coordination meant that some residents only stopped being abused when the 
police intervened and criminal charges were brought.90 This tragic event is one of the 
triggers that have led the CQC to review its inspection and enforcement regime. 
Below I will examine the changes made, and apply Braithwaite’s recommendations 
for regulatory reforms to assess the possibility of substantive improvements in quality 
of care in aged care.91 This in turn will have a beneficial effect on the possibility of 
dignity. 
 
The CQC’s new framework for inspection is currently based on five key questions to 
assess the safety and quality of the residential adult social care services audited.92 
Inspectors must assess whether the home is safe, (whether ‘people are protected from 
abuse and avoidable harm’, effective (whether people’s care ‘achieves good 
outcomes, promotes quality of life and is based on the best available evidence’), 
caring (whether ‘staff involve and treat people with compassion, kindness, dignity and 
respect’), responsive (whether the services meet people’s needs’), and well-led 
(whether the ‘management … of the organisation assures the delivery of high quality 
person-centred care, supports learning and innovation and promotes an open and fair 
culture’).93   
 
The inspection is not precisely linked to each Regulation but revolves around 
answering these five key questions. Such auditing method may encourage a more 
holistic inspection regime, one that focuses on the outcome of quality of care rather 
than forces a tick box exercise that loses sight of the bigger picture and breeds 
unreliability. Braithwaite explains how ‘rule ritualism’ can indeed frustrate the aim of 
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regulation.94 This practice means to ‘write a rule instead of solving a problem’; it is 
the consequence of politicians willing to be seen to improve quality of services, 
bowing to the pressure of ‘conservative ritualists’.95 Increasing the amount of rules 
may indeed appear to tighten the grip of regulators on the service providers, but it 
may stunt the possibility of actual substantive improvements. Although increasing the 
abundance of regulation may reassure service users and the electorate alike, it may 
also jeopardize the quality of the audit performed. It can do so by forcing inspectors 
who are pressed for time to pick and choose the standards they actually survey, 
increasing rather than limiting their level of discretion, generating higher levels of 
unreliability in their reporting and institution rating.96 
 
Braithwaite argues that keeping to a few standards or outcomes (as is the CQC’s new  
inspection design), encourages a ‘a proper process of information-gathering and team 
deliberation on that standard’.97  He believes in the proposition, also defended in this 
dissertation, that ‘dialogue about residents-centred outcomes conduces to more 
reliability than recourse to authoritative interpretations of the meaning of words in 
rules’.98 This proposition can be illustrated in the case of privacy, an important 
element of dignity, and a notion whose meaning differs from person to person.99 
Compliance with dignity objectives ought to be made easier and clearer through the 
involvement of service users. Fleshing out the meaning of dignity standard as well as 
the monitoring of its possibility ought to be led by those who live in the regulated 
service.  
 
In this respect, the CQC mentions the involvement of ‘Experts by Experience’, 
service users who are specifically recruited to help speaking to service users during 
the inspection process.100 This initiative, grounded in a dialogical approach that 
upholds the importance of subjectivity, could be effective in improving conditions for 
dignity for service users. So far lack of resources has been compromising the potential 
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beneficial contribution of these exchanges.101 I would argue that in the case of nursing 
homes and for the outcome of dignity, service users and their relatives ought to be the 
prime sources of information gathering. Unfortunately, Braithwaite et al have noted 
the ‘the greatest weakness of English regulation is on the empowerment of 
residents’. 102  It has been observed that very few care homes had residents’ 
committees, and no regulation so far insists on a meeting with that committee during 
inspection.103 
 
In order to improve compliance, the CQC has enforcement measures at its disposal 
under the Health and Social Care Act 2008 as amended by the Care Act 2014. 104  
These powers are used to improve the quality and safety of healthcare services. The 
aims of the enforcement measures the CQC has at its disposal is two-pronged: to 
‘protect the people using the service from harm, and to ensure they receive health and 
social care services of an appropriate standard’ by requiring and then forcing 
improvements, and to ‘hold providers to account for failures in how the service is 
provided’.105  Due to the nature of my enquiry into the protection of dignity, I will 
concentrate here on the mechanisms in place to protect the service user.  
 
The enforcement regime in force until the 31st March 2015 was burdensome, slow and 
lacking in bite.106 Enforcement was previously dependent on the urgency of the 
situation uncovered by inspection and on whether the impact of the regulatory breach 
on the service user was found to be minor, moderate or major.107 Formal regulatory 
action in the form of a compliance action could then turn into an enforcement action 
through a warning notice.108 Only then could the CQC use criminal enforcement 
methods starting from a penalty notice all the way to prosecution, and/or civil 
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enforcement tools ranging from a variation of registration conditions to the suspension 
of registration, their ‘most powerful sanction’.109 Only 34 homes were closed in 2014 
because of extensive failures to comply with the regulatory regime.110 This figure 
takes its full meaning within a context where a total of 1829 care homes failed to 
comply with at least one key quality standard.111 This figure represents almost 20%, 
or one in five of all homes inspected by the CQC whose report was available in the 
first week of January 2015.112 In real terms, this means that for over 70,000 elderly 
people, care was below standards in safety, effectiveness, caring, responsiveness to 
needs, or management. An alarming 96 homes out of these 1829 failed on all five key 
quality standards, effecting around 3500 residents.113 It is true that the effect of below 
standard care on residents must be mitigated against the potential trauma of moving 
home, 114  and that the failure to meet a standard could be solely due to an 
administrative shortfall not actually affecting the residents’ quality of life. It could 
also unfortunately mean that extremely basic standards of care are not met. Without 
any or few of those basic standards in place, the sustainability of dignity appears 
compromised.  
 
The new enforcement regime is designed to allow for more effective remedial means 
to deal with those providers who fail to comply with the fundamental standards of 
care. On top of the enforcement powers available to the CQC described above, the 
Commission now has the ability to prosecute for the breach of specific Regulations.115 
Breaches of Regulations 11 (Need for consent), 12 (Safe care and Treatment), 13 
(Safeguarding), 14 (Meeting nutritional and hydration needs), 20 (Duty of candour) 
and 20A (Requirement to display performance assessments), can now all be 
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prosecuted through the criminal justice system. 116  Overall, the enforcement 
mechanism has been streamlined and considers the ‘seriousness of the concerns’ and 
‘multiplicity and recurrence of breaches’ to decide on the action to take instead of the 
more rigid system of level of harm caused.117  
 
The enforcement regime is based on a responsive model of regulation that escalates 
the seriousness of the punishment when faced with persistently non-compliant service 
providers. Braithwaite has claimed that this pyramidal model of enforcement also 
needs to be combined with a pyramidal model of reward (calling it the ‘Dual Pyramid 
Principle’) to be effective.118 Although there is a need for a regulatory pyramid that is 
designed to ‘respond to a fear about a risk’,119 and the regulation model endorsed by 
the CQC is indeed risk-based, there is also a need for a reward mechanism for service 
providers to build on their strengths to the detriment of their weaknesses.120 This kind 
of ‘strengths-based’ pyramid does not seek to guarantee a minimum standard of care, 
but rather aims at ‘maximising quality by pulling standards through the ceiling’.121 
Reward without the risk of punishment is not sufficient, because a system built solely 
on praise after compliance would incentivise service providers to find ways to obtain 
the reward without engaging with the regulatory process (Braithwaite names this the 
‘moral hazard’ of rewards for compliance’).122 Only when weaknesses are addressed 
can the reward system be triggered, minimizing the risk of moral hazard.123  
 
Setting out a responsive model of enforcement appears to be the most efficient in 
pushing service providers to adhere to the regulation framework. It is clear that timing 
and transparency are of the essence when it comes to the efficiency of such 
enforcement models. Involving service users may be the key to an enforcement 
system that responds quicker than at the pace of the regulator’s schedule. Involving 
small groups of service users to regularly communicate with a dedicated team of 
regulatory monitors may prove more efficient in discovering inadequate practices and 
                                                
116 CQC (n88) 12 
117 Ibid 17 
118 Braithwaite et al (n3) 315 
119 Ibid 318 
120 Ibid 317 
121 Ibid 318 
122 Ibid 278 
123 Ibid 320 
 182 
areas ripe for improvement, than waiting for the regulatory body to decide on 
inspections and follow-up actions. Conditions for dignity would be improved if those 
who receive care were in some measure able to have a stake in how well the care 
home they live in is following regulations. 
 
 
d) Regulation and care professionals 
 
So far, I have established that in order to create conditions necessary for dignity to 
flourish in care homes, it is essential to construct a regulatory scheme that is 
responsive to the meaning of dignity from the perspective of those who live there. I 
have argued that using experiential dignity as a guide to the construction and 
implementation of regulation rests on the relational nature of persons, and implies the 
need to engage in dialogical exchanges. Engaging with those who are dependent on 
the care of others because of their age has revealed that the realisation of dignity 
depends on actually experiencing identity, self-determination and respect for one’s 
humanity. Individuals move into care homes only because they are no longer able to 
live independently, and so their reliance on others becomes a prominent feature of 
their lives. Although some residents may still have links with those who form part of 
their previous relational world, the role of staff becomes paramount in almost every 
aspect of their dignity, from their sense of identity, to their capacity for self-
determination and the respect they feel for their humanity.  
 
People’s appreciation of their identity is helped by the relationships they form with 
those around them, and is founded in the mechanism Honneth names ‘mutual 
recognition’.124 In a care home, the residents’ sense of identity is shaped by the 
relationships they have with the caring staff. Care professionals who recognise and 
acknowledge the person they care for help foster a sense of identity: alternatively they 
can obstruct this process and contribute to the depersonalisation of the individual care 
for.   It could be said that the image residents have of themselves depends heavily on 
the attitudes the staff have towards them. Keeping residents looking presentable in 
                                                
124 Alex Honneth has described mutual recognition as essential to human relationships, and that without 
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order to retain self-respect is another aspect of identity important to many.125 How 
staff address the residents, whether and how they communicate with them and enable 
them to participate in the life of the home and in the decisions that concern their care 
also play a part in that perception of self. Carers are in a position to help elderly 
people adjust to the debilitating consequences of physical changes, cope with the 
upsetting effects of loss, and feel part of their new surroundings. These are all 
important aspects that make up a person’s sense of identity, a fundamental part of 
dignity. 
 
Staff can also influence people’s ability to self-determine, to have a stake in their lives 
in spite of the institutional setting they live in. Remaining independent for as long as 
possible could be made possible by the provision of the right equipment or the 
delivery of the appropriate help. Retaining some form of control over private space, 
allowing for the possibility of choice in a usually rigid daily routine and facilitating 
the acceptance of a new life chapter can also be made possible by the respectful 
attitude of staff. As to people’s sense of humanity, the staff’s role is also pivotal. 
Maintaining a sense of intrinsic worth may be possible through the personalisation of 
care staff can offer, and the acknowledgement of presidents’ individuality. The feeling 
of being treated equally to others and not seen as a sub-class of citizens can also come 
from the attitude of staff. Staff behaviour and treatment of the residents in their care is 
intrinsically linked with the possibility of dignity for those they care for.  
 
The importance of the role of caring staff professionals in the delivery of dignity 
enabling conditions is not reflected in the way the care industry is, generally, treating 
them. Turnover in the care staff sector is high. Figures show that the yearly turnover 
rate for staff in the adult residential sector is 27.3%.126 This is even higher for the 
40,500 registered nurses who work within residential care settings,127 with a turnover 
of 33.5%.128 This may prevent residents from building meaningful relationships with 
those who care for them, an important aspect for dignity. Furthermore, 1 in 3 are non-
British and there is no statutory requirement for language skills, which might be 
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another obstacle for relationships to form.129 The Social Care Institute for Excellence 
recognises that low staffing levels are also a common challenge for care homes, and 
cites low status and pay, poor training and support, stress and sickness as some 
explanations for that problem.130 Pay is on average £14,400 per year for a care 
worker, which is 26p above the National Living Wage compulsory since April 
2016,131 and 79p below the UK Living Wage.132 The living wage is set by the Living 
Wage Foundation and is based on the cost of living in the UK.133 Some care services 
employers have even been found trying to avoid paying the minimum wage.134  
 
Recent figures show that around 665,000 people work in the residential care sector 
regulated by the CQC.135 ‘Quality service’ is rated by Skills for Care as one of the 
many advantages of professional qualifications, but 48% of people who work in the 
adult care sector have no relevant qualifications for social care recorded.136 Out of 
those who do hold qualifications, only 21% have a level 2 qualification, 16% a level 3 
and only 12% a level 4 or above (3% have other types of qualifications).137 A chart 
recording the type of training care workers receive shows that the majority is in the 
area of ‘moving and handling’ (74%) and safeguarding adults (70%).138 This type of 
training reflects an overall concern for the management of risk and safety. This may 
well suggest that care home providers’ priority is to protect themselves from litigation 
rather than create conditions for dignity. On a more positive note, the data recorded 
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also shows that 83% of care home staff had received an induction and 21% had 
completed or were in the process of completing a Care Certificate.139 This may be the 
result of the Francis enquiry into the failings of the Mid-Staffordshire Foundation 
Trust that led to the commissioning of an independent research into the adequacy of 
care staff training.140 It concluded that the training standards carers received varied 
wildly, and that no set minimum was required. It recommended Higher Education 
England to develop a ‘Certificate of Fundamental Care’ for all staff to have prior to 
being able to work unsupervised.141  
 
High staff turnover, poor pay and lack of training can have direct consequences on the 
attitude of caring professionals towards regulation compliance. These factors may 
encourage ‘motivational postures like game-playing and disengagement that conduce 
to ritualism’.142 Motivational postures have been defined as ‘conglomerates of beliefs, 
attitudes, preferences, interests, and feelings that together communicate the degree to 
which an individual accepts the agenda of the regulator, in principle, and endorses the 
way in which the regulator functions and carries out duties on a daily basis’.143 
Whereas disengagement is ‘a posture of withdrawal’ towards the authority of the 
regulator, game-playing ‘circumvents rules and laws while appearing to do what is 
expected’.144 
 
In order to avoid such behaviour, it is essential for care homes to provide a working 
environment that promotes a ‘motivational posture of commitment to the regulatory 
order’ and continuous improvement in quality of care.145 Achieving this state of 
affairs involves that ‘inevitable webs of regulation are complemented by webs of 
support that increase freedom in (the) lives (of care staff) that give them more 
meaning, that help them build on their strengths to develop a career trajectory from 
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more decent base incomes to even higher incomes as their skills grow.’146 In effect, 
care professionals who are valued, adequately trained and who feel part of an 
organisation that is able to offer them incentive for the work they do, are more likely 
to want to adhere to the regulatory regime and less likely to be resistant to it. As I 
have alluded to above, efforts have been made to implement the living wage, and 
encourage the development of industry-wide training standards.  
 
 
4) Beyond Regulation; Complaints procedure, Ombudsman and Advocacy 
 
Braithwaite has remarked that ‘no group is harder to empower than the 
institutionalized aged who are more lacking than others in both the muscle and the 
voice to resist’.147 If the inspection system fails to spot a problem, or the operator 
refuses or is reluctant to make the necessary changes to improve care in order to 
become compliant with regulations, it should be the case that the individual harmed 
by sub-standard care should be able to complain and seek redress. It is made clear by 
the CQC that they cannot settle formal complaints.148 This is the role of the provider, 
whether that may be a private company or a council led service. The only indirect role 
the CQC has in facilitating personal complaints is in the compliance of registered 
service providers with Regulation 16, which provides that ‘[a]ny complaint received 
must be investigated and necessary and proportionate action must be taken in 
response to any failure identified by the complaint or investigation’.149 
 
Should issues not get resolved satisfactorily, people are directed to contact the Local 
Government Ombudsman (hereafter LGO). Since October 2010 this applies whether 
the care is paid for privately or by the local council.150 The service is free and either 
the service user or their representative can use it when reporting ‘poor quality care, 
fees and charges, poor complaint handling, delay, assessments of need and safety and 
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safeguarding’.151 Once a complaint has been logged, the Ombudsman checks that the 
provider was given the opportunity to rectify the problem first and then assesses 
whether or not the case justifies further action.152 Once it has been established that the 
complaint is valid, an investigation is carried out in all anonymity. Possible outcomes, 
that are not legally enforceable range from an apology, the provision of a service that 
should have been made, changes to a demand for improvement or some form of 
payment.153  
 
In an illustrative case study about good practice in cases of capacity determination, 
the LGO shows how relatives of vulnerable elderly adults ought to be involved, 
especially when the person concerned has difficulties communicating with others.154 
Their example shows the traumatic effect a decision to move an elderly woman with 
Parkinson’s disease to hospital on the ground of safeguarding concerns after a 
determination of lack of capacity had on her and her family.155 Here the LGO argues 
that the council should have involved the woman’s daughter prior to determining 
incapacity, because she was able to understand her mother’s difficult speech, and 
would have been able to explain that her mother was safe and wished to stay home.156 
The LGO represents another layer of enforcement on the ground, to check that 
complaints handling, safeguarding policies, rules on mental capacity determination 
and the quality standards set by the CQC are followed by those organisations that 
procure adult care services.157 All these aspects of care practices are important to 
build an environment amenable to dignity. 
 
Another case shows how failing to engage with those who know the vulnerable adult 
best can have dire consequences on the dignity of the vulnerable adult: 
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A dementia sufferer had to stay in respite care, despite his son arranging a 
private care package that could have allowed him to stay at home, a joint 
investigation by the Local Government Ombudsman (LGO) and the 
Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO) has found. The man had 
been living in respite care while his wife, who also suffered with dementia, was 
being treated in hospital. His son organised a care package to allow him to come 
home. But two local authorities applied for a Deprivation of Liberty Order, 
forcing the man to stay in care, apart from his wife, without informing his son of 
their plans. Before the stay in respite care, the man was admitted to hospital 
with acute glaucoma in April 2009. The couple’s son - himself a doctor - told 
the authorities that he believed the injury had been caused by a blow from his 
mother, who was beginning to show signs of dementia. 
This report was not followed up, and a safeguarding plan was never 
implemented. Instead the father’s discharge from hospital was hastily arranged 
and he returned home without any protection. 
Then over time, the couple’s needs increased. The woman’s symptoms were 
deteriorating and in September she was admitted to hospital, and her husband 
went into respite care. The woman stayed in hospital for six weeks while her 
son arranged a care package. Despite the son telling the authorities that he was 
employing a registered general nurse to provide care when his father came 
home, the two authorities agreed that that this would be inadequate and applied 
for the Deprivation of Liberty Order – without involving him in the decision. In 
addition to this, when the Trust wrote to the son recommending that his parents 
be placed in separate care homes, they sent a copy to his mother – causing her a 
great deal of distress.158  
One commentator from the LGO stated that ‘as a result of actions by both the council 
and the Trust, the couple were denied the chance of living at home together in a 
settled lifestyle for longer than they did. The couple suffered a needless loss of 
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dignity, while their son felt ignored, undermined and excluded from any decision 
about their care’.159 
The main problem with the LGO is its slow processing time of complaints and 
investigation, which impedes its effectiveness and responsiveness on the ground. In 
one example of complaints received, the LGO found that Regulation 17 (the 
predecessor of Regulation 10, the one that dealt indirectly with dignity) had been 
breached because the service provider had failed to involve the resident in her own 
care.160 Participation is an important element of dignity for elderly people in care.161 
The recommendation for redress involved an apology but no financial redress, as the 
care provider’s fees for respite care costs had already been refunded.162 This instance 
illustrates that the dignity of the person involved was never truly protected effectively, 
and that redress only occurred after the damaging events had occurred. In this case the 
person concerned had died by the time the Ombudsman had reached its investigative 
conclusions. 
 
It was also remarked that complaints procedures were not easily accessible and well 
advertised in care homes in the UK.163  It is therefore essential that local and 
accessible advocacy services be at the heart of the residential care system in order for 
all residents to have a voice. Local authorities must, under the Care Act 2014, provide 
Independent advocacy to individuals who are subject of a safeguarding enquiry, if it is 
believed that they would fail to understand the information provided to them or be 
unable to communicate their views.164 There is no right to advocacy when a person 
seeks to complain about the care they receive. Only Regulation 20, the Duty of 
candour, seeks service providers to be open and effective when a safety incident 
occurs, and so advises the use of advocacy services.165 Small local advocacy groups 
that regularly engage with residents’ committees would add another layer of 
dialogical exchange. This would help residents put their opinions across and allow 
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them to engage with the environment they live in. These measures would go a long 
way in fostering conditions for dignity by adding another layer of accountability. 
 
 
5) Conclusion 
 
The environment the person lives in will either facilitate or hinder the possibility of 
dignity, making it in the language of the capabilities, an environmental conversion 
factor. Working out whether an environment can promote favourable conditions to 
dignity understood from the perspective of the resident can be done by looking at how 
the CQC, the regulatory body in charge of health and social care, has designed the 
rules that shape that environment. Current guidelines set out that regulation for this 
sector must be risk-based, to ensure that all providers of health and social care deliver 
services that can prevent avoidable harm and respect the welfare of the service user. I 
have argued here that risk-based regulations may not be the best model to follow in 
order to implement conditions conducive to dignity as understood in this dissertation. 
Although the current guidance for dignity standard appears to embrace some aspects 
of dignity important to those concerned (i.e. respect for privacy, autonomy and non-
discrimination), it does not require the participation of those who live in the regulated 
environment to elaborate on the meaning of dignity and on the ways in which it could 
be realised. 
 
I have argued that in order to make the CQC enforcement model more efficient and 
dignity-compliant, it ought to engage with the various stakeholders of care homes, and 
be applied in conjunction with a strengths based pyramid of support. A combination 
of punishment and reward could improve the effectiveness of an audit based 
enforcement mechanism. Engaging with residents may start with the setting up of 
groups of representatives who meet up regularly with carers and relatives, and are to 
be consulted as part of the inspection routine. This would also improve those 
conditions needed for dignity by empowering residents to communicate and have a 
stake in the running of the environment they live in. I have also considered the effect 
of regulation on care professionals’ motivational postures, and have concluded that 
compliance would improve with if working conditions and morale were addressed.  
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I have discussed how a risk-based model of regulation for elderly individuals in care 
could harm the creation of conditions amenable to dignity. Imposing a risk-based 
regulatory model to healthcare provisions may be appropriate in the delivery of 
medical treatment, but in institutions caring for individuals at the end of their life, 
there is an argument that welfare and the prevention of unavoidable harm should not 
be prioritized to the detriment of dignity as an empowering force. For instance, the 
use of restraints regulated by the CQC and adopted on the ground of safety (based on 
risk limitation),166 causes, amongst other physical and psychological trauma, a loss of 
dignity.167  
 
A regulatory model underpinned by dignity rather than risk may forbid such practice 
altogether, preferring the use of more creative caring methods that would do without 
the use of restraints.168 Currently, the regulatory framework in place for care homes 
considers dignity as one aspect of its welfare aims, understood as the limitation of 
preventable harm, therefore restricting the understanding of dignity to its protective 
functionality. If, on the contrary, safety and welfare were to be considered as an 
element of dignity, the claim dignity makes against harm and the instrumentalisation 
of individuals, the regulatory framework could also include its empowering 
functionality. Instead of limiting dignity to an objective rule that would fit into a 
regulatory system of risk-based governance, it could be adopting the subjective 
criteria of residents through dialogical engagement.  
 
Furthermore, the regulatory framework imposed on service providers ought to have a 
greater bearing on the effects of service provisions commissioned by councils. As the 
case of McDonald shows, the mention of these standards is sparse if almost non-
existent. There is a case to argue that services commissioned by public authorities 
ought to follow such standards more transparently, instead of following its own 
assessment procedures. Beyond the enforcement of regulations, individuals who feel 
their care providers have treated them unjustly can lodge a complaint with the Local 
Government Ombudsman. The process of investigation is slow and sometimes too 
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late to bring any redress, but offers another layer of scrutiny on the performance of 
care services. 
 
Regulations of care homes are applied externally but seek to influence the internal 
workings of the organizations they target in order to improve their performance and 
quality.169 Walshe remarks that such external approaches to improvement have their 
limits because ‘they ignore the complexities and subtleties or organizational 
behaviour, take little or no account of organizational context and culture, and make 
naïve, universal assumptions about the mechanisms for organizational changes’.170 
This can be illustrated by the one-fit-all approach the healthcare regulatory model 
adopts across all services. Despite this problem, I have argued that outcomes are less 
restrictive and paternalistic than strict rules, but they need to be complemented by 
subjective criteria in order to be effective.171 This could be achieved through a 
dialogical approach, for instance at the time of admission and through periodic 
interviews, by a member of staff designated, as some nursing homes have already 
done, as a ‘Dignity Champion’.172  
 
On the other hand, Walshe writes that ‘the problem with this kind of internal 
approaches to improvement is that they often behave as if the organization exists in 
isolation from its environment, and ignore the powerful institutional, social and 
economic pressures that shape organizational objectives’.173 It is indeed naïve to 
consider regulating a particular environment in a vacuum. Care homes are situated 
within a wider social environment they cannot be disassociated from. The macro-
environment care homes function within has to be taken into account in order for 
regulation to be effective. 
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Chapter VI 
 
Social Conversion factor: Ageism     
 
 
1) Introduction  
 
In the first two chapters I established the theoretical underpinning and 
conceptualisation of dignity under a discursive ethical model to be used in long-term 
aged care. I argued that in order to enable the possibility of dignity as defined in this 
way, certain conditions were needed to allow the development of identity, self-
determination and respect for one’s humanity. Inspired by the capability theory, I set 
out to examine the possibility of dignity through the lens of conversion factors, or 
areas prone to be obstacles to the creation of those conditions needed for its 
flourishing. I do so throughout this dissertation by examining how the law shapes the 
experience of the older individual in care by either helping, hindering or having no 
effect on the creation of those conditions.  
 
In Chapter III and IV I discussed the personal conversion factor of multi-dimensional 
vulnerability in the possibility of dignity. I concluded that laws created to protect and 
safeguard individuals in care needed to keep the person’s relational autonomy in mind 
to be compatible with the possibility of dignity. I then considered the way in which 
care home regulation, another legal tool, could convert the environmental factor of 
care homes into a setting amenable to dignity. I argued that, inter alia, dialogical 
engagement with those who lived in the regulated environment ought to form an 
intrinsic part of the construction and monitoring of the regulatory framework for 
dignity conditions to be possible. 
 
I concluded that regulatory models did not exist in a vacuum: wider social forces also 
shape the way in which long-term aged care functions. Therefore I now turn my 
attention to a broader environmental conversion factor that influences the possibility 
of dignity, that of our society’s attitude to old age. The way in which older individuals 
and old age are viewed and treated by society will have a repercussion on the 
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possibility of constructing conditions favourable to dignity. It can do so in two ways. 
Firstly, ageism can irrevocably and inexorably push the issue of dignity in old age 
away from current concerns. This is the result of a ‘them and us’ dichotomy between 
dependent elderly people and the rest of the population. Secondly, ageism can have a 
direct impact on the everyday lives of older individuals in care, jeopardizing their 
ability to sustain their identity, pursue self-determination and have their humanity 
respected. 
 
In order to understand the impact ageism is having on the possibility of dignity I will 
firstly delve into the complex origins and causes of society’s prejudiced relationship 
with ageing. Secondly, I will look at the consequences ageism is specifically having 
on dignity in care. I will then review the current equality laws in place aimed at 
narrowing the ‘them and us’ divide, and whether they are in any way effective in 
achieving a social context amenable to the realisation of dignity. I will finally suggest 
how law can play a positive, albeit limited role in trying to change the way in which 
we treat those in need of care at the end of their lives. 
 
2) Definition and origins of ageism 
 
a) Definition  
 
Despite the pessimistic tone of this introduction about our complex relationship with 
ageing, many studies have focused on its positive effects. Getting older often means 
becoming more rational in choice making,1 wiser about the resolution of social 
conflicts,2 and more emotionally healthy.3 The average life span has increased by ten 
years over the 50 years between 1960 and 2010,4 and pensioners’ incomes have 
                                                
1 Tentori K. et al ‘Wisdom and Aging: Irrational preferences in college students but not older adults’ 
(2001) 81 (3) Cognition B87 
2 Grossman I. et al, ‘Reasoning about social conflicts improves into old age’ (2010) 107 (16) 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States 7426 
3 Williams L. et al, ‘The mellow years? Neural basis of improving emotional stability with age’ (2006) 
26 Journal of Neuroscience 6422 
4 Office for National Statistics, ‘Mortality in England and Wales: Average Life Span, 2010’ (17th 
December 2012) 
< http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_292196.pdf> Accessed 25th September 2015 
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increased more than the average income since 1998/99.5 Despite these changes for the 
better, studies have also shown that prejudices against age are still very much alive.6 
Butler was one of the first to define the term ageism as ‘a process of systematic 
stereotyping of, and discrimination against people because they are old, just as racism 
and sexism accomplish this for skin colour and gender’.7 Seeing elderly people as a 
separate entity is symptomatic of ageism and has resulted in a ‘them and us’ 
dichotomy harmful to our older selves.8  
 
Ageism has been identified as a source of derogatory humour, lack of respect, 
discriminatory treatment, and the conviction that older generations are a burden to the 
young.9 It is, by definition, based on misconceived stigmas. Stigmas are built upon the 
perception of attributes some individuals may have that make them abhorrent to 
others. 10  In the case of the elderly these attributes are for instance ‘frailty, 
forgetfulness and nearness to death’.11 This negative reaction to ageing is even more 
curious if we think that ageing is a phase of life we will all (with any chance) 
experience, unlike any other types of stigma-based characteristics such as gender, 
disability, race, religion or sexual orientation.12 Ageism distorts our perception of 
what it means to be elderly. I believe that the negative image it reflects back at us is a 
very important reason why we still have unresolved problems with the way in which 
people are treated in care homes today.  
 
Many have tried to understand the phenomenon of ageism and have elaborated 
theories to explain why the process of ageing has resulted in these deep-seated 
                                                
5 Department for Works and Pensions, ‘The Pensioners’ Income Series United Kingdom 2012/13’ (July 
2014), 14 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/325315/pensioners-
incomes-series-statistics-july-2014.pdf> Accessed 25th September 2015 
6 See the study conducted by Eurage and commissioned by AgeUK, ‘Ageism in Europe, Findings form 
the European Social Survey’ (AgeUK, 2011)  
<http://www.ageuk.org.uk/Documents/EN-GB/For-
professionals/ageism_across_europe_report_interactive.pdf?dtrk=true> Accessed 13th July 2015  
7 Butler R. ‘Ageism’ in Maddox G. et al (Eds) The Encyclopaedia of Aging (Springer, 1995) 22-23 
8 Nelson.T. D. ‘Ageism: Prejudice Against Our Feared Future Self’ (2005) 61(2) Journal of Social 
Issues 207 
9 Palmore E.B. “The Ageism survey: First findings/response’  (2001) 41 The Gerontologist 572  
10 Weiner B., Ota H., Pierson H., Gallois C., Ng S, et al. ‘An Attributional Analysis of Reaction to 
Stigmas’ (1988) 55 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 738 
11 Hagestad G. and Uhlenberg P., ‘The Social Separation of Old and Young: A Root of Ageism”’ 
(2005) 61(2) Journal of Social Issues 343, 350 
12 Equality Act 2010 s.4 
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stigmas.13 North and Fiske have classified these theories according to their point of 
origins, ranging from those borne out of our own individual psyche, to those 
explained by wider socio-cultural changes.14  
 
 
b) Psychological theories  
 
Individual level theories see ageism explained as emanating from the will to protect 
the ego.15 Terror Management Theory, set out mainly by Martens et al16 and Becker, 
17 is based on the idea that the knowledge of our own mortality is ‘a potent threat to 
the human psyche and that people defend against this threat by clinging on to cultural 
systems of belief to maintain a sense of self-esteem’.18 This theory shows that the 
vilification of old age can be explained by the various threats it poses to our ability to 
mitigate our thoughts about frailty, decrepitude and unavoidable mortality through the 
construction of cultural meaning and self-esteem.19 Martens et al identify three types 
of threats that may crystallise into ageism.20 Firstly, ‘the threat of death’ means that 
humans feel threatened by the fact that older people are a vivid representation of their 
own fragility and that they will eventually ‘decay and die’.21 Secondly, the threat of 
‘animality’ is linked to the deterioration of the elderly body, a more indirect reminder 
of the finite nature of our own flesh.22 Lastly, ‘the threat of insignificance’ is the 
perception that old age does not allow for the construction of self-esteem through the 
realization of certain cultural standards, and so opens up the potential for death 
anxiety. We may fear that getting older means that we have to relinquish the status we 
achieved through work or other means of association, or the attributes we ascribe 
value to, such as beauty or physical fitness that have filled our sense of worth during 
                                                
13 North M. and Fiske S., ‘An Inconvenienced Youth? Ageism and Its Potential Intergenerational 
Roots” (2012) 138(5) Psychological Bulletin  982 
14 Ibid 
15 Ibid 984 
16 Martens A., Goldenberg J., Greenberg J., ‘A Terror Management Perspective on Ageism’ (2005) 
61(3) Journal of Social Issues 223 
17 Becker E. The Denial of Death, (Free Press, 1973) 
18 Martens et al (n16) 224 
19 Martens et al. (n16)  
20 Martens et al (n16) 227-229 
21 Martens et al (n16) 227 
22 Isaksen L. W., ‘Towards a sociology of (gendered) disgust’ (2002) 23 Journal of Family Issues 791 
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our lifetime.23 As our culture is very much focused on valuing youth and all that it 
represents (beauty, productivity, strength, agility…), building self-esteem in old age 
may indeed be perceived as an impossible task, triggering ageism rooted in fear. 
 
Some theories set out the premise that it is the action of interacting with older people 
that elicits ageism.24 Research has indeed described how the physical appearance of 
older people may have a ‘negative halo effect’ on others, which means in this case 
that the perceived unattractiveness of the older person is automatically assimilated to 
negative character traits and aptitudes.25 Likewise, the ‘overgeneralisation effect’ 
theory proposes that certain naturally occurring neutral facial traits are wrongly 
interpreted as the signal of an emotion, itself eliciting certain prejudices and 
behaviours.26  For instance, the droopy eyes of an older person can be read as sadness 
and elicit responses congruent with that reading, although the person is not actually 
sad.27  
 
These theories argue that stigmas are influenced by first impressions. This leads on to 
the question of whether the current importance ascribed to physical attractiveness - 
often linked to youthfulness - in social contacts, is contributing to the occurrence of 
negative stigma building about older people.28 Studies have looked at stigma building 
through the perception of negative character traits or physical attributes that are 
rejected by society.29 It has been shown that older women especially try to fight 
ageing through the use of ‘beauty work’ (make up, cosmetic procedures and hair 
colouring), in order to remain visible in an ageist and sexist society.30 ‘Beauty bias’, 
or the bias that may exist against those ‘less physically attractive than the alleged 
ideal’ has been hailed another mechanism of social stratification and exclusion.31 For 
these reasons, it is probably accurate to conclude that the physical appearance of the 
                                                
23 Martens et al (n16) 228 
24 North and Fiske (n13) 984 
25 Langlois J. H. et al, ‘Maxims or myths of beauty? A meta-analytics and theoretical review’ (2000) 
126 Psychological Bulletin 390 
26 Zebrowitz LA. ‘Physical appearance as a basis for stereotyping’ in MacRae N, Hewstone M, Stangor 
C, (Eds). Foundation of stereotypes and stereotyping (Guilford Press, 1996), 79–120. 
27 Montepare J. M. and Zebrowitz L. A., ‘A social-developmental view of ageism’ in Nelson T. D. 
(Ed.) Ageism: Stereotyping and prejudice against older persons (MIT Press, 2004)  
28 Berrie B., The Power of Looks, Social Stratification of Physical Appearance (Ashgate, 2008) 
29 Goffman E., Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity (Prentice-Hall, 1963)  
30 Clarke L. H. and Griffin M., ‘Visible and invisible ageing: beauty work as a response to ageism’ 
(2008) 28(5) Ageing and Society 653 
31 Berrie (n28) 2 
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very old (Chapter II mentions this ‘unrecognizable body’ older individuals refer to) 
plays a prominent role in the construction of negative stigma. 
 
Other theories explain ageism as indirectly rooted in the natural and instinctive 
Darwinian selection process of evolution that favours the survival of the species 
through the fit and young over the burdensome sick and aged.32 A study has shown 
that in a hypothetical scenario where the need to help arose, the young and healthy 
were chosen over the old and the sick.33 This prioritisation of society’s strongest 
members over its more vulnerable has also been explained under a ‘socio-functional 
perspective’ as being motivated by the exclusion of those who can no longer benefit 
the group they belong to.34 This particular view of ageism considers that once a 
person becomes unable, due to their age, to reciprocate the advantages they acquire 
from being part of a group, their inaptitude to carry on contributing to that group’s 
overall success will result in their exclusion.35 
 
 
c) Cultural theories 
 
Ageism can also be explained as a consequence of ‘socio-cultural’ events or practices 
that have led to the irreversible downgrading of the place and the role of the older 
person in contemporary societies. 36  Under the theoretical framework of 
modernisation, as set out by Burgess, 37 or Cowgil, 38 the decline of the status of the 
elderly has been explained by the transition of western societies from traditional and 
agriculture-based to modern and industry-based.  
 
                                                
32 North and Fiske (n13) 985 
33 Burnstein E. et al, ‘Some neo-Darwinian decision rules for altruism: Weighing cues for inclusive 
fitness as a function of the biological importance of the decision’ (1994) 67 Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 773 
34 Cottrell C. A. et al, ‘What do people desire in others? A socio-functional perspective on the 
importance of different valued characteristics’ (2007) 92 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
208 
35 Ibid 
36 North and Fiske (n13) 985 
37 Burgess E. W. (Ed.), Ageing in Modern Societies (University of Chicago Press, 1960)   
38 Cowgil D. O. ‘A theory of aging in cross-cultural perspective’ in D. O. Owfill and L. D. Holmes 
(Eds) Ageing and Modernization (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1972) 
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Modernisation theory links the demise of the elderly person’s place in society to the 
erosion of the extended family because of urbanization and industrialization.39 From 
the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the role of the elderly person as a productive part 
of the family unit was slowly eroded, and the segregation of society by age began its 
irreversible trend.40 Not only did industrialization eventually enabled families to live 
without having to send their children and elderly relatives to work, it also forcibly 
weeded out from the labour market the less productive workers.41 The increased need 
for a mobile, flexible and adaptable labour force post-industrialisation has also been 
cited as a root cause of the devaluation of the role of older people, whose experience 
became relatively less sought after as a result.42 One socio-historical theory has even 
pinpointed the advent of the printing press as the cause of this downwards shift, 
triggering the loss of older people’s function as storytellers and bearers of 
knowledge.43  
 
Advances in medicine also began the categorization of the elderly as a frail, disease-
prone and incurable segment of the population, whilst at the same time enabling more 
and more people to live longer, enlarging the proportion of elderly in society to 
unprecedented proportions. 44  The family changed from a self-sufficient multi-
generational unit, to a smaller entity with far fewer children and a wider gap between 
generations.45 Once an active, productive and important member of the family, the 
elderly person was now regarded in a negative light, as a burden on resources, and the 
living representation of the end of life and all the ills that it entailed.46 The ‘material 
constraints explanation’ justifies the withdrawal of family support for its elders on the 
ground of a lack of resources, of poverty faced by families during industrialization 
                                                
39 Aboderin I., ‘Modernisation and ageing theory revisited: current explanations of recent developing 
world and historical Western shifts in material family support for older people’ (2004) 24(01) Ageing 
and Society 29, 33 
40 Whitton L. S., ‘Ageism: Paternalism and Prejudice’ (1996-1997) 46 DePaul Law Review 453, 458-
459 
41 Ibid 460 
42 Nelson (n8) 
43 Nelson (n8) 
44 Howard P. Chudacoff, How Old Are You? Age Consciousness in American Culture (Princeton 
University Press, 1992) 
45 Whitton (n40) 461 
46 Gratton B., ‘Factories, Attitudes, and the New Deal: The History of Old Age’ in Beth B. Hess & 
Elizabeth W. Markson (Eds.) Growing Old in America, New Perspective on Age, (4th Ed. Transaction 
Publishers, 1991) 
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through inadequate or insufficient employment.47 Studies conducted in developing 
countries have indeed shown that a lack of resources means that support is directed at 
immediate relatives first, spouse and children, to the detriment of older generations.48 
 
Added to this economical shift in the roles of generations, youth eventually became 
the specific and preferred target of advertisers and filmmakers, synonymous with the 
promise of a better society in a new technologically advanced era,49 changing forever 
the high status of the once respected older person.50 More recently the birth of the 
welfare state in the period between the two World Wars has increased the degree of 
separation between generations, associating the idea of retirement and old age with 
economic dependency, 51  and increasing the pressure on the young to fund 
increasingly burdensome pension and public health costs.52 
 
Some have criticized this theoretical approach on ageing as culturally biased towards 
western countries, and glossing over many social complexities. 53  Laslett has 
challenged orthodoxy by indicating that family units were not often multigenerational, 
questioning the idea that the breakdown of the family unit was responsible for the 
demise of the position of the older person in society.54 Fisher’s account disputes the 
timing and so the causes of the shift in attitudes towards the elderly. 55 His research 
traces the origins of the change back to the egalitarian spirit of the Enlightenment era 
of the early 1800s, which resulted in the rejection of unequal age-based hierarchical 
and often patriarchal authority.56  
                                                
47 Craib I. Classical Social Theory (Oxford University Press, 1997) 
48 Golstein M. C., Schuler S. and Ross J. L., ‘Social and economic forces affecting intergenerational 
relations in a third world country: a cautionary tale from South Asia’ (1983) 38 Journal of Gerontology 
716  
49Achenbaum A., ‘Images of Old Age in America, 1790-1970: A Vision and a Re-Vision’ in Mike 
Featherstone & Andrew Wernick (Eds). Images of Aging: Cultural Representations of Later Life 
(Routledge, 1995), 19-23 
50 Laslett P., The World We Have Lost, further explored (4th Ed, Routledge, 2004) 
51  Fineman M.A., ‘”Elderly” as Vulnerable: Rethinking the Nature of Individual and Societal 
Responsibility’ (2012-2013) 20 Elder Law Journal 71 
52 The cost of pensions is the largest in the welfare budget after that of the NHS with an estimated 
spend of £83 billion for the year 2013-14, rising in cash terms and real terms over the last thirty years. 
Office for Budget Responsibility ‘Welfare trends repot’ (October 2014) 
<http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/wordpress/docs/Welfare_trends_report_2014_dn2B.pdf> Accessed 
25th September 2015 
53 Achenbaum (n49) 308 
54 Laslett (n50) 
55 Fisher Hackett D., Growing Old in America (Oxford University Press, 1977) 
56 Ibid 
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Fisher’s account is echoed by those strands of modernisation theory according to 
which ‘the decreased willingness of children to support older parents is seen as a 
result of the erosion of the ethics of ‘familism’ (of which filial obligation is assumed 
to be an integral part), itself a consequence of increasing secularization and the 
growing influence of ‘modern’ values of individualism’.57 Older generations could 
enforce filial obligation through potential ‘economic, familial and religious sanction’ 
because of their high authoritative and powerful status in traditional societies.58 
Beside these sanctions, younger generations also benefited from useful services 
provided by the older generations in the shape of ‘domestic help, advice, child-
minding and education’.59 Aboderin explains that once the status and role of older 
people is lost through the process of ‘education, urbanization and new technologies’, 
this intergenerational exchange has no longer reason to be. 60  Filial obligation 
therefore becomes more bound to the feelings children may have towards their 
parents, potentially leading to diminishing support. 61  Like other theories of 
modernization, however, even this account has been criticized for its lack of empirical 
grounding, and conceptual limitations.62 
 
Modernization has also had some beneficial consequences. Until the early nineteenth 
century, many women were expected to give up their aspiration to a life of their own 
to dedicate it to the care of elderly relatives.63 Although women still perform the bulk 
of caring duties in the UK today,64 modernization followed by the rise of welfarism 
and institutional care post World War II, has had the positive consequence of opening 
up more opportunities for those women who would previously have been destined to a 
life of caregiving. It is also important to note that the current trend to reduce the 
                                                
57 Aboderin (n39) 36 
58 Ibid 37 
59 Ibid  
60 Ibid 
61 Dinkel R. M. ‘Attitudes of children towards supporting the old’ (1944) 9 American Sociological 
Review 370 
62 Aboderin (n39) 41 
63 Abel E. K., Who Cares for the Elderly? : Public Policy and the Experience s of Adult Daughters 
(Temple University, 1991) 
64 In 2011, 57.5 per cent of unpaid carers were women in England and Wales 
Office for National Statistics, ‘Full story: The gender gap in unpaid care provision: is there an impact 
on health and economic position?’ Part of 2011 Census (May 2013) 
< http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/detailed-characteristics-for-local-authorities-in-
england-and-wales/rpt---unpaid-care.html> Accessed 28th September 2015 
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institutionalization of the elderly,65 added to the drive to cut down social budgets as 
part of current austerity measures,66 may revert the pressures back onto families and 
hence still impact women disproportionally. 
 
d) Structural theory 
 
Looking into the future rather than the past, North and Fiske suggest that ageism may 
be brought on by ‘socio-structural tensions’ from intergenerational resentment borne 
out of a growing number of older people in society.67 They anticipate this probability 
based on current theories linking ageism to the sharing of scarce resources and the 
challenge it poses to traditional age progression.68 It is possible that policies such as 
the rising of the pensionable age to address some of the pressures on limited resources 
an ageing population may be a cause for rising tensions between the working young 
and the retired old.69 This is despite the fact that figures show that more and more 
people aged 65 and over are in work,70 making contributions to the economy through 
tax, volunteering work, charity donations and spending.71  
 
Nonetheless, it is currently estimated that the ‘old age dependency ratio’, or the 
number of people over pensionable age per 1000 people in work, is rising. Following 
existing working trends, the ratio, which was 280 in 1971, is likely to be 354 per 1000 
by 2032, and would have been 455 without the raising of the statutory pensionable 
                                                
65 Rostgaard, T., Timonen, V. and Glendinning, C.‘Guest editorial: Reforming home care in ageing 
societies’, (2012) 20 Health & Social Care in the Community 225 
66 Local Government Association and Association of Directors of Adult Social Services ‘Adult social 
care funding: 2014 state of the nation report’( October 2014) 
<http://www.local.gov.uk/documents/10180/5854661/Adult+social+care+funding+2014+state+of+the
+nation+report/e32866fa-d512-4e77-9961-8861d2d93238> Accessed 14th October 2015 
67 North and Fiske (n13) 986 
68 North and Fiske (n13) 987-989 
69 Binstock R. H., ‘Old age policies, politics and ageism’ (2005) 29 Generations 73 
70 16 per cent of people aged between 65 and 74 were working in 2011, compared to only 8.1 per cent 
in 2001 
ONS, ‘What Does the 2011 Census Tell Us About Older People?’ (6th September 2013) 
< http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_325486.pdf> Accessed 29th September 2015 
71 The Women’s Royal Voluntary Service (WRVS) estimates that the net contribution of people over 
65 totalled £40 billion in 2010 after deduction of costs of welfare, pensions and health. 
WRVS, ‘Gold age Pensioners, Valuing the Socio-Economic Contribution of Older People in the UK’ 
(March 2011) 
<http://www.royalvoluntaryservice.org.uk/Uploads/Documents/gold_age_report_2011.pdf> Accessed 
29th September 2015 
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age.72 Higher numbers of elderly people in society may lead to the perception that 
they are diverting the bulk of scarce resources, encroaching onto the ‘traditional 
progression of age’ by doing so.73 These figures assert the belief that the pressure 
exerted on welfare funds by a growing number of older people could jeopardize the 
expectation the young have of reaping the rewards of their social contributions in old 
age.74  
 
The recent recession has also put fuel on the intergenerational divide by highlighting 
how the baby boomers have lived life to the full and left their children facing a bleak 
and uncertain future.75 Questions are being asked as to the long-term viability of 
current pension schemes in the face of this change in demographics.76 It may be the 
case that the young feel they must suffer welfare cuts in order to sustain the lifestyle 
of the wealthier old.77 They may also begrudge the fact that whilst they struggle to 
find work, the old are no longer obliged to vacate the workplace and make room for 
the next generation, following the abolition of the statutory retirement age.78  
 
Despite these gloomy predictions, some have argued that the growing ageing of our 
population may not inevitably trigger an increase in ageism. For instance, research 
findings have mitigated the strength of unequal welfare redistribution as a real cause 
of resentment between the young and old.79 Instead, fluctuating market forces, the 
expansion of consumerism within the welfare sector, and the rise of individualism 
have all been held to influence the lives of the young and old far more that the 
arrangement of supposedly age-biased social policies.80 The sheer number of retirees 
from the post war baby boom era also means that a large transfer of assets and care is 
                                                
72 Pensions Act 2014 s.26 increases pensionable age to 67  
73 North and Fiske (n13) 987-989 
74 Schultz J.H. & Binstock R. H., Aging nation: The economics and politics of growing older in 
America (Paeger/Greenwood, 2006)  
75 Willetts D, The Pinch: How the Baby Boomers Took Their Children’s Future- And Why They Should 
Give it Back (Atlantic Books, 2011) 
76 Esping-Andersen G.’Towards the good society, once again in Esping-Andersen G. (Ed.) Why We 
Need a New Welfare State (Oxford University Press, 2002) 
77 Higgs P. and Gilleard C., ‘Generational Conflict, Consumption and the ageing welfare state in the 
United Kingdom’ (2010) 30(8) Ageing and Society 1439 
78 The Employment Equality (Repeal of Retirement Age Provisions) Regulations 2011 
79 Higgs and Gilleard (n77) 
80 Ibid 1441 
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underway, and these elements contradict the prediction of the rise of intergenerational 
resentment.81  
 
The increased presence and visibility of older people in society may also have a 
positive effect on their status in the eyes of the young. For instance, a higher presence 
of elderly people in society could mean higher levels of intergenerational contact, 
which has been shown to disperse stereotypes.82 It does so by debunking the negative 
traits previously held about the elderly. More elderly people in society could also 
translate into a wider pool from which to construct more positive stereotypical 
subgroups (i.e. the positive stereotype of ‘good grandparents’ as differentiated from 
the negative one of ‘senile old man’).83 Although stereotypes are a stigmatised 
representation of people, the rise of their positive form could have a positive effect on 
the perception of the elderly generally. 
 
Ageism is a complex phenomenon that stems from a variety of causes. It may be 
borne out of individual and deep-seated fears about mortality and the need to 
counteract them through the construction of self-esteem. It may be caused by face-to-
face interactions with our future selves, and the assimilation of the physical aspects of 
the elderly to negative character traits. It may be the result of evolutionary instincts 
that favour the fittest over the weakest for the survival of the specie. It may have 
developed because of historical socio-cultural events that have had the effect of 
downgrading the status of the elderly, and may worsen because of the pressures 
exerted on the young by an ever-enlarging ageing population. Ageism forms an 
integral part of the macro environment institutionalised elderly care exists in, and for 
that reason must be taken into account when considering solutions to realise dignity in 
care. It impacts its realisation on many fronts, and the next paragraphs will explain 
how.  
 
 
 
                                                
81 Ibid 
82 Hale N. M. ‘Effects of age and interpersonal contact on stereotyping of the elderly’ (1998) 17 
Current Psychology 28 
83 Hummert M. L., ‘Multiple stereotypes of elderly and young adults: A comparison of structure and 
evaluations’ (1990) 5 Psychology and Aging 182 
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3) Effects of ageism on dignity 
 
a) Effects on individuals’ identity  
 
Ageism impacts on how individuals in care develop their sense of identity through the 
eyes of others: this is based on the need of recognition for identity formation. Taylor 
suggests three types of ‘politics of recognition’; the first one is a ‘politics of 
universalism’ owed to all individuals on the basis of their human nature, linked to the 
idea of intrinsic human dignity. 84 The second, a ‘politics of difference’, recognizes 
the unique cultural features of each person.85 The third is the recognition of the 
concrete individual borne out of love and friendship, emotions that belong to the 
private realm.86 Honneth believes that each level of recognition provides a person 
with self-confidence, respect and self-esteem.87 Being recognised as an equal to all 
others, but also as a unique individual, has a direct impact on a person’s ability to 
build a sense of identity, an element of dignity. 
 
Ageism produces stereotypes that shape the behaviour we adopt towards the elderly, 
perverting the recognition process. Stereotypes are by definition ‘a widely held and 
oversimplified image or idea of a particular type of person or thing’. 88  
Generalisations homogenise individuals under one group and pre-condition the 
behaviour of those interacting with that particular group. Social psychology studies 
have shown that warmth and competence are essential character traits indicators.89 
According to the creators of the Stereotype Content Model (SCM), the ‘warmth’ 
indicator is defined as the quality of those who are seen as ‘good-natured, trustworthy, 
tolerant, friendly and sincere’, whereas ‘competent’ suggests ‘capable, skillful, 
intelligent and confident’.90 Statistical surveys have shown that elderly people are a 
group classified as ‘warm and incompetent’ on the SCM, based on perceptions of 
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their low competitiveness and low status.91 This shows that stereotypes are not always 
negative. 92  Nevertheless, ‘benevolent ageism – the old is considered ‘warm’– 
perpetuates and legitimizes policies and practices that stigmatize and limit the lives of 
older adults’,93 by triggering certain emotional responses.94 Pity is usually felt towards 
elderly people based on their stereotype profile.95  
 
The sentiment of pity can influence how health and social care professionals interact 
with older individuals. It can for example foster the misconception that residents are 
helpless and dependent.96 It can surreptitiously convince the residents that they are 
indeed in need of assistance.97 This in turn affects people’s sense of identity, playing 
an integral part in preventing the fulfilment of their dignity. Language choices used in 
elderly care settings can also convey pity. The use of ‘overaccommodation’98 and 
‘baby talk’ 99  are two such noticeable consequences of that practice. 
‘Overaccommodation’ simply means that behaviour is overly altered to accommodate 
perceived ageist stereotypes.100  One study showed that care workers in a nursing 
home were talking to the residents in succinct and simple sentences, presumably in 
response to their perception that their interlocutor could not understand complex 
speech forms.101 ‘Baby talk’ means using a similar tone and pitch that one would use 
to talk to babies, a more pronounced and negative form of overaccommodation.102  
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Shifting perception could be beneficial to the people stigmatised because it appears 
that groups that are situated simultaneously on both the high competence and high 
warmth categories of the SCM are less likely to suffer the consequences of 
prejudices. 103  Unfortunately, mixed stereotypes are difficult to shift upwards 
concurrently, because although the warm stereotype is sensitive to change, 
competence is far more resistant to it.104 Experiments on individual perceptions have 
revealed that the more incompetent an elderly person behaved, the more he gained in 
warmth, but it didn’t mean that he gained in competence the more competently he 
behaved. On the contrary, he only lost in warmth.105 It is as though those whose 
behaviour exceed expectations are rewarded by higher warmth for conforming to the 
stereotype model they are assumed to fit in, whilst those who challenge perception are 
punished with lower levels of warmth and no change in competence.106 Disproving 
incompetence by factual evidence to the contrary is not a straightforward path to 
shifting negative stigmatisation.  
 
In recent years the baby boomers generation has been hailed as powering the 
economy and redefining old age not as ‘a fate’, but as a ‘lifestyle’.107 The increase in 
the proportion of elderly people that will make up our population in the future is also 
bound to mean they will have even greater influence and power in society. These 
changes might eventually transform the ‘incompetence’ stigma attached to them into a 
labelling of ‘competence’, but this, as I mentioned above, could also result in 
diminishing the positive ‘warmth’ stigma they attract. This could change how elderly 
people are treated in health and social care settings, and may eventually have a 
positive impact on their sense of dignity.  
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b) Effects on individuals’ self-determination 
 
Grouping people in categories according to their age, or age categorisation, has been 
identified as a potential problem for self-determination.108 Age categorisation is used 
in theoretical thinking and in practice. For instance, although research using age-
based data may be useful in highlighting differences in the treatment of older people, 
it may also have the negative effect of homogenising people’s characteristics by 
compartmentalising individuals within specific but arbitrary age categories. 109 
Homogenisation is said to fuel intergenerational tensions by perpetuating the ‘them 
and us’ divide through the reinforcement of prejudices.110  
 
On a practical level, age categorisation is the actual separation of people through 
different institutions according to their age.111 The lifecourse can be depicted as a 
three-tier system of age segregation, with education, work and leisure reflecting 
defined institutional areas for each age groups.112 Hagestad goes one step further and 
sees institutions as age segregationist, reinforcing the spatial separation of 
generations.113 In this instance nursing homes are described as an ‘extreme version of 
residential age segregation’. This segregation may have an impact on many aspects of 
identity creation: it can stunt participation, alter relationships, and limit autonomy. 
Physical separation may also de-humanise the person by placing her within an 
environment where the person is objectified, no longer seen as an individual but as a 
task to be performed.114 Here, self-determination could be affected by the physical 
removal of the person from their usual place of residence to an institutional setting.  
 
Despite these concerns, there are practical arguments in favour of age specific 
services. Grouping people with similar needs may be far more economical than 
catering for individuals in a multitude of settings. Some individuals also prefer the 
company of their contemporaries, especially in a phase of life where they feel more 
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vulnerable and isolated.115  This is the difference between the appropriateness of age-
differentiated services and the damaging effect of stereotype-based ageist 
behaviours.116 Offering help to an isolated elderly person who needs 24 hour care is 
age-appropriate, whereas delivering it in an environment that stunts individualism and 
fosters helplessness is not.117 Braithwaite reminds us that ‘stepping back to take a 
broader view of our institutional structures for dealing with all types of ‘isms’ may be 
a necessary first step for making progress on addressing ageism’.118 The physical 
segregation of age may be breeding ageism by preventing intergenerational 
contacts.119  
 
c) Effects on individuals’ humanity 
 
In Chapter II, I linked humanity with the idea of equal treatment. Ageism can breed 
inequality, affecting the humanity of the older person in care, and so have a negative 
effect on the possibility of dignity.120 Elderly people are the largest users of health and 
social care services.121 Some have reported that they were treated less well or afforded 
less choice than younger service users.122 Nussbaum et al have highlighted the 
potential ageist bias of using age as an evaluating tool for the prioritization of medical 
treatment.123 This is reflected in practice by the use of Quality Adjusted Life Years 
(QALY) in the determination of medical resource allocation, however old the person 
concerned may be.124 The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence defines 
QALY as ‘a measure of the state of the health of a person or group in which the 
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benefits, in terms of length of life, are adjusted to reflect the quality of life’.125 A 
whole year of full health has a value of 1, death is rated as 0, and partial health will 
have a value between those two numbers. These numbers are used by the NHS as a 
method of outcome measurement in deciding how to best use their resources.126  
 
Although not directly ageist, the maximisation of QALYs has a strong but natural bias 
on youth and has been branded by some as ageist.127 Two arguments have been 
brought forward in the long-standing debate about the merits of QALYs. The first is 
based on the proposition that as ‘older people have enjoyed more life and have less 
life left to enjoy’, it is justified to suggest that ‘age is an ethical objective, and cost 
effective criterion for rationing health care’. 128  This ‘fair innings’ argument 
underscores the idea that it is fairer to invest limited resources to treat a young person 
who has not yet reached their expected natural lifespan (or fair inning), rather than 
spending it to treat an older person who has already reached theirs.129 This has been 
branded egalitarian ageism, where it is recognised that we ought to all be allowed to 
live an averagely equal amount of years, and that therefore treatment should be given 
to those who still have a lot of years yet to live.130  
 
The second argument rests on the idea that using age as a rationing tool will 
ultimately optimise health benefits overall. This is called utilitarian ageism and 
derives from the idea that young people will reap more QALYs from treatment than 
older people because of their longer life expectancy.131 Rivlin rebuts this justification 
by questioning the veracity of the principles underpinning its apparent fairness.132 He 
contends with the idea exposed above that age is an objective criterion that can be 
used to maximise health benefits.133 According to him, this is a fallacy that cannot be 
applied to all, as some elderly people would benefit greatly from certain medical 
interventions even once older than an arbitrarily set age limit. Should the objective of 
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the health system be to maximise health, the benefits a person may gain from a 
particular treatment should not depend on their age only, but be assessed according to 
their particular physiology. 134  For instance, Rivlin replies to the ‘fair innings’ 
argument that the use of age is far too blunt an instrument and should be replaced by 
other more sophisticated and individualistic considerations.135 
 
Rationing health expenditure according to age is complex and fraught with ethical 
dilemma about the intrinsic value of life. 136  The current age-based system of 
healthcare distribution can be read by ethics theorists as promulgating ageism on the 
back of economic efficiency arguments.137 A distributive system based on age alone 
would affect the elderly’s sense of humanity by reinforcing the societal message that 
their life is now less worthy of resources than others. Although age alone may be the 
wrong criterion to go by, the fact that resources are scarce still remains and forces 
some kind of evaluative framework for their effective allocation.  
 
In this respect, the individualisation of prognosis and choice of treatment would 
appear a lot fairer than the use of chronological age only as a tool for rationing 
resources. It would take into account lifestyles and individual preferences, and may 
benefit from more open discussions about the resources available and what they can 
contribute to a person’s own health priorities (be free of pain, being able to walk 
unaided etc.…) for the achievement of quality of life. Treatment should be afforded 
for its ability to help realise a person’s idea of a good life, and be balanced against the 
harm it may cause to realise it.  
 
Beyond impacting people’s dignity through unequal quantity of treatment, ageism 
also has a repercussion on a person’s humanity through the quality of the treatment 
received. Studies have reported that ageist attitudes can inhibit the recruitment of 
medical staff who wish to specialise in the care of older patients,138 and this is 
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promulgated and perpetuated through medical training.139 This may impact negatively 
the quality on the care received by people in institutional settings, which in turn may 
stunt the possibility of dignity. As I argued previously when analysing the importance 
of the person’s environment for dignity to exist, a sufficient number of appropriately 
trained care home staff is essential to the realisation of identity, autonomy and 
humanity of the people cared for.140  
 
Not only is ageism partly to blame for some staffing issues, it has been linked to the 
recurrence of neglect or abuse of the elderly in the institutional sphere. 141. Ageism 
does not per se provoke abuse or neglect, but it is the stereotypes it is based on that 
perpetuate the idea that it is acceptable to treat people as if less worthy than others.142 
Age driven separatism has caused for stereotypes to form and endure. Whitton reports 
that ‘the typical negative stereotypes reported and studied by sociologists, 
psychologists, and gerontologists include beliefs that the old are impaired, 
incompetent, unproductive, depressed, disengaged, inflexible, senile, and lack sexual 
desire’.143 Herring writes that these preconceived ideas held about elderly people can 
have dire consequences. 144 Ageism gives the elderly a negative image of themselves 
and their place in society and so shunts their willingness to speak up and demand 
change. Ageism seems not only to perversely give the caregiver ammunition and 
justification for abuse, it can also take away from the person cared for the ability and 
confidence to question and fight back against abuse. The devaluation of the elderly 
person through their stereotyping appears therefore to justify their maltreatment.145 
Any disregard for the physical and psychological integrity of the person stands as an 
evident violation of their dignity and another negative consequence of ageism for 
those living in care homes.  
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Whether as part of inter-subjective relationships in social care settings, or on an 
institutional level, a pervasive and cross-cultural message remains: old people are 
different, less able, more fragile, and require more welfare resources than their 
younger counterparts. This prejudiced discourse influences the social construct of age, 
which in turn will define how the elderly is treated on an individual basis and as part 
of a defined group.146 I believe that an ageist environment not only partly defines the 
type of institution we assume appropriate for the delivery of long-term aged care, but 
also contributes to the many infractions committed against the dignity of those who 
use them. The fact that society can regard old age in such a stereotypical and negative 
way may indeed go some way to explaining the existence of institutionalised care as 
we know it today, and the reason behind why the treatment some residents receive can 
be damaging to the opportunity of dignity. Becoming aware that ageing is an intrinsic 
part of our human life course and not a disease we wish to avoid catching,147 might 
make us all petition louder for an environment suitable for dignity when we come to 
need it most. 
 
 
4) Law and ageism in long-term aged care 
 
a) Domestic law 
 
The law in the UK plays a role in mitigating the negative effects of ageism. It has, for 
instance, been tackling age discrimination, ‘the practical manifestation of ageism’,148 
in a very formal way, under the Equality Act 2010, based on the non-discriminatory 
principles of the Human Rights Act 1998. The Equality Act potentially lends itself to 
protecting some aspects of dignity in care home settings in three different ways. It 
may do so by forbidding the discriminatory treatment of individuals, by questioning 
the rationing of finite healthcare services on the ground of age, and by making a 
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statutory requirement the consideration of the effect of public body decisions on those 
whose characteristics are protected. 
 
Firstly, equality law can contribute to the protection of identity within the care home 
environment. The Equality and Human Rights Commission’s guidance about the 
rights of social care services users under the Act 149 stipulates that they may expect 
equal treatment by staff irrespective of their particular protected characteristics. That 
is, elderly people in care must be free from discrimination not only on the ground of 
age, but also disability, gender, sexual orientation, religion and ethnicity.150 This 
means that the actions or omissions of service providers should not cause ‘unlawful 
discrimination, harassment or victimisation’ and they should include making 
‘reasonable adjustments’ in the case of disability.151 For instance, the Equality Act 
enhances conditions for dignity by forbidding ageist language that may damage self-
esteem, a component part of identity building. Indeed, section 26(1)(b)(i) of the 
Equality Act 2010 that defines harassment states that the conduct must have the 
purpose of ‘violating’ the person’s dignity. This could in theory include the 
patronizing form of language I mentioned above.  
Secondly, the Equality Act can protect that component of dignity that I referred to as 
humanity directly through non-discriminatory provision of services under section 29 
which came into force in October 2012. The government consultation about this 
provision states that  
[O]rganisations, and individuals, working in health and social care including 
“commissioners” (those, such as doctors who commission services, and all 
providers where they are delivering public services) can continue to treat people 
differently because of their age. However, they will need to show, if challenged, 
that there is a good reason (“objective justification”) for that different treatment. 
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This approach will contribute towards ensuring that high quality, dignified and 
compassionate care services are provided on the basis of need.152  
This caveat implies that the refusal of expensive but dignity-enhancing medical 
treatment may be shown to be a proportionate mean to achieving the legitimate aim of 
overall health benefits maximisation. The use of QALYs by the NHS has been 
deemed by the Department of Health to remain an appropriate tool to assess the value 
of certain medical treatments, and so this provision might prove ineffective to combat 
age discrimination when economics reasons are used to rationalise the rationing of 
dignity enhancing treatment. 153  
Thirdly, the Equality Act also enables adult social care claimants to question, via the 
Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) laid out under section 149 of the Equality Act 
2010, the potentially dignity-damaging effects of public spending cuts. Having due 
regard in public spending decision-making ‘to the need to eliminate discrimination, 
advance equality and foster good relations between those who share a protected 
characteristic and those who do not share it’,154 means to have due regard as is 
‘appropriate in all the circumstances’.155 Circumstances include ‘on the one hand the 
importance of the areas of life of the members of the disadvantaged … group that are 
affected by the inequality of opportunity and the extent of the inequality; and on the 
other hand, such countervailing factors as are relevant to the function which the 
decision-maker is performing’.156 The duty demands a balancing act between the 
needs of those with a protected characteristic, and the pressure imposed on those who 
distribute finite public resources. 
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Recent case law discussing the meaning of the PSED in cases of inequality of 
treatment for the elderly in care gives out mixed messages as to its efficacy to 
improve care quality. In a recent case, two disabled elderly claimants failed to show 
that cuts to the adult social care budgets had been made without the PSED duty in 
mind, resulting in their unfavourable treatment.157 The judge ruled in this instance that 
‘the duty to have due regard does not involve the taking of any prescribed step nor the 
achievement of a result. The regard is what is appropriate in the circumstances, 
namely at a point where the budget was set and a commitment to engage in an impact 
assessment was acknowledged’.158 The judge also stated that ‘having regard to the 
needs of the elderly and the disabled does not exclude other considerations and the 
weight which is to be attached to each consideration’.159 In this case the judge was 
cautious not to impinge on the decision making power of the local authority 
responsible for budgeting all services within tighter parameters.  
 
Some care home operators have been able to demonstrate that the local authority had 
not followed the PSED duty when it had made the decision to reduce the fees they 
paid for care home places. 160 The court in South West Care Homes held that the 
council had failed to consider that the lower fee it was proposing to pay the care home 
could harm residents by deteriorating the quality of care they received, and by 
increasing the risk of relocation they faced due to higher risks of closure.161  
 
Judicial review makes more transparent the decision-making process of local 
authorities by examining whether the impact on protected characteristics was taken 
into account. Nonetheless, it could be argued that as individuals drive the process of 
judicial review, it may limit the overall impact of the PSED in fighting discriminatory 
services. It is worth noting therefore that in a recent case the court held that ‘in a case 
where large numbers of vulnerable people, many of whom fall within one or more of 
the protected groups, are affected, the due regard necessary is very high’.162 The more 
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individuals with a protected characteristics are affected by a public body decision, the 
higher the level of scrutiny ought to be on the discriminatory effects it could have. 
 
The Equality Act is obviously not able to eradicate ageism, an engrained and complex 
societal problem with a multitude of origins. It may be used to challenge and stamp 
down on discriminatory behaviour and service provision, and scrutinise whether the 
decisions made by those responsible for the public funding of care were taken with 
equality in mind.  In this respect, it goes some way in helping the realisation of 
dignity. It does so by forbidding abusive conduct towards care home residents borne 
out of age discrimination, contributing to the protection of the integrity of the 
person’s identity through self-respect. It also does so by forcing service providers and 
public bodies to take equality into account when making welfare decisions, 
preventing the systematic rationing of care services on the ground of ‘fair innings’. It 
plays a part in sending out the message that ageism has no place in society, 
contributing in some way to the recognition of old age as an intrinsic part of the life 
course, and so facilitating identity creation. 163  The Act confronts the ageist 
environment we live in, by publically claiming that old age should not be a 
justification for poorer treatment in health and care services.  
 
Nonetheless, the Equality Act only deals with the manifestation of ageism rather than 
its causes, falling short of addressing deeper ethical considerations. Although it 
protects dignity by forbidding the use of age as a weapon to perpetrate abuse, and by 
attempting to keep the effects of age discrimination in the mind of those who decide 
on the distribution of scarce health and care resources, it cannot stop the prioritization 
of spending that favours the young and certainly cannot prevent the proliferation of 
stigmatising prejudices about the value of the elderly person in society.  
 
 
b) International law 
 
In 1982 the international community concerned with the issues affecting older 
individuals including the problem of age discrimination, publisehd the Vienna 
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International Plan of Action on Ageing following the first World Assembly on 
Ageing organised by the United Nations (UN). 164  In 2002, the second World 
Assembly on Ageing resulted in the Madrid Plan of Action and a Political Declaration 
which specified, under Article 5, the commitment to eliminate age discrimination.165 
In 2010, the UN created an Open-Ended Working Group on Ageing in order to 
strengthen the protection of the human rights of older people.166 Ten years on from 
Madrid, the UN published a Resolution on the Follow-up to the Second World 
Assembly on Ageing, noticing that ‘in many parts of the world, the Madrid Plan of 
Action remains limited or non-existent’.167 Despite this unsatisfactory result, some 
still argue that soft laws alone can be effective in influencing domestic policy, and 
that the current United Nations initiatives for older individuals are already very 
comprehensively covering all issues that concern them specifically.168 
 
It has been suggested that a Convention on the Right of Older People may be the 
solution to filling the gap in national protection laws against discrimination, but so far 
no treaty has been agreed upon.169 Specific international treaties on the rights of 
children, women and the disabled have had positive effects throughout many member 
states, even though they have not completely eradicated the problems they seek to 
address.170 It can be argued that these conventions have precipitated action from states 
and NGOs, and that without them change may have taken longer and gathered less 
momentum.171 It is surprising therefore that a comparable document still has to 
emerge for the protection of the rights of the older person.  
 
Doron voices several concerns as to the creation of such a convention. He advances 
the view that ‘past experience shows that international conventions for human rights 
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create “superficial” legal rights rather than true social change’, because states with 
poor human rights records usually sign such treaties as a show of their human right 
commitment, without actually ever implementing them.172 More pertinent to this 
discussion is the fact that such conventions actually do not create ‘true’ equality 
because they always fail to ask those they concern to take part in their construction.173 
This can result in biased views that omit to represent certain voices within the group 
concerned, or fail to take into account intersectionality in the type of protection 
offered. As I discussed in Chapter III, elderly individuals can be vulnerable on a 
variety of levels beside age, be it their ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation or 
disability.174 Once more, applying a discursive ethical model to the creation of such 
instrument may produce an international human right instrument more appropriate to 
the delivery of substantive equality. 
 
In the same way that I doubt the Equality Act can do much more against ageism, I 
suspect an international human right instrument alone will not be its nemesis. As I 
discussed in Chapter II, older people seem to mistrust the human right discourse, 
associating it with issues far removed from their own concerns.175 A convention on 
the rights of older individuals would undoubtedly add pace to the anti-discriminatory 
discourse, but in order for it to be implemented as a tool to uphold rights, its 
enforcement mechanism will have to be tailored to those whose rights it seeks to 
protect. Doron’s study shows that although the European Court of Human Rights 
hears a relatively small number of cases brought by older individuals (11.9% of cases 
over a ten year period were started by an older applicant, the majority of which were 
born between 1921-1940), a very high proportion resulted in a violation being found 
(91% of the sample of judgments).176 These figures may suggest that older people’s 
access to the courts, whether regional or under international law, needs to be 
improved. 
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5) Anti-ageism Reforms 
 
a) Legal means 
 
Beyond equality laws, other types of interventions could improve the way in which 
we perceive and treat elderly individuals who rely on care. In the healthcare sector, it 
has been suggested that more soft laws and guidelines would reduce discriminatory 
treatment towards the elderly person.177 This could include more guidelines for 
practitioners that focus on respect for older patients. 178  By concentrating on 
improving the way in which the older patient is treated, there may indeed be less 
chances of delivering services that are prejudiced. Such reforms sound helpful, but 
presume a prior commitment to fight ageism in health policies, when the problem 
instead is how to engender that kind of commitment in the first place 
 
Others have argued that courts, in order to truly improve equality, should take dignity 
into consideration as a value in discrimination cases. 179 This may influence the 
decision making process in judicial review cases that examine the application of the 
PSED duty for care funding discussed above. In particular, Moon and Allen reflect on 
‘dignity and the imperative for different treatment’.180 They argue that respect for 
individuals’ dignity ought to be at the core of the equality law requirement to make 
reasonable adjustment where not doing so would put the disabled person at a clear 
disadvantage.181 They argue that dignity, if kept in mind as a discreet value, can help 
decision-makers operationalize the rule of equal treatment that dictates that similar 
situations are to be treated similarly but different situations are to be treated 
differently.182  
 
This rule, they suggest, falls short of explaining when two individuals are in the same 
situation, and is silent as to the nature of the different treatment when they are in 
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different situations.183 They suggest that dignity can be the answer. A person who is 
disabled ought to be treated differently and material adjustments made if not doing so 
would undermine the equality of her dignity.184 In the same way, when the person’s 
disability has no impact on the situation at hand, then equal dignity demands that 
treatment be equal.185 I believe that the provision of care for the frail dependent 
elderly is akin to reasonable adjustment. Admittedly, the effectiveness of Moon and 
Allen’s solution turns on how clearly the notion of dignity is apprehended and 
articulated. In this dissertation, however, I have taken pains precisely to specify the 
content of dignity for elderly people in care. The dignity of the person, as understood 
in this dissertation, offers a benchmark according which to gauge whether those 
adjustments are being made appropriately. 
 
Indeed, if the concept of dignity is not rigorously specified, it can be used to 
rationalise rather than combat ageist practices. In the case of Seldon, pre Equality Act, 
the Supreme Court had to decide on the legitimacy of the aims pursued by a forced 
retirement.186 Here the court held compulsory retirement had the legitimate aim to 
‘avoid the need to dismiss the older workers on the grounds of incapacity or 
underperformance, thus preserving their dignity and avoiding humiliation, and as 
avoiding the need for costly and divisive disputes about capacity or 
underperformance’.187 This assumption, as Vickers points out, seems ‘suspect and 
based on irrational prejudice and stereotypical ageist assumptions as to older workers’ 
capabilities’.188 This case highlights the importance of the meaning given to dignity. 
In order not to have paternalistic and ageist undertones, it must be understood from 
the perspective of the person concerned, and not be allocated an objective value. 
Ageist bias distorts the meaning of dignity. In the next section of this chapter I will 
suggest other means to stamp down ageism responsive to its deeper causes explored 
above. 
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b) Socio-cultural means 
 
Martens et al suggest that one of the keys to reducing ageism is to accept our own 
mortality.189 To this effect, they suggest a better education on the subject of death 
(although beneficial, these classes have not been proven a direct solution to 
ageism). 190  Beliefs based on religions such as Buddhism, which focus on the 
acceptance of the ephemerality and passing of life, are other ways of lessening the 
fear of death by detaching ourselves from the value systems we build in our lives.191 
They suggest that western existentialist philosophers such as Sartre have also argued 
for the liberating feelings that come with transcending our own mortality, freeing the 
individual to seek meaning in life elsewhere.192  
 
Living within a culture more accepting of death may indeed have a positive effect on 
how we regard ageing, but might be difficult to achieve. Another solution could be to 
find sources of self-esteem that do not lead to ageism.193 Should ‘activities that are 
associated with death provide a culturally valued basis for self-esteem’, then mortality 
anxiety would diminish. 194  Solutions include taking a ‘limited future time 
perspective’.195 Doing so, even when we are young, should make us seek out more 
meaningful and immediately rewarding relationships (rather than those sought by the 
young for the benefits they may them bring in the future), and invest in ‘generativity’ 
or the investment into future generations through the provision of knowledge, skills or 
goods.196 This would transform the process of ageing into a source of self-esteem and 
so prevent it from becoming the cause of ageism. Alternatively or additionally, young 
people could gain comfort from the knowledge that ageing may bring self-esteem 
through, for instance, emotionally rewarding relationships.197  
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Another way to find sources of self-esteem in ageing is the ability to change one’s 
perspective and take that of the older person’s.198 This has been shown to reduce the 
tendency to create stereotypes about the elderly.199 This could only work if the older 
person were to be regarded as a valued part of society. Martens suggests that one way 
of achieving this may come from the better integration of the elderly individual within 
families through better role distribution, such as that of counsellor and advisor.200 
Aspiring to such respected status may no longer make us fear ageing but make us look 
forward to it as a rewarding chapter of our life.201  
 
In response to the problem of age segregation and the way in which it breeds ageist 
attitudes, Hagestad and Uhlenberg recommend ‘stable lasting interactions’ within an 
age-divers environment.202 They envisage that although the creation of identity may 
be the result of a sense of belonging to one specific group, this emphasis on grouping 
neglects the potential benefits of sharing mutual interests with people from other 
groups (in this instance older people sharing their interests with younger ones). This 
interaction could blur the lines of group structures and allow for the ‘them and us’ 
categorization to fade.203 Harding et al refer to this process as ‘the acceptance of other 
individuals in terms of their common humanity, no matter how different they may be 
from oneself’.204  
 
The law could play a role in bringing about these cultural shifts by furthering 
generational integration. Planning law reforms could facilitate the construction of 
mixed-use care facilities that are built not only for the purpose of looking after the 
dependent older person, but also as a community hub for other generations to use. In 
the Netherlands, for instance, students can live rent-free in care homes in exchange 
for their help looking after the residents.205 Educational links could be made between 
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schools and mentors in homes, reinforcing those links already made now by schools 
visiting care homes.206 Laws could be put in place to incentivise such ventures or 
simplify their realisation. It is the physical rapprochement of generations that may 
break down the psychological barriers and stigma perpetuated by ageism. In the 
health care sector it has been suggested that law could play a part in achieving this 
aim, but it is dependent upon the will of policy makers, service providers and future 
service users.  These legal reforms suggest the need for a deeper ethical change in the 
political domain, one that integrates the importance of dialogue and the recognition of 
the other. 
 
 c) Ethical means 
 
The ubiquity of liberalism may be intrinsically linked to the phenomenon of ageism. 
Grounded in the paradigm of the fully functioning man, liberalism in its purist form 
hails a particular form of autonomy as the ultimate political value. It can be argued 
that in that respect liberalism fails to consider those individuals at the margins, who, 
like elderly people in care, are unable to abide by the particular model of autonomy it 
embraces. The discursive ethical model that I have adopted to justify the need to 
engage dialogically with individuals to understand dignity, arcs back to the 
recognition of ‘the concrete other’.207 It is based on a feminist perception of the 
individual that recognises our relational nature and the vital need we have to be linked 
with others to form our autonomy.  
 
This ethical model acknowledges that we are relationally autonomous and inherently 
vulnerable, and so contrasts sharply with the ethics of justice’s founding pillar of 
autonomy understood as freedom from interference. Although it has been argued that 
an ethics of justice need not exclude a propensity for the virtue of benevolence, I 
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would argue that it does so inevitably with an undertone of paternalism.208 It suggests 
that there are two categories of individuals: those who function ‘properly’ and benefit 
from the value system liberalism espouses, and ‘the other’, such as the very old, who 
need assistance. It may be that an ethics of justice instils ageism by presenting the 
elderly person as out of the liberal loop, a stranger to its reigning value system. 
Instead of trying to know ‘the other’ through dialogical engagement, as a relational 
ethics supposes, it may be that a system based on the ethics of justice shunts ‘the 
other’ because of its inability to conform to the autonomous ideal. This conclusion 
would mean that in order to address ageism, a social conversion factor for dignity, the 
dominant ethical system of justice would need to embrace a more inclusive, 
discursive and relational stance. This is change at the deepest level of society and 
requires far more than legal reforms. 
 
 
6) Conclusion 
 
Treating people less well because of their advanced chronological years 
surreptitiously sends out the message that they are no longer full members of that 
society. Fear of death and disgust of our potentially ‘unrecognizable bodies’ can lead 
us to treat those who trigger those feelings as reassuringly unlike us. Being considered 
by society as a group less worthy than the rest of humanity is bound to affect the 
dignity of older people in care, especially at a time in life where interactions with 
others are essential to its achievement. Dignity as conceptualised in Chapter II rests 
on the possibility of identity formation, self-determination and the respect of one’s 
humanity. The fundamental basis of this conceptualisation is dialogical engagement 
between policy makers and those who live in long-term institutional aged care. In 
order to appreciate how these values can be fulfilled under the circumstances of 
institutionalised dependency, the will to interact and understand individuals in care is 
essential. The problem is that if stereotypes about the elderly persist, stereotypes that 
tell us that they are incompetent, frail and incapable, the adoption of a discursive 
ethical model in our understanding of dignity for the elderly in care is unlikely.  
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Our negative attitudes towards the older person can stem from our deep-seated fear of 
death.  The old reflects back at us our own mortality. Ageism can also be explained 
by the loss of the older person’s place in society, and by processes that have broken 
down little by little the links that were binding generations together. Nowadays, by 
choice or by circumstances, the care of the frail elderly is often no longer considered 
the responsibility of the family. Older individuals have become a burden, with a lesser 
role to play with the younger generations they used to educate, provide for and advise. 
Resources have also become scarcer than at other times in recent history, directing 
those left to the closest kin and away from the dependent elderly. The causes of 
ageism are complex and intertwined, making its eradication difficult.  
 
Equality laws currently in place to mitigate the negative effects of discrimination on 
the ground of age forbid certain behaviour and require public bodies to consider the 
effect of their decision on those whose characteristics are protected. The Equality Act 
forces public bodies to make their decisions with equality in mind. This is particularly 
important for those who have to bear the consequences of the rationing of health 
budgets. The process of judicial review gives individuals the possibility of examining 
whether the decision makers took equality into account. International efforts to bring 
awareness of those discriminatory issues that affect older individuals have stopped 
short of setting up a new Convention for the right of the older individual. But I have 
suggested that substantive equality required more than equality laws. 
 
I have argued that although equality laws bring to the fore the issue of ageism and 
make illegal its practice, they stop short of tackling substantive inequality. Other 
means, such as that of soft laws in health care, or the use of dignity as a parameter to 
bear in mind in discrimination cases may help move equality rights in more 
substantive directions.  I have also argued that trying to reduce ageist attitudes 
requires a move towards generational integration. Laws can facilitate the creation of 
institutions and initiatives that bring generations closer together, but this depends on 
the political will to do so. This type of anti-ageist approach rests on the belief that 
there is no ‘them and us’, but rather ‘they are us’.
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Conclusion 
          
 
In this dissertation, I have argued for the use of a subjective understanding to dignity 
in elderly care – that is to say, dignity as understood by the individual cared for – as a 
better basis for social policies. I have argued that such a conceptualisation of dignity 
can guide the legal obligation of dignity in the delivery of care services for older 
individuals. I set out to justify this approach by rooting dignity in relational autonomy 
understood as a process undertaken by all individuals throughout their life course. 
Using qualitative social studies conducted on the topic of the meaning of dignity for 
the older person, I concluded that dignity covered the themes of identity, self-
determination and humanity. Inspired by the capability theory,1 I then set out what I 
believe to be the main conversion factors relevant to dignity defined in this way – 
namely the multi-dimensional vulnerability of the person in long-term aged care, the 
regulations controlling the institutional environment the person lives in and the 
treatment of the older person by society. 
 
This dissertation has also examined the role played by law in creating conditions 
amenable to dignity. I have therefore looked into whether and how legal provisions 
and the judicial process influenced the conversion factors to dignity referred to above. 
The criminal, human rights and safeguarding laws protecting vulnerable individuals; 
the regulatory model controlling care homes: anti-discrimination laws dealing with 
ageism - all of these have an impact on the possibility of dignity for the individual 
who lives in care facilities. In each chapter, I have examined whether current legal 
measures dealing with those conversions factors - namely the presence of personal 
vulnerability, the institutional environment of the care home, and the social 
phenomenon of ageism - could be amenable to dignity.  
 
I have found that several conditions were important for dignity in care to be a 
possibility, and that laws could, sometimes but not always, help set out these 
conditions. Firstly, I argued that in order to make dignity a priority in care, it ought to 
be defined by those concerned under a discursive ethical model. Contrary to the 
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Kantian idea that dignity is rooted in an idea of autonomy that is free of all human 
emotions and borne out of pure rationality,2 I have anchored dignity in a feminist 
view of autonomy that relates to the embodied individual and is acquired through 
relationships.3 This version of autonomy is inclusive of, but not solely dependent on, 
a view of personhood anchored in rational agency. It embraces an idea of the 
individual that is vulnerable, embodied, and interconnected with others. This 
conceptualisation of concrete individuals connected to one another demands that to 
know and care for the ‘concrete other’, one has to engage in dialogue.4 This means 
that the first condition for dignity is the development of a meaning that is experiential 
and subjective. This way of understanding dignity respects the person in front of us, 
without assuming anything on their behalf.  
 
The second condition for dignity I put forward is the way in which individuals, 
institutions, and the state perceive and hence treat the person in care. The way in 
which elderly individuals in care are thought of is important because it conditions the 
type of legislation that will shape the experience of care. It will for instance influence 
self-determination, an element of dignity, by legally defining the boundaries between 
the possibility of autonomous decision-making, and the duty of the state to protect 
those at the mercy of dependency. Thus I submitted that vulnerability, a personal 
factor to dignity, ought to be recognised as inherent and universal to all human 
beings, so as to avoid the homogenisation of older individuals into a group, and treat 
that group in a paternalistic way.5 In order to make policies responsive to that 
vulnerability, I have argued that it was important to develop this understanding of 
universal vulnerability further. The person in care ought to be recognised as someone 
with multi-dimensional vulnerability. Inherently, situationally and ‘pathogenically’ 
vulnerable,6 the person in care must be seen as more than just an old person who 
needs to be kept safe. For instance, an intersectional approach to vulnerability is 
                                                
2 Kant I., Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (trans. Mary J. Gregor) Practical Philosophy 
(Cambridge University Press, 1997) 
3 Nedelsky J., Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2012) 
4 Benhabib S., ‘The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and 
Feminist Theory’ in S. Benhabib and D. Cornell (Eds.) Feminism as Critique (Polity Press, 1987) 
5 Fineman M.A., Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency (The New Press, 2005) 
6  Mackenzie C., ‘The Importance of Relational Autonomy and Capabilities for an Ethics of 
Vulnerability’ in C. Mackenzie, W. Rogers and S. Dodd (Eds.) Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics 
and Feminist Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2013) 
 229 
needed where the person’s gender, sexual orientation and ethnic background must be 
taken into account. I then reviewed the current legal means available to protect that 
multi-dimensional vulnerability in order for dignity to be a possibility. This meant 
reviewing how criminal, human rights and safeguarding laws could offer the 
possibility of identity, self-determination and respect for humanity.  
 
I found that criminal laws embraced a universal idea of vulnerability, were responsive 
to situational vulnerability, and were primarily (but not exclusively) better at 
protecting older individuals from physical harm. I then turned my attention to the 
protection against vulnerability offered by human rights laws under Article 8 and 3. I 
concluded that the protection offered by Article 8 was not absolute and that thresholds 
for triggering Article 3 were high. I also suggested that older individuals did not feel 
particularly concerned by the human rights discourse, diminishing its potential 
usefulness as a tool to protect vulnerability. I examined in more details the role of 
Article 8 in the context of dignity in the case of McDonald. This case illustrated how 
its use was limited by the application of a wide margin of appreciation in matters of 
publically funded services. The McDonald case also highlighted how the statutory 
duties local authorities were under in their social care function influenced the 
conceptualisation of dignity. I concluded that the new statutory duty of wellbeing 
created by the Care Act 2014 could in time foster the development of a more 
subjective understanding of dignity. 
 
In the following chapter I continued to explore the compatibility of legal provisions 
set to protect individuals from the effects of vulnerability with conditions amenable to 
dignity. In this particular chapter I reviewed the main measures set out to protect 
vulnerability through intervention under safeguarding laws, capacity and best interest 
determination rules under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, as well as laws and 
safeguards regarding restraint practices. I argued that legal provisions concerned with 
capacity and best interest determination were taking relational autonomy into account, 
but that they could give even more weight to the views of the incapacitated person. I 
discussed the potential impact Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities could have in doing so.7  This new approach assumes capacity rather 
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than tries to establish it, and seeks to offer support to anyone who wishes to make 
decisions.  
 
The third condition I suggested should be satisfied for dignity to be possible relates to 
the regulatory framework that controls the care home environment. I suggested that I 
submitted here that residents ought to be able to take part in the design of the 
regulatory outcomes that controlled the operations of care homes. I argued that 
imposing a regulatory framework without consulting those impacted by it could 
frustrate the possibility of identity, self-determination and respect for humanity 
because it implied that the person cared for had no part to take in the running of the 
institution they lived in. I suggested that the CQC also ought to engage with those 
who lived out their days in care homes to find out from them whether regulatory 
outcomes were being fulfilled. Accountability to the individuals in care ought to be a 
feature of the regulatory model in place. As I have quoted before, an institution that 
ignored the voices of those it takes care of may run the risk of becoming a ‘total 
institution’, one that ‘isolates, controls and reconstitutes the daily lives of their 
residents’.8 I argued that the adoption of a risk-based model of governance in care 
settings was not necessarily favourable to the development of dignity. I exposed that 
as risk-based regulations sought to rationalise the diminution of harm in the irrational 
world of caring relationships, they could stunt the possibility of meaningful and 
dignity enhancing relationships to develop between staff and those they cared for.  
 
The fourth condition I set out was that of anti-ageism. The way in which society 
considers and so treats older people in general affects their ability to form a sense of 
identity, influence their daily lives in institutions, and their status in the eyes of others. 
This is why I consider ageism to be a social conversion factor to dignity of the older 
person in care. I looked into the many causes of ageism. I found out that some were 
embedded in our psyche and linked to our primeval instincts for survival, whilst 
others were likely to be cultural and the result of the way in which the family group 
had evolved. The fact that we now live longer, benefit from social security and work 
away from the home has meant that the family unit is no longer the place where care 
for the very old is expected to be delivered. Although many carers are still family 
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members,9 a considerable number of older individuals now rely on professional and 
institutional carers. I have examined the role of equality laws in the fight against age 
discrimination and the positive duty put on local authorities to consider the impact of 
their decision on those whose characteristics are protected. I have concluded that 
dignity realisation as understood in this dissertation ought to be an intrinsic part of 
equality laws, and that initiatives to interweave generations may lessen our innate fear 
and rejection of old age. Although equality laws play an important part in stamping 
down the negative effects of age discrimination on dignity, I have argued that a 
cultural shift in our relationship with old age also needs to happen for dignity in care 
to flourish.  
 
Care homes should offer living conditions that allow us to experience dignity. Dignity 
is a feeling we become conscious of when it is taken away, or chipped at, when it is in 
the hands of others. Similarly, when all is well, ‘our body is simply the vehicle for 
achieving ends in the world and is transparent to our intentions’.10 When our body 
becomes weak and overcome by disability or illness, the usual functioning of our day-
to-day life becomes dependent on others. Dialogue becomes essential, as the 
perception of the help we require to achieve our ends may not be the same as that of 
the person providing care.11 A third party, regardless of how well intentioned, cannot 
fathom, without engaging with us directly, what makes us who we are, what decisions 
we would like to make about our day to day life and the way we would like to be 
treated. Respecting a person’s dignity ought to begin with the willingness to interact 
with that person so as to get to know who they are and what they want. It is only 
through this knowing process that we can hope to create conditions that will allow for 
dignity to be realised.  
 
I believe that upholding the understanding of dignity I argue for in this dissertation 
turns it into a valuable concept, one that can serve as a guide to care that respects the 
person. It is a claim for treatment that enables us to form and hold on to a sense of 
identity, that allows us to make decisions about our lives, and that values the person 
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that we are on the ground of our humanity. A care home that manages to create 
conditions that allow for dignity to be experienced is a place where residents have a 
stake in how the environment they live in is run, are engaged with on an equal 
footing, where they have the possibility to discuss their past, present and future, their 
care, their daily lives and their preferences. It is a place where care professionals are 
valued, rewarded and trained adequately. A place led by individuals who understand 
what matters to the people they care for and takes that into account when delivering 
care to them in a safe manner.  
 
The role of law in establishing such conditions is important. Throughout this 
dissertation I have referred to the wellbeing principle enshrined under the Care Act 
2014, and the potential it represents in embracing a more person-centred idea of 
dignity. Its judicial interpretation, if true to a genuinely person-centred conception of 
care, could bolster a discursive meaning of dignity. The power of judicial 
interpretation to give real weight to the wishes of the person cared for can already be 
seen in the judicial application of the principles underpinning the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005.12 Although the meaning of the wellbeing principle under the Care Act 2014 
has yet to be settled by the courts, it may become another legal tool used to reinforce 
the importance of the views of the person in care. On an international level, the advent 
of the CRPD, and more particularly that of Article 12, which establishes a 
presumption of capacity for all, is also bringing a new perspective on the importance 
of the voice of those individuals who need others to thrive, and how laws can help 
facilitate these voices to be heard.  
 
Clements nonetheless writes that ‘judgments must, when the usual ‘due process’ tools 
fail, include that most judicially ridiculed of instrument – the cri de coeur: the simple 
statement that - no matter how rational the process; no matter how pressing the need; 
no matter how politically charged the context - ‘this cannot be’: the ‘revulsion’ 
option’.13 This is why our understanding of dignity needs to come from the person 
claiming it. My suggestion is that if our - and the courts’ - understanding of dignity 
comes from the persons claiming it, it is less likely that the courts will abdicate their 
                                                
12 See for instance the cases of Re: S and S, C v V [2008] EWHC B16 (Fam) and A London Authority v 
JH [2011] EWCOP 2420 discussed in Chapter IV 
13 Clements L., ‘Disability, dignity and cri de coeur’ [2011] 6 European Human Rights Law Review 
675, 685 
 233 
responsibility to denounce violations of dignity that would be permissible under other 
- judicially favoured - standards and arguments, such as pressing needs, rationality of 
the process, and deference to legislatures on matters of controversial social policy.    
 
Finally, I would like to address the main criticisms that I think this dissertation may 
provoke. Asking elderly individuals to define dignity and implementing those 
findings in the legislative framework of social care and in judicial and extrajudicial 
decision-making processes care may come across as unrealistic and too expensive to 
achieve. I do not believe it unrealistic to finding out the meaning of dignity from a 
subjective point of view in order to help build a framework with which to work from. 
It would indeed be unrealistic to use every response given to the question of the 
meaning of dignity as a definition to implement in social care settings. Yet, many 
individuals in care appear to share the same main ideas about the meaning of dignity, 
as I showed in Chapter II. Individuals may find one area (identity, self-determination 
or humanity) to be more essential to them, and how they manage to fulfil it will again 
vary from person to person. Gathering and comparing the views on dignity of elderly 
people in care is meant to provide a framework that can help build regulations, and 
persuade institutions to include residents in their implementations. It is meant to guide 
safeguarding and capacity laws. It is supposed to engage a multi-generational 
dialogue. A society willing to truly listen to the voices of those it usually assumes as 
voiceless is a society that creates conditions fertile for dignity.  
 
This point brings me to the second argument against the idea of using subjective 
dignity in order to ground social care policies, the one that sees it failing on cost. The 
response to this objection is that seeking the participation of those who are dependent 
on care to establish the meaning of dignity as a basis of social care legislation is not 
the same as channelling unlimited resources and deploying every means possible 
towards the end of realising dignity. It is clear that someone with ‘champagne tastes’, 
as Dworkin refers to in his argument against equality of welfare, ought not receive 
more resources than others, and the same principle applies in order for dignity to be 
realised. It is doubtful that frail individuals – individuals who are at the very end of 
their lives – would have extravagant requests in order to fulfil their need for their 
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sense of identity to thrive, their self-determination to exist, and their humanity to be 
respected.14  
 
On the other hand, it is possible that an older person in care who is to have a stake in 
the shape of her daily life within a care institution may, for example, be privileging 
certain aspects of her life over health and safety concerns. A system responsive to her 
views would readjust its priorities accordingly. I believe that a system of care home 
regulation and social care laws inspired by a concept of dignity borne out of 
discussions with those whose lives they shape would create a care environment that 
would truly give precedence to the dignity of the person. The wellbeing principle 
enshrined in law under section 1 of the Care Act 2014, as well as the SCIE’s guiding 
work about dignity,15 are some of the signs that the conceptualisation of dignity 
argued for here may one day be upheld. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
14 Dworkin R., ‘What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare’ (Summer 1981) 10(3) Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 185, 189 
15 Cass E., Robbins D. and Richardson A., ‘Dignity in care’ Social Care Institute for Excellence 
(March 2009)  
< http://www.hscbusiness.hscni.net/pdf/SCIE-_Dignity_in_care_March_2009_pdf.pdf> Accessed 7th 
February 2018 
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